Today in Manhunting History -- May 29, 1998: The Raid That Never Was

Note: Updated to edit a bad grammatical error in the opening sentence . . . that will teach me to post while trying to build a Lego castle with a five-year-old at the same time.

By May 1998, the CIA’s Counter Terrorism Center had spent months planning a raid on Tarnak Farms, Osama bin Laden’s compound on the outskirts of Kandahar comprising about 80 concrete or mud-brick buildings surrounded by a 10-foot wall, for some time. CIA officers were able to map the entire site from satellite photos, identifying the houses belonging to bin Laden’s wives and the one where he was most likely to sleep. The plan was meticulously detailed. One team of Afghan tribals on the CIA payroll would enter the compound through a drainage ditch that ran under the fence while another team would sneak through the front gate, using silenced pistols to eliminate the guards. When they found bin Laden, they would hold him in a provisioned cave 30 miles away until the Americans could take custody. From May 20 to 24 the CIA ran a successful final rehearsal of the operation. The CTC planned to brief cabinet-level principals and their deputies the following week. June 23 would be D-Day for the raid, with bin Laden in American custody by July 23.

Satellite imagery of Tarnak Farms used to prepare for the proposed 1998 raid.

 Although a Principals Committee meeting to approve the operation was scheduled for May 30, it never took place. The White House Counterterror Strategy Group, led by Richard Clarke, perceived the Afghan tribals as a bunch of aging anti-Soviet mujahideen well past their prime and milking the CIA for easy money while avoiding any real operations on the ground. Moreover, the CIA’s senior management did not believe the plan would succeed. Thus on May 29, CTC Chief Jeff O’Connell informed the Bin Laden unit that cabinet-level officials thought the risk of civilian casualties was too high, and the decision had been made to abort the operation.

The working-level CIA officers were disappointed, believing the raid to be the “best plan we are going to come up with to capture [bin Laden] while he is in Afghanistan and bring him to justice.” The tribals’ reported readiness to act was subsequently diminished. And as the 9/11 Commission later noted, “No capture plan before 9/11 ever again attained the same level of detail and preparation.”