Time's Top 10 Manhunts

Somehow I missed this "Top 10 Manhunts" list that Time magazine published the day after the Abbottabad raid.  Sure, it's gimmicky and misses some obvious choices (i.e. the Faqir of Ipi, Pablo Escobar, and Eric Rudolph, to name a few), but it is interesting nonetheless.

Again, the difference between most of these manhunts and what I describe as "strategic manhunts" are that only four of Time's Top 10 were pursued across an international border (Saddam, Karadzic, Eichmann, and bin Laden), and of those, Eichmann was not pursued by uniformed forces (it was strictly a covert Mossad operation) and Karadzic, although a prominent target, was one roughly two dozen Bosnian Serbs pursued by JSOC forces after the Dayton Accords.

Today in Manhunting History -- May 31: Losing al-Rahman

Since May 20, Task Force 145 had been following Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's spiritual adviser, Abd al-Rahman, waiting for him to get into the blue sedan that indicated he was en route to meeting Iraq's most wanted terrorist.  Finally, after eleven days of waiting and watching, on May 31 a Predator observed Rahman switching cars to a blue sedan.

The sedan weaved through Baghdad traffic, making numerous turns to shake any possible tail. After one sudden turn it disappeared behind a tall building. The Predator’s camera panned up and down the street, but could find no sign of the car. The Predator flew around the building, continuing to pan its camera in all directions, but the blue sedan had simply vanished, and with it possibly the best chance of catching Zarqawi to date.

Little did the Task Force realize they would get another shot a week later . . .

In Memoriam

CPT Shane Mahaffee, Died of wounds suffered in an May 5, 2006, IED attack near Hilla, Iraq.

CPT Brian Freeman, KIA, Karbala, Iraq, January 20, 2007

Some debts can never be repaid.  Some sacrifices will never be forgotten.  Rest in peace, brothers.

Today in Manhunting History -- May 29, 1998: The Raid That Never Was

Note: Updated to edit a bad grammatical error in the opening sentence . . . that will teach me to post while trying to build a Lego castle with a five-year-old at the same time.

By May 1998, the CIA’s Counter Terrorism Center had spent months planning a raid on Tarnak Farms, Osama bin Laden’s compound on the outskirts of Kandahar comprising about 80 concrete or mud-brick buildings surrounded by a 10-foot wall, for some time. CIA officers were able to map the entire site from satellite photos, identifying the houses belonging to bin Laden’s wives and the one where he was most likely to sleep. The plan was meticulously detailed. One team of Afghan tribals on the CIA payroll would enter the compound through a drainage ditch that ran under the fence while another team would sneak through the front gate, using silenced pistols to eliminate the guards. When they found bin Laden, they would hold him in a provisioned cave 30 miles away until the Americans could take custody. From May 20 to 24 the CIA ran a successful final rehearsal of the operation. The CTC planned to brief cabinet-level principals and their deputies the following week. June 23 would be D-Day for the raid, with bin Laden in American custody by July 23.

Satellite imagery of Tarnak Farms used to prepare for the proposed 1998 raid.

 Although a Principals Committee meeting to approve the operation was scheduled for May 30, it never took place. The White House Counterterror Strategy Group, led by Richard Clarke, perceived the Afghan tribals as a bunch of aging anti-Soviet mujahideen well past their prime and milking the CIA for easy money while avoiding any real operations on the ground. Moreover, the CIA’s senior management did not believe the plan would succeed. Thus on May 29, CTC Chief Jeff O’Connell informed the Bin Laden unit that cabinet-level officials thought the risk of civilian casualties was too high, and the decision had been made to abort the operation.

The working-level CIA officers were disappointed, believing the raid to be the “best plan we are going to come up with to capture [bin Laden] while he is in Afghanistan and bring him to justice.” The tribals’ reported readiness to act was subsequently diminished. And as the 9/11 Commission later noted, “No capture plan before 9/11 ever again attained the same level of detail and preparation.”

Bin Laden Confidants Captured

The Daily Mail reports that a British SAS team has captured two top Taliban commanders -- reported to be close confidants of Osama bin Laden -- near Babaji in Helmand province.

More details are sure to emerge in the coming days (i.e. Was the intel derived from the Abbottabad raid, or part of the ongoing decapitation campaign against the Taliban?) but any time members of the Quetta Shura can be taken out of the fight it is a good thing.

Bin Laden and Pakistan

One of the critical questions in the aftermatth of the Abbottabad raid that killed bin Laden is whether any Pakistani intelligence or government officials knew of his location, and if so, how high did such knowledge go.

Today, Mark Mazzetti of the The New York Times reports that documents seized in the Abbottabad compound show bin Laden and his aides discussed seeking Pakistani protection in exchange for al Qa'ida refraining from attacking targets within Pakistan.  Although the proposal apparently never got beyond the "discussion phase," it suggests the Pakistani government was not complicit in hiding bin Laden.  Secretary of State Clinton explicitly stated this yesterday as she arrived for an unannounced visit in Islamabad.  This in itself is interesting, as in the past Secretary Clinton -- to her credit -- was never shy about saying she thought bin Laden was hiding in Pakistan.  Secretary Clinton's statement follows Secretary Gates' remarks last week that there was no evidence "current Pakistani leaders" knew bin Laden was there, although Gates' also suggested his gut told him somebody had to know.

This is likely not the last word on this topic, as skeptics and conspiracy theorists will inevitably chime in on the subject.  But although we have a number of reasons to be frustrated with our Pakistani allies, hiding bin Laden in defiance of our strategic manhunt for him does not appear to be one of them.

A Pakistani Mole?

Over at HotAir, "Allahpundit" conjectures there may have been a mole within Pakistani intelligence who provided the details of the Abbottabad compound, which would also explain the recent arrest of Muhammed Ali Qasim Yaqub and the rumors regarding Mullah Omar.

This theory is plausible, but unlikely for several reasons:

1. If true, and the mole was somebody within Pakistan's ISI who knew bin Laden's location for a long time, why would they decide to rat him out now, especially at a time of heightened U.S.-Pakistani tensions.
2. Theoretically, it could have been somebody who was recently looped in on bin Laden's location, but that would represent an unprecedented breech within ISI to allow access to such important information.  (Of course, it should also be noted that it is still at most unproven speculation that somebody within ISI knew his location in the first place).
3. Yaqub was reportedly arrested by Pakistani forces, so it is unclear why a mole feeding us the location and details of bin Laden's compound to the US would also be providing information to other elements of Pakistani security as well.  Wouldn't this just cast more suspicion on a potential "traitor"?
4. Also, if we did have anything to do with Mullah Omar's rumored death, does anybody realistically think the Administration could keep quiet about it?*

The full story of how we found bin Laden may never be revealed in order to protect sources and methods.  But I think the current narrative about tracking Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti back to Abbottabad, where surveillance by both human and technical means provided the intelligence for SEAL Team Six's raid on the compound is plausible enough that Occam's Razor should prevail for now.  

On the other hand, maybe Allahpundit is on to something by suggesting a wife may have turned bin Laden in because of his porn stash . . .

* Although I think the Obama administration should have sat on the news of bin Laden's death for a week to exploit the intelligence found, it should be noted that the Bush administration announced the capture of Saddam Hussein and death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi within 24 hours of the event.  Alas, it may be unrealistic in this day and age to ask policymakers to keep such good news to themselves for a full news cycle.

