- On the "pro" side, in The Atlantic, Amitai Etzioni with "Everything Libertarians and Liberals Get Wrong About Drones"; and
- In the "con" corner, Steve Coll's New Yorker piece, "Remote Control: Our drone delusion"
Are drones perfect? No, they are only as good as the men and women operating them. But they allow for more checks and greater accuracy in the targeting process than any comparable weapons system.
Has there been unintended civilian deaths due to drone strikes against al-Qa'ida leadership? Of course, and it is tragic. But collateral damage occurs during every war, and we simply can not choose to disengage in the fight against Salafist terrorists simply because they devalue life so much that they choose to hide behind human shields. At the risk of being crass, I would rather take a small risk of harming a limited number of extremist sympathizers (or those not discriminating enough to avoid houses or ceremonies with jihadist leaders) in order to reduce the risk of future attacks to American civilians.
That being said, I found Etzioni's article to be flawed. He is correct to note that "it is difficult to reach conclusive judgments [about civilian casualties], as neither critics nor proponents of drones are actually there to observe the effects of drone strikes. Instead we often have to rely upon reports from locals, who are notoriously unreliable." But I think he is too quick to dismiss the argument that the drone strikes may be counterproductive because they turn local populations against us, create more terrorists and sympathizers in the process, and therefore undermine our own strategic goals. While theoretically possible, I don't think we've hit this tipping point yet. But that is not to say that concern should be dismissed out-of-hand. Secondly, it is a legitimate concern to worry that the Obama administration is conducting the war with next to no oversight by Congress. Also writing in The Atlantic, Conor Friedersdorf flatly contradicts Etzioni's assertions regarding Congressional oversight, and quite frankly has the better of the argument.
(I do strongly disagree, however, with Friedersdorf's conclusion that because the Obama administration refuses to defend its program before Congress, ipso facto it is indefensible. I think a simpler answer is because they are arrogant and realize there is nothing Congress can do to stop them: Democrats will not embarrass a President from their own party, and Republicans are generally supportive of the policy. The original decision to intervene in Libya, in my opinion, was eminently defensible, even if the conduct of that operation and subsequent post-conflict policy has been badly mishandled. But the Obama administration similarly never felt compelled to make a case for the air campaign to oust Gaddafi even though he likely had the votes for a Congressional authorization of the use of military force).
However, despite the flaws in Etzioni's piece, I think Coll's is far worse, and this kills me, because Stephen Coll is one of the best writers on international affairs out there. (Ghost Wars is the definitive book on U.S. policy towards Afghanistan pre-9/11, and The Bin Ladens was entertaining and insightful as well. I haven't read his book on ExxonMobil's empire in the Middle East yet, but it is on my list if I ever finish the book I'm currently writing). Coll makes what I see as three fundamental errors in his peace: First, he is surprisingly sloppy in defining the difference between assassinations and targeted killings, and even when he acknowledges this difference repeatedly contradicts himself. In Wanted Dead or Alive I suggest the following distinction between targeted killings and assassinations: whereas the former are a form of decapitation strategy directed against the leadership network or chain-of-command of an organization in an effort to achieve a broader strategic goal (i.e. we kill Joe Smith not because he is uniquely Joe Smith, but rather because he is the #14 ranking officer in an organization in a declared state of war with the United States), assassination is directed at one specific individual whose demise is a strategic goal in and of itself. Coll himself acknowledges this, admitting: "An assassination campaign against suspected terrorists is not the same as one that occasionally rubs out unfriendly political leaders of nation-states," and in the next sentence referring to it properly as a "program of targeted killing." But then he goes on to us the term "assassination" to describe the drone campaign against al-Qa'ida five times. The only reason to contradict himself like this is to lead the reader to associate the decapitation campaign against al-Qa'ida with the moral opprobrium (rightly) applied to assassination. This is a cheap ploy unworthy of as excellent a writer as Coll.
(And again, it is a legitimate argument to claim the killing of American citizens without trial via drone via drone is unconstitutional and against our values. I disagree with it when applied to individuals we know have sworn fealty to al-Qa'ida's leadership, but it is certainly an argument that must always be kept in mind).
Second, Coll argues that it is "far from clear that killing leaders is even a reliable means of disrupting terrorist groups like Al Qaeda." This is a legitimate question, and one that I've tackled before in my work, concluding that operational success in strategic manhunts (or by extension, decapitation campaigns) only correlate to strategic success because of broader counterinsurgency policies. However, even if drone strikes aren't strategically decisive in and of themselves, against an enemy with whom no political accommodation is possible (i.e. al-Qa'ida) sometimes all you can do is whack-a-mole to keep them from planning and launching effective operations themselves. Coll favorably cites academic studies by Jenna Jordan and Aaron Mannes, without citing similar studies that contradict their findings and argue for the utility of decapitation by Patrick Johnston of RAND and Byran Price.
Finally, Coll argues that "America's drone campaign is . . . creating an ominous global precedent," and ask that when China is able to field armed drones (note to Mr. Coll: they already do) "How might its Politburo apply Obama's doctrines to Tibetan activists holding meetings in Nepal?" Alas, I don't think the Chinese pay much attention to international norms as a check on their behavior when they feel their national security or internal stability is threatened. Were the Chinese inhibited by international norms in Tiannamen Square in 1989, or in their persistent harassment of human rights advocates whom they perceive as a threat to the current power structure within China? No. Like most states, they define their national interests as they see fit, and determine the morality of their actions accordingly irrespective of the United States' actions.
Again, one could argue that the drone campaign is strategically counterproductive. One could argue that the Obama administration must be much more transparent with the relevant Congressional committees. And one could plausibly argue that killing American citizens abroad without a trial is a violation of their constitutional rights regardless of their role within al-Qa'ida and hence a betrayal of our values. But to say we shouldn't use this tool to protect ourselves because the Chinese might abuse the technology someday is a very thin reed upon which to make an anti-drone argument.
Okay, wow, that turned out much longer than planned. I guess it is because I admire Coll as a writer so much that I got a bit carried away here. Next time, I'll just provide some links and not pontificate so much.
Have a good weekend!
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