Two pieces today (by Peter Bergen on CNN.com and in The Hill) reporting on SEAL Team Six members calling shenanigans on Esquire's account of the Abbottabad raid, based upon "The Shooter"'s version of events. Today's accounts largely conform to what an anonymous SEAL wrote on Brandon Webb's blog, a reputable source of information on the SOF community.
Numerous Navy, SOCOM, and Veterans Affairs' spokespeople have already poked holes in reporter Phil Bronstein's claim that "The Shooter" has been abandoned by the military and is now unemployed and ineligible to receive health benefits. But if Webb and Bergen's SEAL sources are correct, the puzzle becomes clearer . . . well, at least a little bit. If the "The Shooter" was indeed fired from the DevGru due to repeated indiscretions regarding Operation Neptune Spear, it is understandable why he would want to get out before reaching the 20-year mark for full retirement benefits, and why he'd want to stick it to the Navy and SOCOM by making false claims about his benefits. Moreover, the new SEAL speaking anonymously would appear to largely corroborate "Mark Owen"'s account of the raid in No Easy Day.
Again, I say "a little bit" clearer because we are still talking about a "He Said/He Said" situation between anonymous sources, neither which version can be corroborated without reliance on more anonymous sources. But while I respect and appreciate "The Shooter"'s service (which extends beyond any tall tales he may tell about Abbottabad), "Mark Owen" and the third SEAL's account is more plausible from a tactical angle. Additionally, for my money Bergen comes off as more credible than Bronstein (who is not a bad reporter by any means), given the depth of his experience on the topic and that he isn't also trying to push an alternate angle to the story that would be embarrassing to the military for allegedly abandoning a hero (which isn't to say the VA isn't a hot mess a lot of the time in providing veterans with services).
Regardless, one reads all these accounts and comes away amazed at the tactical acumen, selfless courage, and incredible discipline of "The Point Man," who likely got off the fatal shot on Osama Bin Laden, subsequently used his body to shield his teammates from potential suicide belts on bin Laden's wives (which they fortunately were not wearing), and perhaps more amazing, has managed to remain silent about these events to this day.
Wednesday, March 27, 2013
Tuesday, March 19, 2013
Today in Manhunting History (Special Anniversary Edition) -- March 19, 2003: The Dora Farms Mission
(Originally posted March 19, 2012, but reposted in conjunction with all the 10th anniversary remembrances of the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom)
After months of steady military buildup in the Persian Gulf region and Sisyphean diplomacy at the United Nations, on March 17, 2003, President George W. Bush announced that Saddam could avoid war under one condition: if he and his sons left Iraq within 48 hours. Speaking from the White House following a meeting abroad with allied leaders, Bush declared: “The decades of deceit and cruelty have now reached an end,” and that if Saddam and his sons did not accept this final offer, their refusal “will result in military conflict.” The intricately planned military timetable for “D-Day” – which involved commando raids, the beginning of the “Shock and Awe” air strikes, and the ground invasion led by the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force and the Army’s V Corps – was synchronized with the expiration of President Bush’s deadline.
The next day on March 18, however, a CIA source learned of a possible meeting that night at Dora Farms, an estate owned by Saddam’s wife southeast of Baghdad on the bank of the Tigris River. Although it was unclear who would be present, indications were that Saddam’s sons Uday and Qusay, and perhaps the entire family, might be planning a meeting there to discuss what to do if the Coalition invaded. “At that point,” CIA Director George Tenet recalled, “we ordered U.S. overhead reconnaissance to examine the site closely. What we saw was a large contingent of security vehicles, precisely the kinds that would typically precede and accompany Saddam’s movements, hidden under trees at the farm.” Sometime after 12:30 PM (8:30PM Baghdad time) the CIA’s source on the scene reported Uday and Qusay were definitely at the farm, that he had actually seen Saddam, and that the dictator would be returning to spend the night with his sons sometime between 3-3:30 AM Baghdad time. Tenet told the President’s war cabinet: “It’s as good as it gets. I can’t give you 100 percent assurance, but this is as good as it gets.”
Given CENTCOM’s elaborate plan of attack, attempting to strike Dora Farms posed a significant risk. If Saddam was not present, the United States would be telegraphing that a major air and ground attack was forthcoming, thereby forfeiting strategic surprise. Yet when President Bush met with his war cabinet that afternoon, all of Bush’s advisors recommended the strike, with Secretary of State Colin Powell saying: “If we’ve got a chance to decapitate them, it’s worth it.”