Ratko Mladic Arrested

The Associated Press is reporting this morning that Ratko Mladic has been arrested in Serbia by the Serbian Security Intelligence Agency.  Mladic, who was the commander of Bosnian Serb forces during the 1992-1995 Bosnian War, was indicted by the UN war crimes tribunal for genocide for overseeing the massacre of some 8,000 Bosnian Muslims at Srebrenica, amongst other atrocities committed by his forces as an intentional strategy.

AP photo of Mladic c. 1995

After the signing of the Dayton Accords in 1995, members of Delta Force participated in the hunt for the Mladic, Radovan Karadzic, and other suspected war criminals.  I decided not to write about this hunt in "Wanted Dead or Alive" for two reasons: a) Delta was hunting for a large class of individuals (with some success, even if the two biggest targets eluded them) rather than one man, so it did not quite fit into my definition of "strategic manhunts" wherein one man is the focus; and b) There just isn't much material on the hunt aside from "Dalton Fury"'s anecdotes in Kill Bin Laden and a few paragraphs in an obscure Naval Postgraduate School thesis on manhunting (and JSOC personnel are understandably reluctant to discuss details of any of their operations).

There is probably a really good story behind this hunt waiting to be told, and maybe with Mladic finally apprehended somebody will step forward to tell it.

"Enraged 500-Foot Bin Laden Emerges from the Sea"

Crap, now I have to revise my bin Laden chapters again?!?

Via The Onion, enjoy the funny . . .

Blurbs

The blurbs are starting to come in for "Wanted Dead or Alive," including the following:

"I... was captivated. Little did I know how much I did not know concerning U.S. military manhunts. Ben's book changed all that, it is a first-class contribution to our community of interest and practice." --Dave Dillegge, editor at Small Wars Journal

"Runkle nailed it, expertly capturing the amazing chase of manhunting... the dangerous game of cat and mouse where the hunter manipulates the hunteds' social network, intercepts their chatter, and limits their freedom of movement - to ultimately take their life. A tall boy energy drink for our modern day specops warriors." --Dalton Fury - NYT Bestselling author of Kill Bin Laden

Coming from someone who has devoted as much intellectual energy to the problem of modern warfare as Dave and from as well respected a warrior as "Dalton Fury," this is really humbling.

Today in Manhunting History -- May 25, 1916: Killing Cervantes

Since the fight at April 22 battle at Tomochic, Candelario Cervantes had been playing a game of cat-and-mouse with Dodd and the 7th Cavalry. Cervantes, whom Pershing called “the most able and the most desperate of Villa’s band,” was bold enough to raid in the area around Namiquipa, right under the nose of Pershing’s headquarters. On May 25 a small detachment of mappers and riflemen from the 2nd Engineers and 17th Infantry under Lance Corporal Davis Marksbury left Las Cruces, 12 miles south of Namiquipa, intending to study the Santa Maria Valley. While one group sketched the terrain, another began hunting for pigs in the brush of Alamia Canyon.

A band of Mexicans suddenly appeared on the horizon, firing and riding furiously towards the Americans. Marksbury was killed and three others wounded as the U.S. troops were quickly pinned down. Several soldiers noticed the fancily dressed leader of the Mexican band. Mounted on a large black horse, he wore a fancy sombrero turned up at the brim and a “fancy coat that looked like velvet or plush, with a white braid in front.” Infantry Private George D. Hullett emptied his pistol at the Mexicans and then picked up Marksbury’s rifle. He calmly aimed his weapon, drawing a bead on the flashily dressed Mexican. He fired once, knocking the tall man from his horse. The Mexicans withdrew and when inspecting the personal effects of the bandit, the Americans realized they had killed Cervantes, Villa’s deputy at the Columbus raid.

Cervantes, on the far left, with Pancho Villa

Where is Mullah Omar?

According to Pakistan's Dawn, Afghan officials claim Mullah Omar has disappeared from his hideout in Quetta, Pakistan, although they "cannot confirm the killing" of the Taliban's leader.

The Taliban, however, vehemently deny this.

Is this just a case of he said/he said? Bill Roggio, as always, does a good job sorting out the competing claims.

Alternatively, this could be a case . . . wait, Afghan intelligence has sources who know where Mullah Omar's hideout is?!?  To paraphrase Seth Green in "Austin Powers": I have a SEAL Team in my room, you give me five seconds, I'll get it, I'll come back down here, BOOM, I'll blow their brains out!  (To which Dr. Evil responds: "Scott, you just don't get it, do ya? You don't.")

Seriously, though, I'm skeptical of this report.  Roggio is right that, although it is possible Mullah Omar is relocating in the wake of the Abbottabad raid, it is highly unlikely for a variety of reasons. 

Moreover, it is unlikely that the "Commander of the Faithful" would be killed without acknowledgement of the Taliban.  Although such an event would be a crippling blow to the insurgency, al-Qaeda and other affiliated extremists groups have historically acknowledged the deaths of their senior leaders so that their followers can perform the proper prayer rituals for them, and this religious observance has trumped the strategic downside to admitting a successful U.S. strike. 

This is why I was always skeptical of analysts who suggested that the seeming frigidity of bin Laden's trail during the last decade suggested he may have died of natural causes. 

Today in Manhunting History -- May 24, 1898: Arming Aguinaldo

After Aguinaldo spent the night aboard Admiral Dewey's flagship [see May 19], the next morning he was provided with close to a hundred rifles, some cannons, and ammunition courtesy of Dewey, who encouraged him to “go ashore and start your army.”  Four days later, on 24 May, Dewey allowed a steamer from Hong Kong filled with thousands of rifles and ammunition to reach Aguinaldo at Cavite. 

Years later, when the young Filipino became the target of a massive U.S. strategic manhunt, Dewey explained that he requested Aguinaldo’s return to the Philippines “as it was possible that he might have valuable information to impart at a time when no source of information was to be neglected.”  Moreover, he told Congress, “we had a common enemy [in Spain], and of course I wanted his help.”   Consequently “my policy was to avoid any entangling alliance with the insurgents, while I appreciated that, pending the arrival of our troops, they might be of service.”

News of Aguinaldo’s return spread like wildfire through the Philippines.  Aguinaldo moved quickly to consolidate his political power, proclaiming himself dictator on 24 May to rule during the initial stages of the renewed insurgency. He reassembled the insurgent forces, and began operations around Manila at the end of May.  His troops proceeded to capture much of the Cavite region and lay siege to Manila, taking more than 2,000 Spanish prisoners.  By the end of June, central Luzon was in Filipino hands.  Aguinaldo’s army numbered about 30,000 men, exclusive of small hit-and-run groups that operated as far south as the Moro islands. 

"Mole Theory" the Result of Cattiness?

According to The Australian, bin Laden's older widows blame the youngest wife for tipping off U.S. forces.

Money quote: "It's a well-known fact that when you have two older wives and then this young one comes along half their age, they don't like it."

A lesson we can all appreciate, I think.

Does anybody know if there is either a Saudi or Pakistani version of the Jerry Springer show that bin Laden's lives can appear on?

A Mole in Bin Laden's Compound?

The Daily Mail (UK) reports that SEAL TEAM Six dropped something akin to a facebook during the raid on bin Laden's compound, and that the existence of a previously unknown picture of bin Laden's youngest wife, Amal, suggests there was a mole within the compound providing intelligence to U.S. intelligence.

