This small tactical success had little strategic impact on the Geronimo Campaign, but is possibly the origin of U.S. World War II paratroopers screaming “Geronimo!” as they leaped from airplanes.
Sunday, August 7, 2011
Today in Manhunting History -- August 7, 1885: "Geronimo!!!"
On August 7, Major Wirt Davis’ 4th U.S. Cavalry Apache scouts attacked Geronimo’s camp west of Casas Grandes, Chihuahua. The renegades were caught by surprise, and the warriors were forced to jump over a steep bluff in order to avoid capture. Although Geronimo personally escaped, he lost 13 horses and mules – along with saddles, blankets, and dried meat – in the attack. More devastatingly for the old warrior, two of his wives and five children from his family were among the Chiricahuas captured.
This small tactical success had little strategic impact on the Geronimo Campaign, but is possibly the origin of U.S. World War II paratroopers screaming “Geronimo!” as they leaped from airplanes.
This small tactical success had little strategic impact on the Geronimo Campaign, but is possibly the origin of U.S. World War II paratroopers screaming “Geronimo!” as they leaped from airplanes.
Saturday, August 6, 2011
Horrible News
I just returned from my trip to New York, and was greeted with the terrible news that 22 members of SEAL Team Six were among the 31 U.S. servicemen killed when their Chinook was shot down by a RPG in the Tangi Valley in Wardak Province just west of Kabul.
More details will emerge of course. But for now, our prayers and condolences go out to the families and survivors of those heroes killed.
More details will emerge of course. But for now, our prayers and condolences go out to the families and survivors of those heroes killed.
Thursday, August 4, 2011
Schmidle Muddle?
C. Christine Fair questions the authenticity of the New Yorker article on the SEALs Abbottabad raid by Nicholas Schmidle I linked to on Monday.
I think the writing/editing of the story is misleading in some ways I didn't notice at first, as there are a few passages which clearly imply he had interviewed the SEALs themselves, which he apparently didn't. As Paul Farhi notes in yesterday's Washington Post:
Second, I think it is a major leap to say that any inaccuracies in the story will undermine the effectiveness of U.S. Cyber Command. (Schmidle's father is Marine Lt. Gen. Robert E. Schmidle, Jr., deputy commander of CyberCom). The story Schmidle outlines conforms largely to the previous accounts of the raid that have been published, albeit with much greater detail and dramatic flourish. But there is nothing so earth-shattering in his account, in my opinion, to make it appear to be propaganda or disinformation. Again, those who are predisposed to believe CyberCom is part of some vast U.S.-imperial conspiracy do not need a loosely sourced essay in the New Yorker to lead them to this conclusion.
Fair may have something of a point regarding how Schmidle has the shooter saying "For God and For Country, Geronimo, Geronimo, Geronimo" may be perceived in the Muslim world. This is new information compared to previous accounts (which I cite in Wanted Dead or Alive) which could alter some perceptions. But again, I think that having U.S. black helicopters invade a suburb 130 miles into Pakistan would likely, in and of itself, be enough to fuel concerns about U.S. imperialism. Really, would Muslims be less offended had the SEAL shooter had yelled Allahu Akbar ("God is Great!") before shooting an unarmed bin Laden? (Seriously, if anybody knows the answer to this I'd really be interested in hearing your thoughts).
None of this is to say that The New Yorker shouldn't have edited the piece more carefully, or at least explicitly noted somewhere that none of the SEALs were interviewed for the article. As evidenced by the excerpts Farhi notes, the result is misleading at best. However, I think the policy conclusions that Fair (who is undoubtedly a leading scholar on Pakistan) go too far in placing sole attribution for Pakistani or Muslim paranoia on American actions.
I think the writing/editing of the story is misleading in some ways I didn't notice at first, as there are a few passages which clearly imply he had interviewed the SEALs themselves, which he apparently didn't. As Paul Farhi notes in yesterday's Washington Post:
The SEALs, he writes of the raid’s climactic moment, “instantly sensed that it was Crankshaft,” the mission’s name for bin Laden, implying that the SEALs themselves had conveyed this impression to him.But I think Fair overreaches in her conclusion about the implication of this lapse. First, given the prevalence of conspiracy theories in the Muslim world, I don't think any account, no matter how well-sourced or footnoted will dispel all unresolved questions about the Abbottabad raid. When Fair says "Mr. Schmidle's is the first (and so far only) account of the drama," she apparently is forgetting the multiple conflicting accounts offered by the White House in the week after the raid, as well as Kim Dozier's comprehensive piece on the raid.
He also writes that the raiders “were further jostled by the awareness that they were possibly minutes away from ending the costliest manhunt in American history; as a result, some of their recollections — on which this account is based — may be imprecise and, thus, subject to dispute.”
Except that the account was based not on their recollections but on the recollections of people who spoke to the SEALs.