The latest information indicated that while at Dora Farms Saddam would be staying in a manzul, an Arabic word that could be translated either as “place of refuge” or “basement/bunker.” If there were a bunker at Dora Farms, cruise missiles would not be able to take it out. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Meyers called CENTCOM commander General Tommy Franks on a secure phone. Could a stealth fighter be loaded with EGBU-27 bunker busting bombs in time for the attack?
“Absolutely not,” Franks replied. “We don’t have the F-117 ready to go.” Franks checked further, however, and learned that the Air Force been following the intelligence and had prepared the planes at Al Udeid airbase in Qatar. Franks sent word to the White House that an attack would indeed be possible.
There was one important tactical problem, however. To execute the mission the F-117s would have to fly into the heart of Iraq’s air defenses, which surrounded the capital with surface-to-air missile sites and antiaircraft artillery. Although F-117s are virtually invisible to radar and ground observers while flying at night at high altitude, in daylight they become relatively slow, defenseless targets. According to the weather and light data, first twilight – when aircraft become visible from the ground – would be at 5:39 AM.
General Meyers called again, asking how long the President had to make a final decision on the attack. “Tom, I need your drop-dead, no-shit decision time.”
In order to get the planes in and out of Iraqi airspace before dawn, Franks said, “Time on target must be no later than 0530 Iraq time, Dick, with takeoff from Al Udeid no later than 0330. . . . I need the President’s decision by 0315, so the jets can start engines and taxi.”
It was already 2:27 AM.
Time passed slowly in CENTCOM’s headquarters. At 2:59 AM Franks received word that the aircraft were armed, and the pilots were briefed and sitting on the runway in their planes.
Finally, at 3:12 AM, the phone rang. “The mission is a go, Tom,” General Meyers said. “Please execute.”
At 3:38 Qatari time, Lieutenant Colonel Dave Toomey and Major Mark Hoehn were airborne, flying north towards Baghdad in a race with the dawn. An hour later, 45 Tomahawk land attack missiles (TLAMs) were fired from surface vessels and submarines in the North Arabian Gulf. Each TLAM carried a 1,000-pound warhead, and once launched was impossible to recall.
The campaign to kill Saddam Hussein was under way.
As Toomey and Hoehn neared Baghdad, the GPS on one of Toomey’s bombs went dead. The EGBU-27’s had never been used in combat, and had only arrived in Qatar the day before the mission. So Toomey, a combat veteran and the squadron’s director of operations, literally pulled out the instruction manual, rebooted the computerized guidance system, and hoped for the best. As Toomey and Hoehn approached Dora Farms along oval flight paths from the east and west, the sun was almost above the horizon. Clouds shielded them from ground observation, but also hid the target complex. At the last moment, however, the pilots found a break in the clouds that gave them six seconds to visually identify the targets and drop the bombs at 5:36 AM Baghdad time.
Although Toomey and Hoehn could not know if they had gotten Saddam, reconnaissance photos showed all four bombs hit their target squarely. When the first intelligence reports from the scene started coming in, the CIA’s source reported that someone who looked to be Saddam was pulled from the rubble, looking blue and receiving oxygen. He had been put on a stretcher and loaded into the back of an ambulance, which did not move for half an hour before leaving the complex. Around 4:30 AM Tenet called the White House Situation Room and told the duty officer: “Tell the President we got the son of a bitch!”
Several hours later, however, Saddam appeared on Iraqi television. He was wearing an army uniform, a beret, and glasses. For seven minutes he read from a notepad, denouncing the American attack. It was not clear to U.S. analysts whether the address was live or taped, whether it was Saddam or a body double.
The next day on March 18, however, a CIA source learned of a possible meeting that night at Dora Farms, an estate owned by Saddam’s wife southeast of Baghdad on the bank of the Tigris River. Although it was unclear who would be present, indications were that Saddam’s sons Uday and Qusay, and perhaps the entire family, might be planning a meeting there to discuss what to do if the Coalition invaded. “At that point,” CIA Director George Tenet recalled, “we ordered U.S. overhead reconnaissance to examine the site closely. What we saw was a large contingent of security vehicles, precisely the kinds that would typically precede and accompany Saddam’s movements, hidden under trees at the farm.” Sometime after 12:30 PM (8:30PM Baghdad time) the CIA’s source on the scene reported Uday and Qusay were definitely at the farm, that he had actually seen Saddam, and that the dictator would be returning to spend the night with his sons sometime between 3-3:30 AM Baghdad time. Tenet told the President’s war cabinet: “It’s as good as it gets. I can’t give you 100 percent assurance, but this is as good as it gets.”