Um, I'm going to go out on a limb here and say no, there wasn't a mole in bin Laden's camp.

One of the things that made bin Laden so difficult to track during the 13-year manhunt was the intense loyalty of his followers.  Former U.S. counterterrorist official Roger Cressey once told Peter Bergen that an al-Qaeda operative betraying bin Laden would be like "a Catholic giving up the Pope."  Abdel Bari Atwan, editor of Al Quds al Arabi newspaper, said: "I don't believe they will surrender him.  He's adored by the people around him.  For them, he is not a leader.  He is everything.  He's the father; he's the brother; he is a leader; he is the imam."  And Maulana Sami al-Haq, head of Pakistan's largest religious academy explained, "He's a hero to us."

What is true of his followers is likely doubly so for his spouses, who after Tora Bora returned to their families in either Saudi Arabia or Yemen.  All three chose to return to bin Laden at some point while he was in hiding in Pakistan despite having the option of obtaining a divorce and remaining safely at home. 

Although it is possible that one may have been tracked to Abbottabad, this would have been an inadvertent revelation of bin Laden's location, not a conscious betrayal as suggested by the word "mole" or implied by Pakistan's Interior Minister.  Even this scenario is far fetched, as bin Laden and his family/families supposedly had been living in Abbottabad for five years.  If they had tracked Amal from Yemen to Pakistan the raid should have been launched a long time ago.  

As I noted last week, a significant portion of the stories that emerge in the week's after bin Laden's death are as likely to be speculation based upon bare threads as actual reality.

Today in Manhunting History -- May 22, 1885: Battle at Devil's River Canyon

After separating from Lieutenant Davis’s scouts at Eagle Creek, Captain Allen Smith led two companies of the 4th Cavalry in pursuit of the Chiricahuas, accompanied by Gatewood and his scouts. As the command approached the settlements near the San Francisco River and the New Mexico border, they found signs that Geronimo had begun killing settlers. On May 22, the scouts found a trail believed to be Geronimo’s, and followed it 25 miles to Devil’s River, a canyon that opened into a small valley 600 feet below the rim of the Mogollons. As they entered a narrow valley, some 40 feet wide, Smith called a halt and ordered his men to make camp. At about 2PM, the canyon suddenly echoed with gunfire, as the Indians attacked from four directions; up and down the canyon, and from both canyon walls. First Lieutenant James Parker rallied his men and led them into the hail of fire coming from up the canyon. First Lieutenant Charles Gatewood followed, and led his scouts in a charge to the summit.

The Apaches dispersed, and as quickly as the action had begun, it was over. Gatewood and Parker had captured the enemy position at the crest of the canyon, and 500 yards further they took the renegades’ now-abandoned camp. Seventeen fires were still either burning or filled with live or hot coals, and the hostiles left behind some horses, various items of clothing and equipment, and a lot of beef. These possessions were gained at the cost of two soldiers and an Indian scout wounded.

Today in Manhunting History -- May 21, 1927: Sandino and the USA

Despite Sandino’s refusal to accept the Tititapa Accords that ended the Nicaraguan Civil War (see May 12 below), he initially accepted the U.S. peacekeeping mission. On May 21 he wired the Marine commander, Brigadier General Logan Feland. “For peace to be durable,” Sandino wrote, “we propose that the two parties leave the affairs of the Republic in the hands of [an] American governor, until absolutely free elections have been held.”

Ironically, Sandino would eventually establish his international reputation (especially amongst anti-American leftists) by opposing the U.S. presence in Nicaragua.  Yet he only adopted this stance after the United States rebuffed his proposal to appoint a military governor to Nicaragua, and despite his pro-democracy rhetoric, Sandino would violently oppose what were Nicaragua's freest elections to date.

Just in Case . . .

. . . the world ends tomorrow, thanks for tuning in for this blog's 18-day run.  I assume I'll still be here one way or another, but just in case, it is worth noting the Center for Disease Control's advice on what to do in the event of a zombie apocalypse.

Although this is a clever way of providing guidance on disaster preparedness, if there is a zombie outbreak I think I'd much rather have a good supply of small arms and ammo (and a big @#$#ing machete) than my birth certificate and passport sealed in a plastic bag!

Just saying. 

Today in Manhunting History -- May 20, 2006: Following Abd al-Rahman

In the early hours of April 16, 2006, SEAL Team Six and Army Rangers conducted a raid on an "Anger Brigades" safe house in Yusufiyah, a small town 20 miles southwest of Baghdad.  One of the men detained was “Abu Haydr,” a genial 43-year old with a penchant for Harry Potter books, whose girth nearly buckled the white plastic chairs in the interrogation rooms. For three weeks he was questioned twice daily but gave up nothing. Finally, an interrogation ruse tricked the Iraqi into revealing the existence of Abd al-Rahman, a Sunni cleric from a mosque in Baghdad’s Mansur district. “He is Abu Musab al Zarqawi’s personal spiritual advisor,” Abu Haydr said. “If you want Zarqawi, watch al Rahman.” He said that whenever they met, Rahman would change cars a number of times in the middle of his trip. Only when he got into a blue sedan would he be taken directly to Zarqawi.

On May 20, Task Force 145 began watching Rahman's every move, hoping it would lead to Iraq's most wanted man.

From the "Well, Duh!" Category

ABC News reported last night that "We are just learning tonight that an urgent worldwide manhunt is underway" for the people named in files recovered from Osama bin Laden's thumb drives in Abbottabad.

Really?!?  Well DUH!!!

As if our intelligence agencies opened the files, saw the names of hundreds of al-Qa'ida operatives, and then said, Hey, anyone else have a craving for Mexican?  I know a little cantina a few hours away.  What?  No, no, those files can wait, those guys aren't going anywhere.  Come on, margaritas are only a dollar until 7PM!

Although there has been some speculation as to whether the media should report details such as this, in reality there isn't anybody on that list who doesn't already know he's a wanted man or who, when the President announced that bin Laden had been killed and we had his computers, didn't realize he had to rethink his modus operandi.

That being said, I haven't seen an explanation as to why the White House decided to announce the operations' success immediately rather than waiting a week to give U.S. intelligence a head start on these guys.  I'd be curious to see if there wasn't somebody who suggested they should sit on the news for a bit in order to exploit the intelligence the SEALs had discovered.

A Rift Within Al-Qa'ida?

Jason Burke, a long-time observer of al-Qa'ida, writes in The Guardian that the selection of Saif al-Adel as "interim leader" of the terrorist network may represent a major split within militant ranks.

This raises an interesting question: is al-Qa'ida more dangerous as a hierarchical organization with a clear chain-of-command, or as a diffuse network?

The consensus has typically been that a network is more dangerous because it is harder to decapitate and is more adaptive/flexible than a hierarchy (see "The Spider and the Starfish," although that book works much better describing information networks than actual functional organizations). 

But what if the loss of the undisputed leader leads to significant infighting that strategically/operationally cripples the organization for a period of time?  Would the various al-Qa'ida franchises (AQ in the Arabian Peninsula, AQ in Islamic Magrheb, Jemaah Islamiyah in SE Asia, al Shabab in Somalia, etc). be able to coordinate the illicit networks upon which they depend to operate?