Second, I think it is a major leap to say that any inaccuracies in the story will undermine the effectiveness of U.S. Cyber Command. (Schmidle's father is Marine Lt. Gen. Robert E. Schmidle, Jr., deputy commander of CyberCom). The story Schmidle outlines conforms largely to the previous accounts of the raid that have been published, albeit with much greater detail and dramatic flourish. But there is nothing so earth-shattering in his account, in my opinion, to make it appear to be propaganda or disinformation. Again, those who are predisposed to believe CyberCom is part of some vast U.S.-imperial conspiracy do not need a loosely sourced essay in the New Yorker to lead them to this conclusion.
Fair may have something of a point regarding how Schmidle has the shooter saying "For God and For Country, Geronimo, Geronimo, Geronimo" may be perceived in the Muslim world. This is new information compared to previous accounts (which I cite in Wanted Dead or Alive) which could alter some perceptions. But again, I think that having U.S. black helicopters invade a suburb 130 miles into Pakistan would likely, in and of itself, be enough to fuel concerns about U.S. imperialism. Really, would Muslims be less offended had the SEAL shooter had yelled Allahu Akbar ("God is Great!") before shooting an unarmed bin Laden? (Seriously, if anybody knows the answer to this I'd really be interested in hearing your thoughts).
None of this is to say that The New Yorker shouldn't have edited the piece more carefully, or at least explicitly noted somewhere that none of the SEALs were interviewed for the article. As evidenced by the excerpts Farhi notes, the result is misleading at best. However, I think the policy conclusions that Fair (who is undoubtedly a leading scholar on Pakistan) go too far in placing sole attribution for Pakistani or Muslim paranoia on American actions.
Media Alert: Friday, August 5
I will be on "The Dylan Ratigan Show" on MSNBC tomorrow afternoon (Friday the 5th). Given that I'm going to be on a panel with a writer from The Nation, an unsuccessful Democratic candidate for Congress, and a novelist/essayist who covers Hip Hop for Rolling Stone (and claims conservatives opposed to the rapper Common being invited to the White House so they could prevent President Obama from receiving credit for killing bin Laden)*, I doubt my book or counter-terrorism will be the primary topic of conversation.
But given the lineup I've outlined above, I think it should be high entertainment value regardless!
*Actually, conspiracy theories aside, Toure sounds like one of the coolest people on the planet. I will not try to appear to be anything but the hopeless square that I am when we are on together.
But given the lineup I've outlined above, I think it should be high entertainment value regardless!
*Actually, conspiracy theories aside, Toure sounds like one of the coolest people on the planet. I will not try to appear to be anything but the hopeless square that I am when we are on together.
Tuesday, August 2, 2011
Release Day!!!
"Wanted Dead or Alive: Manhunts from Geronimo to bin Laden" was finally released today!!! (Finally, because I first conceived the idea for this book in 2003, put it off endlessly until some combination of inspiration, desperation, and lubrication -- in the form of a bottle of Portuguese wine shared with a friend who gave me the necessary kick in the ass to move forward with the project -- led me to finally start writing in November 2008).
In case you have not already, now is the time to order early and often! You can order from either:
Amazon - http://www.amazon.com/Wanted-Dead-Alive-Manhunts-Geronimo/dp/0230104851/ref=pd_rhf_p_t_1
Barnes and Noble - http://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/wanted-dead-or-alive-benjamin-runkle/1100667325; or
IndieBound - http://www.indiebound.org/book/9780230104853
I'll celebrate with family tonight, and return to the killing and capturing tomorrow. Until then, enjoy the funny from The Onion, which is eerily perceptive in its satire of the War on Terror
In case you have not already, now is the time to order early and often! You can order from either:
Amazon - http://www.amazon.com/Wanted-Dead-Alive-Manhunts-Geronimo/dp/0230104851/ref=pd_rhf_p_t_1
Barnes and Noble - http://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/wanted-dead-or-alive-benjamin-runkle/1100667325; or
IndieBound - http://www.indiebound.org/book/9780230104853
I'll celebrate with family tonight, and return to the killing and capturing tomorrow. Until then, enjoy the funny from The Onion, which is eerily perceptive in its satire of the War on Terror
Monday, August 1, 2011
"What Happened That Night in Abbottabad"
If you haven't read it already, pour yourself a drink and settle down to read Eric Schmidle's piece on the SEALs Abbottabad raid in The New Yorker.
Go ahead, I'll wait.
We can discuss this tomorrow after you've had a chance to digest it, but for now, just know that his account surpasses Kimberly Dozier's May 17 article as the definitive account of the raid, and if I get to write a revised/expanded edition of "Wanted Dead or Alive," will be cited heavily.
But for now, just enjoy the kick-ass!
Go ahead, I'll wait.
We can discuss this tomorrow after you've had a chance to digest it, but for now, just know that his account surpasses Kimberly Dozier's May 17 article as the definitive account of the raid, and if I get to write a revised/expanded edition of "Wanted Dead or Alive," will be cited heavily.
But for now, just enjoy the kick-ass!
