Over the month following the unsuccessful June 17 attack on Aideed's compound in Mogadishu, the 1-22nd Infantry conducted several raids aimed at capturing the Somali warlord. Yet having been alerted that he was a wanted man, Aideed went underground. He reorganized his intelligence service, purging suspected double agents or using them to spread disinformation regarding his movements. He changed his location once or twice a night, masquerading as a sheikh, a woman, an old man, an Islamic mullah, or a hospital patient. He appeared on television, weary yet defiant, declaring: “I’m not concerned by the search being conducted now. They are trying to arrest me unjustly.”
As the tempo of the strategic manhunt intensified, Aideed and the SNA kept the military pressure up, increasing their sniping at UN forces. On July 2 Aideed’s men attacked an Italian checkpoint, killing three and wounding 24. Five days later six Somali UN employees died in an ambush. And on July 9, the SNA lobbed the first mortar rounds into the U.S. embassy compound that housed the American QRF.
Saturday, July 9, 2011
Friday, July 8, 2011
"Joker" Bombs and the Dangers of Over Reliance on Technology
On Wednesday it was reported that terrorists may begin surgically implanting bombs inside militants bodies in order to evade airport detection devices. And if you're thinking this sounds vaguely familiar, yes, this is straight out of the scene in The Dark Knight in which the Joker blows up the Gotham City police headquarters via a bomb implanted in an unwitting henchman.
Will Saletan of Slate writes a well-linked piece explaining why current scanner technology would be unable to detect these bombs, and that we are therefore vulnerable until we develop a technology capable of seeing completely through a person to detect any foreign object.
To me, this illustrates a point in my book, which is that we are over reliant on technology in our counterterrorism efforts. I don't mean to imply that technology plays no role in manhunting, only that satellites and eavesdropping technology can not locate every terrorist, and work best when supplementing human intelligence. Similarly, passive defensive technologies are most effective when backing up well-trained security personnel that possess good judgment.
It is telling that Saletan never even considers this human dimension (in his telling, humans are automatons that only act when the scanners tell them to), or the fact that certain types of profiling (shhhh!) . . . i.e. past travel itineraries, age groups, physical "tells" . . . can be effective where technology fails. But because of our reliance on technology (okay, and probably political correctness) Saletan never discusses these as possibly effective methods for ferreting out terrorists carrying surgically implanted bombs.
If we conducted offensive counterterrorism in a similar manner (i.e. only targeted terrorists positively identified by satellite before striking), Osama bin Laden and countless other bad guys would still be alive.
Will Saletan of Slate writes a well-linked piece explaining why current scanner technology would be unable to detect these bombs, and that we are therefore vulnerable until we develop a technology capable of seeing completely through a person to detect any foreign object.
To me, this illustrates a point in my book, which is that we are over reliant on technology in our counterterrorism efforts. I don't mean to imply that technology plays no role in manhunting, only that satellites and eavesdropping technology can not locate every terrorist, and work best when supplementing human intelligence. Similarly, passive defensive technologies are most effective when backing up well-trained security personnel that possess good judgment.
It is telling that Saletan never even considers this human dimension (in his telling, humans are automatons that only act when the scanners tell them to), or the fact that certain types of profiling (shhhh!) . . . i.e. past travel itineraries, age groups, physical "tells" . . . can be effective where technology fails. But because of our reliance on technology (okay, and probably political correctness) Saletan never discusses these as possibly effective methods for ferreting out terrorists carrying surgically implanted bombs.
If we conducted offensive counterterrorism in a similar manner (i.e. only targeted terrorists positively identified by satellite before striking), Osama bin Laden and countless other bad guys would still be alive.
Wednesday, July 6, 2011
The First Review!!!