In 2006, when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed in Iraq, it took al-Qa'ida three months to settle upon a successor to lead al-Qa'ida's Iraqi franchise (AQI).  It was during that time that COL Sean MacFarland and the 1st BCT of the 1st Armored Division began the offensive in Ramadi and Sheik Sittar al-Rishawi of the Albu Risha clan (a subset of the massive Dulaimi tribe) formed the Anbar Salvation Council.  It is plausible that AQI's leadership void during this period prevented the terrorist organization from responding effectively to these challenges, and that this subsequently enabled the Anbar Awakening and eventually the U.S. Surge to succeed.* 

Theoretically, if a similar leadership void were to emerge in al-Qa'ida in the wake of bin Laden's death, and the U.S. were able to launch an offensive against its operatives and affiliates based . . . I don't know, on a newly discovered trove of intelligence, perhaps? . . . than bin Laden's death could have similar strategic significance.

But at this point, this is highly speculative at best.

*Unfortunately, lacking a reliable memoir of life inside al-Qa'ida in Iraq during this period -- if such a thing could possibly exist -- this is a completely untestable proposition.

Today in Manhunting History -- May 19, 1898: Aguinaldo's Homecoming

The morning sun still hung low over the horizon on 19 May, 1898, illuminating the rocky shores of Corregidor Island as the U.S.S McCulloch sailed into Manila Bay.  Over the next few hours the revenue cutter passed the spongy littoral marshes south of Cavite, the small peninsula jutting into the bay ten miles south of Manila.  As the ship passed the peninsula, passengers on the landward side could make out the twisted rigging and battered funnels of battleships protruding above the water line – the wreckage of the Spanish fleet destroyed by Admiral George Dewey’s squadron in a stunning naval victory less than three weeks earlier.

           

The “remnants and ruins” of the Spanish fleet were an especially powerful image for one of the McCullough’s passengers, Emilio Aguinaldo.  Barely 28 years old, Aguinaldo was not physically imposing, only five-foot-four and slight of build.  His face was handsome despite scars from a childhood bout of smallpox.  His wide, high brow suggested intelligence, and sat over clear, serene, and slightly Asiatic eyes.  Although the three day trip across the South China Sea from Hong Kong had been outwardly uneventful, the young man’s mind was in perpetual turmoil. 

Emilio Aguinaldo

Despite his youth, Aguinaldo was returning from exile in Hong Kong as the leader of the Philippine revolution against Spanish colonial rule in the archipelago.  As the McCullough traversed the waves, his waking hours had been spent in deep reflection: Would he find his people as ready to support his cause as before?  Had his acceptance of exile tainted his ability to lead?  And what about his family, and the families of his comrades in arms that had been left behind?  Had the Spanish honored their promises to guarantee their safety?  Or in the panic of war with the Americans would they take them as hostages, or worse, torture and perhaps kill them?

           

As these thoughts turned over and over in his mind, the red-tile roofs of the old city of Manila appeared over the horizon.  Just after noon, the McCulloch dropped anchor in Manila’s inner harbor.  Almost immediately, Admiral Dewey’s launch pulled up alongside to convey Aguinaldo to the Admiral aboard his flagship.  Accompanied by his aides Colonel Gregorio del Pilar and Lieutenant J. Leyba, he boarded the launch, and quickly found himself being piped over the Olympia, the cruiser which served as the Dewey’s flagship.  Upon boarding, he was enthusiastically greeted by a tall, slim man with wavy grey hair and a thick, white mustache.  Admiral Dewey was a 60 year old naval veteran of the Civil War who wore an immaculate, tailored dress-white uniform and polished high-instep boots.  Dewey immediately ushered Aguinaldo and his aides to his private quarters for discussions of the course ahead.

Dewey aboard the U.S.S. Olympia

           

Over the next twenty-four hours, Aguinaldo’s mind would be put to rest on several issues, as he received the American commander’s blessing to restart his revolution.  Although he could not know it that afternoon in Manila Bay, within two months he would be at the height of his power, the President of the nascent Republic of the Philippines in command of 30,000 troops and in control of almost the entire archipelago. 

           

Perhaps still more inconceivable, within a year Emilio Aguinaldo would become the most wanted man in the Philippines, with as many as 70,000 American troops possessing orders to capture or kill him.

Meanwhile, in Pakistan . . .

Two potentially big stories out of the al Qa'ida camp.

First, CNN reports that former Egyptian special forces officer Saif al-Adel has been chosen "caretaker" of al Qa'ida in the wake of Osama bin Laden's death.  Al-Adel's reputation is that he is perhaps al-Qa'ida's sharpist strategist, but that because he spent so many years out of the spotlight under "house arrest" in Iran (which conveniently didn't get in the way of planning attacks) he is not considered to be among the terrorist organization's more charasmatic leaders.  This would be ironic, if true, since lack of charisma is generally the explanation for why bin Laden's long-time deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri might not automatically ascend to the number one position.

Second, according to Bill Roggio at the excellent Long War Journal, the "senior al-Qa'ida commander" recently arrested by the Pakistanis in Karachi is actually a courier who relayed messages between bin Laden and Zawahiri.  Initially, this announcement was treated skeptically.  Many believed that Muhammed Ali Qasim Yaqub's importance was being inflated in order to demonstrate Pakistan was doing something about al-Qa'ida.  But as the intelligence chain that lead to bin Laden's killing demonstrates, couriers can prove invaluable as sources of intelligence in manhunts. 

Given that the arrest occurred on May 4, it raises an interesting question: if al-Qa'ida's leadership knew one the key links between bin Laden and Zawahiri were in custody, especially in the wake of the Abbottabad raid, could this have played a role in the choice of al-Adel rather than al-Zawahiri as "caretaker"? 

In other words, maybe AQ does not have a lot of faith that Zawahiri will be around for much longer, and doesn't want him in too prominent a position just in case? 

Just a thought.

Stealth Drones and Technology in Manhunts

A Washington Post story today revealing that stealth drones kept watch over bin Laden's Abbottabad compound is getting a lot of attention. While the development of such a drone would be significant, especially because bin Laden had appeared to have "drone-proofed" the compound by building it within range of Islamabad's air defense exclusion zone, it is not clear how this new gee-whiz technology specifically contributed to the successful raid.* 

Although the CIA "conducted clandestine flights over the compound for months before the May 2 assault in an effort to capture high-resolution video that satellites could not provide," the article goes on to admit that "the CIA never obtained a photograph of bin Laden at the compound or other direct confirmation of his presence before the assault."  And while the reporter notes "the agency concluded after months of watching the complex that the figure frequently seen pacing back and forth was probably the al-Qaeda chief," nothing in the article contradicts Bob Woodward's story in the Post on May 6 reporting that the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency could only estimate that man suspected to be bin Laden was somewhere between 5-foot-8 and 6-foot-8. 

In other words, given that there was human surveillance of the compound, and that the RQ-170 did not provide actual confirmation of bin Laden's process, it is not clear what the "Stealth Drone" contributed to the hunt. 

This is not to say this isn't a useful piece of technology, but rather that the story reinforces a key finding of my book, which is that technology is never a decisive factor in a strategic manhunt.  Ever since General Miles erected heliograph stations throughout the area of operations in the Geronimo Campaign, U.S forces have attempted to exploit their relative advantage in technology while engaged in strategic manhunts. Yet there is little-to-no correlation between advances in technology levels and operational success. Funston was able to capture Aguinaldo even though U.S. forces in the Philippines enjoyed no significant technological advantage over the Filipino insurgents, whereas Pershing failed to catch Pancho Villa despite being equipped with planes, trucks, and radios.