Given CENTCOM’s elaborate plan of attack, attempting to strike Dora Farms posed a significant risk. If Saddam was not present, the United States would be telegraphing that a major air and ground attack was forthcoming, thereby forfeiting strategic surprise. Yet when President Bush met with his war cabinet that afternoon, all of Bush’s advisors recommended the strike, with Secretary of State Colin Powell saying: “If we’ve got a chance to decapitate them, it’s worth it.”
The latest information indicated that while at Dora Farms Saddam would be staying in a manzul, an Arabic word that could be translated either as “place of refuge” or “basement/bunker.” If there were a bunker at Dora Farms, cruise missiles would not be able to take it out. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Meyers called CENTCOM commander General Tommy Franks on a secure phone. Could a stealth fighter be loaded with EGBU-27 bunker busting bombs in time for the attack?
“Absolutely not,” Franks replied. “We don’t have the F-117 ready to go.” Franks checked further, however, and learned that the Air Force been following the intelligence and had prepared the planes at Al Udeid airbase in Qatar. Franks sent word to the White House that an attack would indeed be possible.
There was one important tactical problem, however. To execute the mission the F-117s would have to fly into the heart of Iraq’s air defenses, which surrounded the capital with surface-to-air missile sites and antiaircraft artillery. Although F-117s are virtually invisible to radar and ground observers while flying at night at high altitude, in daylight they become relatively slow, defenseless targets. According to the weather and light data, first twilight – when aircraft become visible from the ground – would be at 5:39 AM.
General Meyers called again, asking how long the President had to make a final decision on the attack. “Tom, I need your drop-dead, no-shit decision time.”
In order to get the planes in and out of Iraqi airspace before dawn, Franks said, “Time on target must be no later than 0530 Iraq time, Dick, with takeoff from Al Udeid no later than 0330. . . . I need the President’s decision by 0315, so the jets can start engines and taxi.”
It was already 2:27 AM.
Time passed slowly in CENTCOM’s headquarters. At 2:59 AM Franks received word that the aircraft were armed, and the pilots were briefed and sitting on the runway in their planes.
Finally, at 3:12 AM, the phone rang. “The mission is a go, Tom,” General Meyers said. “Please execute.”
At 3:38 Qatari time, Lieutenant Colonel Dave Toomey and Major Mark Hoehn were airborne, flying north towards Baghdad in a race with the dawn. An hour later, 45 Tomahawk land attack missiles (TLAMs) were fired from surface vessels and submarines in the North Arabian Gulf. Each TLAM carried a 1,000-pound warhead, and once launched was impossible to recall.
The campaign to kill Saddam Hussein was under way.
As Toomey and Hoehn neared Baghdad, the GPS on one of Toomey’s bombs went dead. The EGBU-27’s had never been used in combat, and had only arrived in Qatar the day before the mission. So Toomey, a combat veteran and the squadron’s director of operations, literally pulled out the instruction manual, rebooted the computerized guidance system, and hoped for the best. As Toomey and Hoehn approached Dora Farms along oval flight paths from the east and west, the sun was almost above the horizon. Clouds shielded them from ground observation, but also hid the target complex. At the last moment, however, the pilots found a break in the clouds that gave them six seconds to visually identify the targets and drop the bombs at 5:36 AM Baghdad time.
Although Toomey and Hoehn could not know if they had gotten Saddam, reconnaissance photos showed all four bombs hit their target squarely. When the first intelligence reports from the scene started coming in, the CIA’s source reported that someone who looked to be Saddam was pulled from the rubble, looking blue and receiving oxygen. He had been put on a stretcher and loaded into the back of an ambulance, which did not move for half an hour before leaving the complex. Around 4:30 AM Tenet called the White House Situation Room and told the duty officer: “Tell the President we got the son of a bitch!”
Several hours later, however, Saddam appeared on Iraqi television. He was wearing an army uniform, a beret, and glasses. For seven minutes he read from a notepad, denouncing the American attack. It was not clear to U.S. analysts whether the address was live or taped, whether it was Saddam or a body double.
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| The remains of Saddam's alleged bunker at Dora Farms. |
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