Al-Qa'ida on the Brink? Two Dissents
The Los Angeles Times provides some additional reporting on Douglas E. Lute's appearance at the Aspen Security Forum Friday, quoting the lieutenant general as saying "I think there are three to five senior leaders that, if they're removed from the battlefield, would jeopardize Al Qaeda's capacity to regenerate."
Two dissenting views garnered some attention last week. Previously, on Thursday retired Admiral Dennis C. Blair, who was forced out last year as Director of National Intelligence, told the same forum that the United States should end the drone war in Pakistan. "It's not going to lower the threat to the U.S.," he said, because al-Qa'ida has proved "it can sustain its level of resistance to an air-only campaign." Instead, Blair believes that cooperation with the government's of Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia is the only way to bring peace to the world's ungoverned spaces. He goes so far as to say that drone strikes in Pakistan need "two hands on the trigger," and should be launched only when "we agree with them on what drone attacks" should target.
Umm, yeah.
Apparently, Admiral Blair hasn't heard about the planned operations against jihadist IED factories in Pakistan that failed either due to poor operational security or deliberate tip-offs after the United States shared the intelligence with the Pakistanis, precisely the "dual-trigger" relationship Blair envisions. Also, Blair fails to consider that one way of changing conditions on the ground for the better in failed or at-risk states is precisely by killing the extremists who seek to terrorize the local population and undermine the legitimate authorities through terrorist attacks and intimidation. Does Blair really think that al-Qa'ida activists in these countries would be less interested in attacking the United States if we worked more closely with governments they consider apostates against their version of the true Islam?
Second, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross writes in National Review Online that statements such as Lute's (or earlier, Secretary Panetta) regarding al-Qa'ida's vulnerability should be taken with a large grain of salt given that U.S. officials have said the terrorist organization was on the ropes several times before over the last decade. I think Gartenstein-Ross's point about the failure of previous intelligence assessments is correct, but ignores the key point I noted earlier of distinguishing between AQSL and al-Qa'ida's affiliates.
The idea that we may be "three to five senior leaders" away from permanently crippling the core of the group based in Pakistan may be true (as if killing/capturing those 3-5 were an easy task in its own right), but this won't necessarily impinge upon the various affiliates' -- al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al-Qa'ida in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb,or al-Sha'baab -- ability to target U.S. interests or the homeland itself. These are not mutually exclusive developments.
Indeed, although we likely disagree regarding Osama bin Laden's importantce at the time of the Abbottabad raid, I think Gartenstein-Ross would agree that even with bin Laden dead, bin Ladenism lives on, and hence in terms of counter-terrorism policy little has changed since May 1 as we continue to target the broader network.
Two dissenting views garnered some attention last week. Previously, on Thursday retired Admiral Dennis C. Blair, who was forced out last year as Director of National Intelligence, told the same forum that the United States should end the drone war in Pakistan. "It's not going to lower the threat to the U.S.," he said, because al-Qa'ida has proved "it can sustain its level of resistance to an air-only campaign." Instead, Blair believes that cooperation with the government's of Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia is the only way to bring peace to the world's ungoverned spaces. He goes so far as to say that drone strikes in Pakistan need "two hands on the trigger," and should be launched only when "we agree with them on what drone attacks" should target.
Umm, yeah.
Apparently, Admiral Blair hasn't heard about the planned operations against jihadist IED factories in Pakistan that failed either due to poor operational security or deliberate tip-offs after the United States shared the intelligence with the Pakistanis, precisely the "dual-trigger" relationship Blair envisions. Also, Blair fails to consider that one way of changing conditions on the ground for the better in failed or at-risk states is precisely by killing the extremists who seek to terrorize the local population and undermine the legitimate authorities through terrorist attacks and intimidation. Does Blair really think that al-Qa'ida activists in these countries would be less interested in attacking the United States if we worked more closely with governments they consider apostates against their version of the true Islam?
Second, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross writes in National Review Online that statements such as Lute's (or earlier, Secretary Panetta) regarding al-Qa'ida's vulnerability should be taken with a large grain of salt given that U.S. officials have said the terrorist organization was on the ropes several times before over the last decade. I think Gartenstein-Ross's point about the failure of previous intelligence assessments is correct, but ignores the key point I noted earlier of distinguishing between AQSL and al-Qa'ida's affiliates.
The idea that we may be "three to five senior leaders" away from permanently crippling the core of the group based in Pakistan may be true (as if killing/capturing those 3-5 were an easy task in its own right), but this won't necessarily impinge upon the various affiliates' -- al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al-Qa'ida in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb,or al-Sha'baab -- ability to target U.S. interests or the homeland itself. These are not mutually exclusive developments.
Indeed, although we likely disagree regarding Osama bin Laden's importantce at the time of the Abbottabad raid, I think Gartenstein-Ross would agree that even with bin Laden dead, bin Ladenism lives on, and hence in terms of counter-terrorism policy little has changed since May 1 as we continue to target the broader network.
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