The United States enjoyed perhaps its greatest relative advantage in technology during the four-month pursuit of Aideed in Somalia. Task Force Ranger had access to the full range of U.S. intelligence capabilities and assets, including sensors that previous generations of raiders “could only dream about.” The Centra Spike signals intelligence team was pulled off the hunt for Colombian drug lord Pablo Escobar in order to assist the search for Aideed. Theater and joint task force imagery assets included the navy’s tactical airborne reconnaissance pod system (TARPS) slung under low-flying jet aircraft; a specially modified Navy P3 Orion patrol plane; a single-engine superquiet airplane with a real-time downlink to JTF HQ; the Pioneer unmanned aerial vehicle with a downlink to the JOC, and the Night Hawk ground FLIR system. All the observation birds were equipped with video cameras and radio equipment that would relay the action live to the JOC, meaning MG William Garrison and his staff had more instant information about unfolding operations than any commander in history.

Yet the highly sophisticated technological assets utilized by Task Force Ranger were ultimately ineffective because it could not pick up the low technology used by Somalis. Aideed communicated with his militia by using either couriers or dated walkie-talkies too low-powered to be detected by the sophisticated American electronic eavesdropping equipment. In other words, Somalia’s complete and utter technological backwardness actually was an asset to Aideed.

Even in cases such as the Saddam and Zarqawi manhunts where high degrees of absolute technology positively correlate to operational success, these technologies played only a peripheral role. U.S. forces hunting Saddam and Zarqawi possessed satellites that recorded suspicious changes in the Iraqi terrain, spy aircraft scoured hiding spots with thermal scans, and UAVs fed live video to military headquarters in Iraq. The radar in Apache helicopters, originally designed to target moving tanks, was reprogrammed to track cars and detect unusual traffic patterns, such as fast-moving convoys. And the RC-135 River Joint aircraft – a converted Boeing 707 loaded with antennae for picking up electronic communications – flew over Iraq for up to 10 hours at a time, detecting signals up to 230 miles away and pinpointing the source of the conversation to within one-to-three miles. But this advanced technology contributed little to the successful conclusion of the Iraqi manhunts. Saddam and his sons were extremely careful not to use phones or other communications equipment that might give their positions away. Other than the single phone call intercepted during the raid that killed his sons, there were reportedly few, if any, direct intercepts of Saddam available. Similarly, Zarqawi knew how much the Americans relied on high technology to track down suspects: he and his men refrained from using cell phones, knowing how easily they could be tracked.

This is not to say that technology is never useful during manhunts.  In broader targeted killing campaigns such as those being conducted against secondary al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders it is invaluable.  Whereas senior leaders such as Saddam, Zarqawi, or bin Laden can effectively go "off the net," their lieutenants do not have this luxury, and have to communicate in order to be functionally effective. 

But Lieutenant General Lance Smith, former Deputy Commander of CENTCOM once noted that one of the reasons U.S. forces have difficulty getting the leadership of al Qaeda "is because they recognize that technology is not their friend.”  Or as former Delta Force commander Pete Blaber argues in his memoir: “The reality and complexity of life virtually guarantee there will never be” an all-purpose technological panacea for finding people.  “Instead, these types of capabilities should be looked at as part of an overall system.  A buffet of capabilities that could be used in combination with our guys working the situation on the ground to assist in the vexing challenge of locating a wanted man.”

*If I'm wrong and the RQ0170 was the key to the whole operation, than it is a good thing that its specific role is murky.  However, there probably isn't anybody left alive in al-Qaeda who doesn't already know to be aware of drones.

AP on Abbottabad

Okay, up until now, I've avoided writing much about Osama bin Laden's death for several reasons:
1. In operations such as this, much of the initial information proves to be either incorrect due to the fog of war (see the constantly shifting explanations by the White House until they finally announced they weren't saying anything further); or is selectively leaked to make one part of the bureaucracy look brilliant/courageous.
2. The really good gouge, both on the raid itself and on the intelligence trove discovered is going to be kept quiet for as long as possible (except, of course, if you have a Vice President who . . . er, seems not to understand the meaning of discretion), and should be so that our Special Operations Forces can utilize these tactics again in the near future against other targets. 
3. In addition to this being the busiest time of year for my day job, I was swamped writing pieces on this topic for the Washington Post, the Weekly Standard, and Foreign Policy.
4. There is are a lot of questions that are simply unanswerable at this time.

I'll actually have a lot of posts on bin Laden's death and its aftermath/strategic effects coming shortly.  But for now, I'll point you to this piece today by Kimberly Dozier of the Associated Press, which appears to be the most detailed account yet of the Abbottabad raid to date.

Today in Manhunting History -- May 17, 1885: Geronimo Escapes

The two days after the confronation at Turkey Creek passed without word from Crook.  The Apaches grew increasingly apprehensive, assuming the worst as each hour passed.

On Sunday, May 17, Lieutenant Davis was umpiring a baseball game at Fort Apache while awaiting the response from Crook that would never come.  At about 4PM, his interpreter and a scout interrupted to report that Geronimo and an unknown number of Chiricahua and Warm Springs Apaches had fled the reservation in the middle of the night.  Davis attempted to send another telegram to Captain Pierce, but was unable to get a message through.  It was not until noon the next day that a break in the line was discovered – the fleeing Apaches had cut the line where it passed through the foliage of a tree and cleverly tied the ends tautly together with a leather thong to hide the break – and repaired.

Once higher headquarters was informed of the Apaches’ flight Davis began preparing his scouts for the pursuit.  Speed was essential, for if Geronimo and his band made it to the Mexican frontier, he would be nearly impossible to corner.  They left with a detachment of regular troops from Fort Apache in the afternoon, but as daylight faded and dusk transformed the desert sky into darkness, the advance slowed to a crawl lest they stumble into an ambush while following an uncertain trail. 

They marched through the night.  At dawn the detachment reached a ridge above the valley of Eagle Creek.  The scouts pointed to the opposite side of the valley, and looking through their field glasses, Davis and the other officers could see the dust raised by the fugitives’ ponies ascending a ridge some 15-20 miles ahead.

Geronimo had escaped. 

Realizing that further pursuit was useless – it was later discovered that the hostiles had traveled 90 miles without halting – Lieutenant Davis turned back.  A long campaign in Mexico lay ahead, and he needed to wire General Crook for instructions.

Over the days to come, as news spread that 120 Apaches under Geronimo were on the loose, “something like mass hysteria gripped the citizens of Arizona and New Mexico,”  and America's first strategic manhunt would commence.

"Enduring Battle"

Congratulations to my former officemate a decade ago at the (now, sadly defunct) Olin Institute for National Security Studies, Christopher Hamner, for the excellent notice his book "Enduring Battle: American Soldiers in Three Wars, 1776-1945" received in Saturday's Wall Street Journal. 

For anybody interested in military history, I strongly recommend Chris's book.  I haven't read it yet, but read several of his papers on the relationship between technology and combat motivation when he was writing his dissertation.  As I said at the time when I served as his reviewer at an academic seminar, his thesis was a "forehead slapper": it made me slap my forehead and wish I'd thought of that as a thesis topic!  The resulting work was fascinating, and I look forward to getting a copy soon. 