From Kirkus Reviews (subscription required), which along with Publishers' Weekly and Library Journal is one of the three key trade publications of the publishing industry:
WANTED DEAD OR ALIVE (reviewed on July 1, 2011) The recent demise of Osama bin Laden serves as an appropriate coda for former Defense Department and National Security Council staffer Runkle's (co-author: Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority, 2009, etc.) history of the manhunt in American military strategy.With the bin Laden hunts, the author downplays what Clinton and his administration tried to do from 1997 to ’98, while providing Bush I's team with the benefit of the doubt—e.g., in bin Laden's escape from Tora-Bora in 1991. His preferences are understandable, however, as he demonstrates how such partisanship has been an included feature of countless manhunts, often with military consequences. At the end of the Indian Wars, with one quarter of the U.S. Army in the hunt, Grover Cleveland had a personal interest in bringing the “monster” Geronimo to account. In the Philippines at the turn of the century, the fate of the “demonized” Emilio Aguinaldo was affected by the 1900 election between William Jennings Bryan and William McKinley. Intervening in Mexico's civil war prior to World War I to hunt for Pancho Villa, President Wilson found he could not withdraw without giving the Republicans an issue in the 1916 elections. Militarily, Runkle's 12 manhunts illustrate key features of counterinsurgency or asymmetrical warfare strategy, and indicate how America's military leadership, and its thinking, has been shaped through the succession of such hunts and campaigns. The author provides a focus on the necessity of what Colin Powell called creating “a flesh and blood villain” to crystallize political support.Going behind the headlines, Runkle provides worthwhile background and context for understanding current wars and how they are fought.It is interesting to see some basic things they get wrong, but since it is an overall positive review, I won't quibble.
Tuesday, July 5, 2011
"The Man Who Hunted Osama bin Laden"
A great piece today by AP writers Adam Goldman and Matt Apuzzo on the unnamed CIA analyst who led the hunt for Osama bin Laden. The article illustrates just how much uncertainty there was in identifying the Abbottabad compound as bin Laden's hideout, what a significant risk the Agency took in presenting this to the White House as such, and yes, the guts it took for President Obama to order the raid that killed the Saudi mastermind.
It also illustrates the importance of perseverance in manhunting. Excluding the hunt for bin Laden, which at 13 years was an obvious outlier, the average successful strategic manhunt lasts 18 months. According to Goldman and Apuzzo, it took three years from the decision to focus on Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti before he turned up on a National Security Agency wiretap. Again, only the four-year pursuit of Pablo Escobar lasted longer than the lag in waiting for a lead in the bin Laden hunt.
It is a pity -- albeit an understandable one -- that a hero such as "John" should remain anonymous for the rest of his life.
It also illustrates the importance of perseverance in manhunting. Excluding the hunt for bin Laden, which at 13 years was an obvious outlier, the average successful strategic manhunt lasts 18 months. According to Goldman and Apuzzo, it took three years from the decision to focus on Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti before he turned up on a National Security Agency wiretap. Again, only the four-year pursuit of Pablo Escobar lasted longer than the lag in waiting for a lead in the bin Laden hunt.
It is a pity -- albeit an understandable one -- that a hero such as "John" should remain anonymous for the rest of his life.
Saturday, July 2, 2011
Today in Manhunting History -- July 2, 1927: "The Sandino Affair" Begins
Initially, U.S. officials did not perceive Sandino to be a significant threat. Sandino had not attempted to stop the occupation of Jinotega, San Rafael, and Ocotal as the Marines restored civil government throughout Nicaragua. Combined with his requests for an American military governor, U.S. officials believed persuasion could still work on Sandino. Even if persuasion failed, General Feland viewed Sandino’s band as only one of several groups of “bandits operating near the Honduran border, none of which were seen as a substantial barrier to peace and the elections of 1928. Moreover, since Tititapa, desertions had left Sandino with less than 30 men under arms, and Feland was confident the rebel’s force would eventually disintegrate altogether
On May 31, 50 Marines under Major Harold Pierce left Managua to establish control over Nueva Segovia and to “peaceably disarm everybody.” Yet there was no desire “to make heroes out of a copule of cattle thieves by chasing them through the jungles with a squad of Marines.” Thus, Feland instructed Pierce to “secure information that will facilitate the coming supervision of elections, but do not fire a shot inless imperatively necessary; and conciliate with firmness, tranquilize without force of arms, avoid combat.” There were no immediate plans for military action against Sandino, and even Captain Hatfield confined his garrison’s activities to disarming cooperative Nicaraguans and collecting information on Sandino.
During this period of Marine restraint, however, Sandino began plundering mines and kidnapping Europeans for ransom, attracting new recruits in the process. On June 30 word came to Managua that Sandino had seized his old workplace, the American-owned San Albino gold mine. On July 2 Rear Admiral Julian Latimer – commander of the Special Service Squadron in Nicaragua – ordered General Feland to commence operations to disarm Sandino as soon as possible. Feland subsequently detailed Major Oliver Floyd to command a force of 75 Marines and 150 Nicaraguan volunteers with the mission of disarming Sandino.
