Speaking of Africa . . .

1. Last Thursday the State Department announced it was offering more than $10 million in rewards for information leading to the apprehension of the leaders of several al-Qa'ida affiliated networks in Africa, including $7 million for Abubakar Shekau, leader of Nigerian based Boko Haram, and $5 million for Mokhtar Belmokhtar, leader of the "Signed in Blood Battalion" offshoot of al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

Shekau's Boko Haram has killed more than 2,800 people in its campaign to overthrow the Nigerian government and establish Sharia (its name literally means "Western education is forbidden"), has threatened Western targets in Nigeria (its August 2011 attack against a United Nations facility in Abuja, Nigeria, killed 23 people) and the United States, and has begun aligning itself with AQIM and the Somali-based al-Shabaab. Bekmokhtar, a.k.a. "The Marlboro Man" (a reference to acquiring funding for his splinter group through cigarette smuggling, not because he looks rugged on horseback in magazine ads), was the mastermind behind the raid on British Petroleum's facility in In Amenas, Algeria, that ultimately resulted in the death of 37 hostages, including three Americans.

Although I'm on the record as being a skeptic regarding the utility of bounties in manhunts, if nothing else this is significant as an acknowledgement that these groups pose a threat to U.S. interests, and possibly as a first step toward helping our allies combat these groups before they grow strong enough to directly threaten U.S. targets. Bill Roggio, as always, provides a useful background of Shekau, Belmokhtar, and the Reward for Justice program's other new targets over at The Long War Journal.

(One side note: I appreciated the depiction of the bureaucratic friction that cased Belmokhtar to formally split from AQIM. Apparently, in a memo recovered in a building abandoned by al-Qa'ida fighters in Mali, AQIM described how Belmokhtar "didn't answer his phone when they called, failed to turn in his expense reports, ignored meetings, and refused time and again to carry out" spectacular attacks. Substitute "business development" for "spectacular attacks" and it sounds like any corporate headquarters in America!)

Hostage taking and mass murder aside, I think we can all sympathize with
micromanaging bosses like Mokhtar Belmokhtar's.

2. More disturbingly, the Associated Press also found manuals with Arabic instructions on how to use SA-7 surface-to-air missiles, which are capable of shooting down commercial aircraft. (In Kenya in 2002, for example, suspected Islamic extremists fired two SA-7s at a Boeing 757 carrying 271 Israeli vacationers, fortunately missing their target). In addition to the recovery of the SA-7's battery pack and launch tube by French troops in Mali in March, this suggests that AQIM may have acquired loose MANPADS looted in the wake of Moammar Qaddafi's overthrow in 2011. (Boy, sure glad we learned the post-war lessons from Iraq with regards to securing weapons materiel! In conjunction with the Benghazi consulate attack, suddenly the Obama administration's immaculate intervention model isn't looking so hot anymore).

Noted Georgetown University terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman tells the AP: "If terrorists start training and learn how to use [SA-7s], we'll be in a lot of trouble." This was a concern back when I worked AFRICOM issues in Congress in 2011, and one that I felt was never adequately addressed. A shootdown of a commercial plane could be a game changer in the War on Terror in North Africa, forcing a more direct U.S. involvement against these groups.

French soldiers in March 2013 examining SA-7 battery pack and launch tube abandoned by retreating al-Qa'ida fighters in Mali. This is potentially VERY bad news. Photo by ECPAD, via AP.