Today in Manhunting History -- October 4, 1993: The Battle of the Black Sea, Part II

At 1:55AM, October 4, the relief convoy finally reached Task Force Ranger’s perimeter. The combined force waited almost three hours while Wolcott’s body was extracted from Super 61. Seeing the preparations for withdrawal, the Somalis increased their fire and committed their last reserves. Finally, the combined force was able to depart the crash site at 0537. Because there were so many non-ambulatory wounded, there was not enough room in the vehicles for all the soldiers. Some of the corpses were placed atop the Malaysian APCs, a morbid spectacle given that “some bodies were missing pieces and others did not resemble a cadaver.” The nervous Malaysian drivers took off, leaving the Rangers and Delta operators who had been fighting 14 hours straight behind, and forcing them to run through the same streets they had already fought through before in what became known in Ranger lore as “The Mogadishu Mile.” Eventually they overtook and stopped a Pakistani M-113. By 6:20AM all personnel were loaded and movement continued until they reached the safety of the Pakistani perimeter at the stadium.

Overall, it was an impressive feat. Task Force Ranger had raided into the heart of the adversary’s stronghold in broad daylight and seized 24 prisoners, including the two “Tier One” leaders they were after. The cost had been steep: 18 Americans dead, one missing, and 84 wounded. But the Somalis had clearly fared worse, suffering an estimated 500-1,000 fatalities. In the mind of at least one Delta operator, “they’d just fought one of the most one-sided battles in American history.”

Aideed later said he had been just to the east of the target house at the time of the raid. Within 20 minutes the SNA had sealed the roads and the warlord was moved to a safer location. Yet even if he personally escaped harm, the “Battle of the Black Sea” had cost the warlord dearly. Many families aligned with him had suffered casualties, and local spies reported some of Aideed’s strongest clan allies had fled Mogadishu fearing the seemingly inevitable American retribution. Others were sending peace feelers, offering to dump Aideed to avoid further bloodshed. The SNA’s arsenal of RPGs were depleted, and both General Garrison and Howe believed Aideed had been struck a mortal blow. Consequently, they pressed their U.S. and UN superiors to take the initiative and finish the job.

The perception in Washington, however, was shaped by the vivid television images of dead and naked bodies of U.S. soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. President Clinton was in a hotel room in San Francisco when he saw the horrifying pictures. Angered, he asked his staff “How could this happen?” even though the raid was the direct result of his policy decisions. Many in Congress demanded an immediate withdrawal from Somalia, and as was the case with the Sandino manhunt 60 years prior, the outrage over U.S. casualties caused the White House to throw in the towel.

To many Americans, this was the lasting image of the October 3-4 battle, as well as of the broader hunt for Mohammed Farah Aideed.