On May 31, 50 Marines under Major Harold Pierce left Managua to establish control over Nueva Segovia and to “peaceably disarm everybody.” Yet there was no desire “to make heroes out of a copule of cattle thieves by chasing them through the jungles with a squad of Marines.” Thus, Feland instructed Pierce to “secure information that will facilitate the coming supervision of elections, but do not fire a shot inless imperatively necessary; and conciliate with firmness, tranquilize without force of arms, avoid combat.” There were no immediate plans for military action against Sandino, and even Captain Hatfield confined his garrison’s activities to disarming cooperative Nicaraguans and collecting information on Sandino.
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| U.S. Marine Corps Brigadier General Logan Feland and staff in 1928 |
Friday, July 1, 2011
Today in Manhunting History -- July 1, 2004: Zarqawi's Bounty
U.S. commanders began to focus intently on hunting Abu Musab al-Zarqawi after the March 2004 massacre of an estimated 185 Shi’a pilgrims celebrating the Ashura festival in Karbala and Baghdad. During the abortive offensive on Fallujah the next month, Task Force 121 operators (who four months earlier had pulled the fugitive Saddam Hussein from his spiderhole) approached Marine commanders for help to insert “certain devices” in a house near city hall that would aid the search for the Jordanian. The mission was scrubbed, however, for fear that inserting such a small force into the middle of hostile territory in an urban battlefield would lead to a reprise of Mogadishu.
Consequently, early attempts to apprehend Zarqawi were dependent upon a decidedly unsupportive local population. When the CIA determined the torture studio in which Zarqawi murdered Nicholas Berg was located in Fallujah’s Jolan District, Major General James Mattis proposed joint U.S.-Iraqi patrols in Jolan to pursue Zarqawi. But the ineffectual commander of the “Fallujah Brigade” declined. In June, U.S. aircraft began dropping pamphlets over Fallujah urging residents to turn in Zarqawi, who had a $10 million bounty on his head. But this effort also produced no tangible results.
U.S. forces began kinetic action against Zarqawi’s network in Fallujah through the only means available to them, killing 18 Iraqis in an airstrike against a suspected safe house on June 19. On July 1 the reward for Zarqawi’s capture was raised to $25 million, the same amount as bin Laden.
Consequently, early attempts to apprehend Zarqawi were dependent upon a decidedly unsupportive local population. When the CIA determined the torture studio in which Zarqawi murdered Nicholas Berg was located in Fallujah’s Jolan District, Major General James Mattis proposed joint U.S.-Iraqi patrols in Jolan to pursue Zarqawi. But the ineffectual commander of the “Fallujah Brigade” declined. In June, U.S. aircraft began dropping pamphlets over Fallujah urging residents to turn in Zarqawi, who had a $10 million bounty on his head. But this effort also produced no tangible results.
U.S. forces began kinetic action against Zarqawi’s network in Fallujah through the only means available to them, killing 18 Iraqis in an airstrike against a suspected safe house on June 19. On July 1 the reward for Zarqawi’s capture was raised to $25 million, the same amount as bin Laden.
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| Zarqawi's wanted poster before the bounty was raised to $25 million. |
In Other News . . .
As I head out for the Fourth of July weekend (and hopefully spend time away from the computer), some brief Osama bin Laden/al-Qa'ida related stories from the past week that caught my eye:
- Intelligence recovered from Abbottabad reveals bin Laden considered changing al-Qa'ida's name in order to rebrand it in the Muslim world;
- A rumor that SEAL Team Six wore night vision contact lenses on the Abbottabad raid. (Question: Would such lens be subject to wash out like regular NVGs, and if so, wouldn't this make such lens a bad idea?); and finally
- PETA has apparently asked Pakistani President Asif Ali Zadari if they can decorate the walls of bin Laden's Abbottabad compound with animal rights slogans. No, really.
Have a happy and safe holiday weekend!
- Intelligence recovered from Abbottabad reveals bin Laden considered changing al-Qa'ida's name in order to rebrand it in the Muslim world;
- A rumor that SEAL Team Six wore night vision contact lenses on the Abbottabad raid. (Question: Would such lens be subject to wash out like regular NVGs, and if so, wouldn't this make such lens a bad idea?); and finally
- PETA has apparently asked Pakistani President Asif Ali Zadari if they can decorate the walls of bin Laden's Abbottabad compound with animal rights slogans. No, really.
Have a happy and safe holiday weekend!
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