(Alas, my doctoral dissertation is lost for the ages, although I think my mother still has a copy . . . ) 

Today in Manhunting History -- May 15, 1885: Showdown at Turkey Creek

The American Southwest, in the words of an army officer stationed there in the 19^th Century, is “a region in which not only purgatory and hell, but heaven likewise, had combined to produce a bewildering kaleidoscope of all that is wonderful, weird, terrible, and awe-inspiring, with not a little that was beautiful and romantic.”

The sun had barely risen over this Dantesque landscape on May 15, 1886, when Lieutenant Britton Davis realized his day would be closer to the inferno than to paradise.

As he stepped out of his tent at Turkey Creek on the San Carlos Reservation, home to 5,000 Apache Indians, the dawn illuminated the stern faces of all the major Chiricahua and Warm Springs Apache chieftains: Naiche – son of the legendary Cochise, Mangus, Chihuahua, Loco, and the aged Nana.  Most ominously, Davis saw Geronimo, whom he knew as “a thoroughly vicious, intractable, and treacherous man” whose “word, no matter how earnestly pledged, was worthless.”  Geronimo stood only five-foot-eight inches, but was still powerfully built at age 61, and his countenance bespoke “a look of unspeakable savagery, or fierceness.”  Thirty warriors, all armed, stood behind the chiefs.  Worse, not a single woman or child was in sight, “a sure sign of something serious in the air.” 

They said they wanted to talk.  Davis sent for his interpreter, then invited the leaders into his tent.  Once inside, the chiefs squatted in a semicircle.  Loco began to speak, but was interrupted by a visibly agitated Chihuahua. 

We are not children, Chihuahua said.  When the Apaches had agreed to return to the reservation after the last outbreak in 1883, he argued, We agreed on a peace with Americans, Mexicans, and other Indian tribes. We said nothing about conduct among ourselves. 

The Apaches had many reasons to be discontented with their life at San Carlos.  No Apaches were more independent or warlike than the Chiricahuas and Warm Springs under Davis’s supervision.  While some Apaches made great strides in their new life as farmers, none of the Chiricahua “were making anything more than a bluff at farming,” letting their women tend the fields while the warriors scoffed at performing such unmanly tasks.  San Carlos itself was a perpetually hot and dry, gravelly flat between the Gila and San Carlos rivers that earned the appellation of “Hell’s Forty Acres” from the officers who served there.  In addition to facing the slow encroachment upon their lands by miners and farmers, the Apaches were subjected to an extraordinary level of corruption at the hands of the civilian Indian Agents assigned to San Carlos through patronage politics.  Davis noted that the weekly ration of flour “would hardly suffice for one day,” and the beef cows issued to the Indians were little more than walking skeletons.

On this day, however, Chihuahua was referring to the regulations regarding the treatment of women and Tizwin.  The Apaches claimed the right of a husband to beat his wife as an ancient and accepted tribal custom, as well as the right of a husband to cut off the nose of an adulterous squaw, often by biting it off.  Among the Indians of the reservation there were “about a score of women so disfigured,” and some of the beatings, typically with a heavy stick, were too brutal for the U.S. Army officers in charge of the reservation to ignore.  Consequently, General Crook had prohibited these practices.

Additionally, the brewing and drinking of tizwin (a fermented corn mash) was banned due to the Apaches’ proclivity for violence when intoxicated.  One such drinking spree the previous year led to a failed ambush of Lieutenant Davis.  The leader of the assassination plot, the warrior-chief Kaytennae, was subsequently arrested, exiled, and imprisoned in Alcatraz.

Davis had served in the Arizona Territory for seven years and understood his wards as well as any American officer.  He tried to placate the chiefs, but they responded with jeers and veiled threats.  Chihuahua taunted Davis through the interpreter: Tell Fat Boy that I and all the other chiefs and their men have been drinking Tizwin the night before and now we want to know what he is going to do about it – whether or not he is going to put us all in jail.  He added that he did not think the soldiers had a jail big enough to hold all the Indians who violated the prohibition.

Davis had no option but to play for time.  He explained that a problem this serious must be submitted to General Crook for a decision, that he would telegram Crook and notify them as soon as he received a reply.  Davis made sure they understood an answer might take several days before riding to Fort Apache to send the message.

Lt. Britton Davis

The telegram from Fort Apache to Crook’s headquarters at Fort Bowie had to pass through civilian hands.  In order to avoid leaks, messages were kept simple and cryptic.  Moreover, before reaching the General, Davis’s telegram also had to pass through Captain Francis E. Pierce.  Pierce had only been in Arizona for two months, and so decided to wake the veteran Chief of Scouts Al Seiber for advice.  Unfortunately, Sieber was sleeping off his own whiskey drunk.  Through bleary eyes and an addled mind, he read the telegram.

“It’s nothing but a tizwin drink,” Sieber muttered.  “Don’t pay any attention to it.  Davis will handle it.” 

As Sieber returned to sleeping off his hangover, Pierce filed away the seemingly inconsequential note.

“I am firmly convinced,” Crook would later write, “that, had I known of the occurrences reported in Lieutenant Davis’s telegram of May 15, 1885, which I did not see until months afterwards, the outbreak of Mangus and Geronimo a few days later would not have occurred.”

Today in Manhunting History -- May 14, 1916: Patton versus Pancho Villa (sort of)

Although by May the trail Pancho Villa's trail had gone cold, Pershing's Punitive Expedition enjoyed some success in hunting Villa’s subordinates.  On May 14, Pershing placed an aide in command of an expedition to buy corn from nearby haciendas.  Lieutenant George S. Patton, 30, was a tall, thin, reedy-voiced officer already renowned as one of the Army’s best athletes and pistol shots.  When he learned in March that his regiment would not go to Mexico, Patton literally begged Pershing to take him along, offering to perform any job, no matter how menial.  As Patton recalled the encounter, Pershing replied: Everyone wants to go. Why should I favor you?"

"Because I want to go more than anyone else," Patton said.

"That will do," Pershing said, dismissing the supplicant.

Undeterred, Patton went home and packed his gear.  At 5AM the next morning his phone rang, and when he answered it heard Pershing's voice on the other end.  "Lieutenant Patton," the General asked, "how long will it take you to get ready?"

Patton replied that he was already packed, to which Pershing exclaimed "I'll be G-d damned.  You are appointed aide."

(Of course, Patton neglected to mention that the recently widowed Pershing was seeing Patton's sister Nina socially at the time . . .)

Lieutenant George S. Patton during the 1916 Punitive Expedition

While purchasing feed in Rubio, Patton noticed a group of 50 or 60 unarmed Mexicans.  One of the guides, an ex-Villista named E.L. Holmdahl recognized “a number of old friends” among them.  Although Villa was still in hiding somewhere south of Parral, the commander of his Dorados (Villa's elite bodyguard), General Julio Cardenas, was believed to be in hiding in the vicinity of Rubio.  Patton and his party – a corporal, six privates, Holmdahl and another civilian interpreter – drove to Las Ciengas, where Patton interrogated Cardenas’ uncle.  The uncle’s nervousness aroused Patton’s suspicions, and on a hunch, he ordered his convoy to drive six miles to San Miguelito Ranch, where Cardenas’ family was rumored to be residing.

