Although the firefight of 4 February was a random occurrence, General Otis had spent the previous three months carefully developing a battle plan with his division commanders and Admiral Dewey. On the morning of 5 February he put this contingency plan into effect and ordered immediate offensive operations. The subsequent battle would be the biggest of the war, fought along a 16-mile front and involving all or part of 13 regiments and thousands of Filipinos. By the afternoon the Americans had overwhelmed the Filipino nationalist forces, taking all the disputed territory between the armies while suffering 238 casualties – of whom 44 were killed in action or died of their wounds – against an estimated 4,000 Filipino casualties.
The intensity of the American assault stunned Aguinaldo and his generals. Filipino morale had been soaring after the string of victories over demoralized Spanish forces – as well as the failure of U.S. forces to respond to numerous provocations. Five-hundred pound shells from Dewey’s guns crashed into the Filipino trenches. Unlike the Spaniards, the Americans were excellent shots, were aggressive, and moved fast. Aguinaldo sent envoys to Otis offering a truce and the creation of a neutral buffer between the two armies, to be followed by peace talks, but Otis simply replied: “The fighting, having once begun, must go on to the grim end.”
Aguinaldo was quickly demonized by Americans. Secretary of War Elihu Root called him “an assassin” and “a Chinese half-breed.” Frank Millet wrote in Harper’s Weekly that “he has the keen cunning of the Chinaman, and the personal vanity and light mental caliber of the Filipino.” The New York Times declared that Aguinaldo was nothing but “a vain popinjay, wicked liar, and a perfectly incapable leader” whose men were “dupes, a foolish incredulous mob,” and that the “mischievous influence of this tricky little man must be broken.” Even Admiral Dewey, who had previously spoken fondly of the young Filipino, told anyone who would listen that Aguinaldo was only interested in “revenge, plunder, and pillage.”
Otis, whom one historian has aptly described as “the Philippine war’s answer to George McClellan, without the latter’s good looks,” was slow to pursue the battered Filipino forces, and allowed a month to pass before resuming the offensive. It wouldn't be until late March that he ordered Major General Arthur MacArthur’s division to attack along the railway line stretching north out of the capital to capture Malolos, 20 miles up the line. Otis believed that the north held the enemy’s center of gravity -- its army, its capital, and its commander-in-chief, Aguinaldo -- and was sure that the capture of this trinity would break the opposition.
|
MG Otis and staff at Malcanan Palace, Manilla |