As Patton’s car sped toward the house, he saw three old men and a boy skinning a cow in the front yard east of the house.  One of the men ran into the house, but quickly returned and resumed his work.  Patton’s car halted at the house’s northwest corner, and the other two cars took up positions at the southwest.  Pershing jumped out and, carrying a rifle and pistol, raced along the ranch’s northern edge.  Two soldiers made a similar dash along the southern wall while the privates covered the windows in case any Mexicans jumped out.  Patton reached the eastern side first and moved toward the gate.  When he was 15 yards from the large arched door, three armed men on horseback burst out from the house.  Seeing Patton standing with his pistol drawn, they dashed toward the southeast corner until they saw the soldiers coming from the south.  The Mexicans turned and rode straight at Patton.  “All three shot at me,” Patton recalled, “one bullet threw gravel at me.  I fired back . . . five times” from a range of 20 yards.  Two of Patton’s shots hit their targets, one entering a horse’s belly, the other breaking the rider’s right arm. 

Patton’s soldiers began firing from the southeast corner, putting him in the line of fire.  Patton ducked behind the corner and reloaded as three bullets hit a foot above his head and covered him in adobe dust.  Consequently, he did not see the man he had shot turn back into the house’s courtyard.

When Patton came around the corner again he was nearly stampeded by a horseman.  Patton fired and broke the horse’s hip, bringing it crashing down on the rider.  When the Mexican disentangled himself and rose to fire, Patton and several other Americans cut him down at a range of about 10 yards.  The third rider had made it 100 yards east of the hacienda before the soldiers fired at him.  He pitched forward dead in the sand near a stone wall.

Two of the three Mexicans were now dead.  The first man, who had reentered the inner patio and climbed out a window, was spotted running from a gate in the southwest corner toward the nearby fields when a fusillade brought him down.  When Holmdahl approached him, the man “held up his left hand in surrender, but when H[olmdahl] was 20 feet from him he raised his pistol and shot at H[olmdahl] but fortunately missed him and H[olmdahl] blew out his brains."

A search of the hacienda turned up no further Villistas, only Cardenas’ family.  Nobody would identify the bodies, however, so the corpses were strapped across the hoods of the three automobiles like hunting trophies.  As they prepared to leave, Patton saw some 40 men on horseback racing toward the hacienda, likely intending to rescue Cardenas.  Outnumbered, the Americans retreated toward Rubio, where the first man Patton had shot was identified as Cardenas.

Pershing allowed Patton to keep Cardenas’ saddle and saber as trophies, began referring to him as “the Bandit,” and promoted him to First Lieutenant.  The Rubio exploit quickly appeared in the U.S. press, and newspaper readers were thrilled to have an attractive, young hero with whom they could associate the Punitive Expedition.  Meanwhile, in Mexico, the Americans buried the rapidly decomposing Mexicans.  Against the backdrop of a blood-red sunset, a veteran sergeant offered an impromptu eulogy: “Ashes to ashes, and dust to dust/ If Villa won’t bury you, Uncle Sam must.”

Today in Manhunting History -- May 13, 1989: Bush Urges PDF Coup

While aboard Air Force One (en route to speak at Mississippi State's commencement ceremony) three days after the violent suppression of protests in Panama City, President George W. Bush summoned the reporters traveling with him to his cabin.  In extemporaneous remarks, he said he had no quarrel with the PDF, just with Noriega and his "thuggery."

"The will of the people should not be thwarted by this man," Bush said.  When a reporter asked what Panamanians should do, the President replied: "They ought to just do everything they can to get Mr. Noriega out of there."  The remarks were widely interpreted as official American encouragement of a coup.

It would take nearly four months before the President's wish came to fruition, and even then only with tragicomic results.

         

Ben on "Kilmeade and Friends" Friday

Tomorrow (Friday) I'll be appearing on Fox Radio's "Kilmeade and Friends" at 10:20AM, Eastern Standard Time.

(Yes, that's the same radio show on which Rosie O'Donnell complained that we didn't give Osama bin Laden due process).

For my part, I'll insist that I don't believe Lord Vader's claim that the Empire's most-wanted-terrorist is dead until they can produce either Obi wan Kenobi's body or photos!  (This is a brilliant parody, by the way, right down to the comments: "I love how the liberal rag GET keeps referring our Defense Star as the "Death Star". Take that propaganda back to Courescant, Nerfherder!!! "

Today in Manhunting History -- May 12, 1927: The Peace of Tititapa

By May 1927, Nicaragua's perpetually feuding Conservative and Liberal factions had been fighting a bloody civil war for nearly year.  In February, the heart of Chinandega was blasted out in street-to-street and house-to-house fighting.  Hundreds were killed on each side, and one observer noted the bones of some bodies had been picked clean by vultures, while others had "only their abdominal cavities scooped out by the ravaging beaks of turkey buzzards who gorge themselves to a nauseating stupor."

In an attempt to end the strife, President Calvin Coolidge sent former Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson to Nicaragua as his personal representative.  Stimson subsequently negotiated an agreement in which the Conservative President Diaz would remain in office until new presidential elections supervised by Americans could be held in 1928.  In the meantime, Diaz would reappoint the Liberal congressmen and judges removed by his coup and appoint Liberal civil governors in Nicaragua's six Liberal-dominated provinces.  Both parties would disband their armies and surrender their arms for bounties.  These forces, including the regular army, would be replaced before the 1928 election by a new, nonpartisan Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, which would be trained, officered, and supported by the United States Marines. 

While today such a mission would be considered a model peacekeeping operation, in 1927 it was an unprecedented form of intervention by U.S. forces in Latin America. 

Although his Liberal forces held the upper hand, Liberal General Jose Marie Moncada admitted to Stimson during their May 11 meeting under a blackthorn tree just outside the village of Tititapa "that neither he nor the Government could pacify the country without the help of the United States."  Consequently, on May 12 Moncada informed the Americans that each of his twelve generals had signed the Tititapa agreement and begun to disarm.

All of his commanders, that is, except for one.

That lone holdout, Augusto C. Sandino, would become the target of what was the longest strategic manhunt in U.S. military history until the recently concluded hunt for bin Laden.

Frontline: Kill/Capture

Yesterday I watched the new PBS Frontline special, "Kill/Capture", which looks at targeted killings as part of our counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.  Although the camera work was great, I thought it was badly biased.  Every mission shown is either a dry hole or they arrest/kill the wrong guy.  The only successful missions are presented directly by a military spokesperson (i.e. General Petraeus) or prefaced as "the military claims" rather than as an objective fact.  Conversely, the Taliban interviewees are allowed to speak without interruption (understandably, I supposed . . . ) or asked any challenging questions.

In other words, they are clearly skeptical of the U.S. military but permit the Taliban to go on extended propaganda diatribes.

Nowhere is it mentioned that there is clear evidence that these operations are having an effect.

"Targeted killings" such as those in Afghanistan/Pakistan, incidentally, are distinct from the strategic manhunts I examine in Wanted Dead or Alive.  Targeted killings are a form of a decapitation strategy, which directs strikes against key leadership and/or telecommunications nodes during a conflict under the assumption that these are an enemy's Achilles' heel.  Historical examples of such campaigns include elements of the Phoenix Program in Vietnam, Israeli forces' targeted killings of Palestinian terrorists during the Second Intifada, and by JSOC against AQI and Jaish al-Mahdi operatives in Iraq.  Although these campaigns targeted individuals, these leaders were targeted because of their specific role in a broader organization rather than the unique threat they posed.  In other words, decapitation strikes targeting individuals are a means to achieve the broader end of battlefield victory.  In a strategic manhunt, the neutralization of the individual is an end in itself. 

Simply put, the man is the mission.

Today in Manhunting History -- May 11, 2004: The Murder of Nicholas Berg

Although he had operated an al-Qa'ida sponsored training camp in Afghanistan and killed an American diplomat in Amman, Jordan, Abu Musab al Zarqawi was largely unkown to Americans until Secretary of State Colin Powell invoked him in his February 2003 presentation at the United Nations as the link between al-Qa'ida and Saddam's regime.  On the second day of Operation Iraqi Freedom, more than 40 U.S. cruise missiles were fired at a terrorist facility near the northern town of Khurmal in hopes of killing Zarqawi.  Yet by the time the Coalition invaded Iraq, the Jordanian had already fled across the Iranian border.

Zarqawi fell off the U.S. radar screen after Baghdad fell in April 2003.  As Coalition forces focused on hunting Saddam, he was lumped together with other foreign Arab terrorists.  In the summer of 2003 Zarqawi moved back to the Sunni areas of Iraq and, beginning with the bombing of the UN headquarters, masterminded an eight-month wave of suicide attacks across Iraq.  Whereas other insurgents targeted Americans or other Coalition military personnel, Zarqawi's network terrorized Shi'a civilians with attacks in market places, cafes, and other crowded, everyday locations.  This spree of suicide bombings culminated with the murder of an estimated 185 Shi'a worshippers celebrating the religious festival of Ashura in twin bombings in Karbala and Baghdad.




Nicholas Berg moments before his beheading by Abu Musab al Zarawi

 Zarqawi's reputation for barbarism, however, was sealed on May 11, 2004, when a video titled "Sheikh Abu Musab Zarqawi Slaughters an American Infidel" appeared on an Islamist web site.  The video showed a thin, bearded man wearing an organge jumpsuit -- who identified himself as Nicholas Berg of West Chester, Pennsylvania -- bound and seated before a row of five men dressed in black, their faces obscured by scarves and ski masks.  One of the masked men, later identified as Zarqawi, read a proclamation in Arabic.  "For the mothers and wives of American soldiers," the short, stocky man said, "You will receive nothing from us but coffin after coffin slaughtered in this way."  The men then pushed Berg to the floor as Zarqawi produced a long knife from his shirt.  He stepped forward and put the blade to Berg's neck.  As the men yelled "Allahu Akbar!" (God is great!), Berg's bloodcurdling screams filled the air.  Zarqawi began to saw until Berg fell silent, and finally held the American's decapitated head to the camera.

Abu Musab al Zarqawi was now the most wanted man in Iraq.

The Age of the Manhunt

I have another article out, the lead piece on Foreign Policy.com examining why strategic manhunts are likely to be a more tempting policy option after Osama bin Laden's death for reasons that actually have little to do with the Abbottabad operation.

As always, comments and critiques are welcome.

On a Lighter Note . . .

No, Star Trek's Maquis were not involved in the Abbottabad raid that killed bin Laden, regardless of what a German TV network says.  (Okay, truth be told, I have no idea who the Maquis were -- I never got into the Star Trek sequel series, but I know some readers are SF geeks and will get a kick out of this).

Also, a lot of people have commented to me about the fortuitous timing of my book given the killing of bin Laden.  Apparently, my luck is dwarfed by Pamela White's, whose romance novel about Navy SEALs was previously scheduled to come out just a few days after bin Laden was killed.

Wait, there's a whole series of romance novels about Navy SEALs?!?  I know what my next book will be!!!  (CPT Dunkle didn't mean to fall in love with Saddam Hussein's niece, but he still had a mission to complete . . .)

Today in Manhunting History -- May 10, 1989: Bloody Panama

Heading into Panama's May 1989 presidential election, polls indicated that the opposition to strongman General Manuel Noriega would win the contest by a two-to-one margin.  Fearful of defeat, Noriega ordered the Panama Defense Forces and his personal paramilitary organization, the "Dignity Battalions," to seize the ballot boxes, close select polling stations, and intimidate the opposition and its supporters.  Despite this massive fraud, exit polls conducted by the Catholic Church showed 55.1 percent for the opposition candidate, Guillermo Endara, and 39.5 percent for Noriega's proxy candidate, Carlos Duque.  Noreiga quickly cancelled the elections and installed another crony, Francisco Rodriguez, as president.

On May 10, the cheated opposition candidates organized a rally to protest the stolen election near Noriega's military headquarters, La Comandancia.  Thousands of demonstrators honked car horns and chanted "Down with the pineapple," in Spanish, a reference to Noriega's pockmarked face.  In response, Noriega unleashed his paramilitary thugs on the protestors.  As the march proceeded down the Via Espana in Panama City, men wearing red T-shirts inscribed "Dignity Battalions" descended upon the crowd, furiously swinging steel pipes, tire irons, and planks with jutting nails.  Endara was quickly knocked unconscious, lying in the street bleeding from a gash in his head.  The bodyguard of vice-presidential candidate Guillermo "Billy" Ford was shot dead.  Ford himself staggered desperately along the sidewalk, his white shirt drenched in his bodyguard's blood, hounded by Noriega's goons at every step.  Television cameras captured the horrifying, indelible images of the patrician, white-haired Ford being struck by one fist after another, a look of sheer terror in his eyes as a lead pipe was raised against him.

For many Americans, this would be the symbol that defined Manuel Noriega's Panama, and formed the backdrop for Operation Just Cause six months later. 

Target Neutralized

My piece on what the history of strategic manhunts tells us about the strategic significance of killing bin Laden in the new edition of The Weekly Standard (also available on newstands).

The Next Bin Laden

Following up on Bill Roggio's piece Friday, John Schindler compares the merits (or demerits) of the candidates to replace bin Laden.

Schindler makes an interesting point at the end, arguing the SEALs operation is the War on Terror's Battle of El-Alamein -- not the beginning of the end, but rather the end of the beginning.

Today in Manhunting History -- May 9, 1914: "The Life of General Villa"

Even amidst the vicious backdrop of the Mexican Revolution, Pancho Villa stood out for his brutality.  After each victory, Villa ordered the mass executions of hundreds of prisoners.  He oversaw the torture and slaughter of hundreds of ethnic Chinese in the towns he captured.  And any individual who dared cross him, including friends who fell out of favor like the American writer Ambrose Bierce, were murdered without hesitation.

But America loves bad boys. 

Despite his depredations, Villa's flamboyance and reputation for helping the poor made him a popular figure with the American press and the public, and even the staid New York Times referred to Villa as "the Robin Hood of Mexico."  President Wilson himself declared that Villa was "not so bad as he had been painted," and that amidst the turmoil of the Revolution, "Villa was perhaps the safest man to tie to."

Thus, on May 9, 1914, The Life of General Villa, filmed by the Mutual Film Corporation with Villa's permission, premiered at the Lyric Theater in New York City.  (The photo below is of Villa above his famous horse, Siete Legusa, in a still from the film).

HBO made a movie, "And Starring Pancho Villa as himself" about this episode in 2003 starring Antonio Banderas.  Also, another biopic about Villa is in development, although Johnny Depp, who was supposed to portray Villa, is no longer attached to the film.

It is a topic for another time, but it never ceases to amaze me how Hollywood lionizes the men whom America targeted (Geronimo, Villa, Che Guevara, and supposedly Pablo Escobar), each of whom was a bad man, while the heroes who tracked them down are lost to history if not altogether forgotten.