Mead on Awlaki and the "Assassination" Question

I meant to post this excellent piece by Walter Russell Mead on his blog on the American Interest's website on the question of whether the killing of Yemeni-American cleric Anwar al-Awlaki was a legitimate act of war or an assassination.  Key quotes:

Perhaps this is just further proof of how mindless I am, but it does seem to me that Al-Awlaki and his buds are at war with the people of the United States and that in war, people not only die: it is sometimes your duty to kill them. . . .

I am neither a lawyer nor a judge, but it does not take much special knowledge to understand that Mr. Awlaki had placed himself well beyond the protections of criminal law. 

I tend to agree with Mead's analysis re: al-Awlaki.  But as I have said before, I also recognize that al-Awlaki was really low-hanging fruit in this debate, whose actions and statements clearly indicated he was actively planning attacks on the U.S. homeland, and hence an imminent threat.  There may be other American Islamists in the future, however, where the evidence is neither so transparent nor clear-cut.  Consequently, I think it reasonable to debate whether the al-Awlaki case was a necessary act of self-defense or sets a dangerous precedent that could be abused in the future, or even both.

P.S.  I highly recommend Mead's book A Special Providence, which I used to use when teaching a course on U.S. National Security at Johns Hopkins, for anybody interested in the history of U.S. foreign policy.

Shameless Self-Promotion Post #3

First, for those who missed it (i.e. because I only found out it would be on 45 minutes before it actually aired, and hence most people with lives didn't get my frantic emails on time), here is the video of my September 12 talk at the Tattered Cover. 

Before anyone asks: No, I wasn't auditioning to be a livestock auctioneer or have a plane to catch afterwards.  This was just my first reading, so I tried to cram too much information in during my 30 minutes or remarks and hence talked way too fast.

Second, yesterday I received a note saying that "Wanted Dead or Alive" (the blog, not the book) has been named one of the Top 25 Homeland Security Blogs.  Given some of the other blogs on the list, I'm actually pretty honored by this, albeit fearful that now I'll have to take this blogging thing more seriously (i.e. no pictures of the Riddler; no three-week vacations). 

As soon as I can figure out how to insert the code to do so, I'll display the Criminal Justice Degree Schools "badge" on the page.

Today in Manhunting History -- October 4, 1993: The Battle of the Black Sea, Part II

At 1:55AM, October 4, the relief convoy finally reached Task Force Ranger’s perimeter. The combined force waited almost three hours while Wolcott’s body was extracted from Super 61. Seeing the preparations for withdrawal, the Somalis increased their fire and committed their last reserves. Finally, the combined force was able to depart the crash site at 0537. Because there were so many non-ambulatory wounded, there was not enough room in the vehicles for all the soldiers. Some of the corpses were placed atop the Malaysian APCs, a morbid spectacle given that “some bodies were missing pieces and others did not resemble a cadaver.” The nervous Malaysian drivers took off, leaving the Rangers and Delta operators who had been fighting 14 hours straight behind, and forcing them to run through the same streets they had already fought through before in what became known in Ranger lore as “The Mogadishu Mile.” Eventually they overtook and stopped a Pakistani M-113. By 6:20AM all personnel were loaded and movement continued until they reached the safety of the Pakistani perimeter at the stadium.

Overall, it was an impressive feat. Task Force Ranger had raided into the heart of the adversary’s stronghold in broad daylight and seized 24 prisoners, including the two “Tier One” leaders they were after. The cost had been steep: 18 Americans dead, one missing, and 84 wounded. But the Somalis had clearly fared worse, suffering an estimated 500-1,000 fatalities. In the mind of at least one Delta operator, “they’d just fought one of the most one-sided battles in American history.”

Aideed later said he had been just to the east of the target house at the time of the raid. Within 20 minutes the SNA had sealed the roads and the warlord was moved to a safer location. Yet even if he personally escaped harm, the “Battle of the Black Sea” had cost the warlord dearly. Many families aligned with him had suffered casualties, and local spies reported some of Aideed’s strongest clan allies had fled Mogadishu fearing the seemingly inevitable American retribution. Others were sending peace feelers, offering to dump Aideed to avoid further bloodshed. The SNA’s arsenal of RPGs were depleted, and both General Garrison and Howe believed Aideed had been struck a mortal blow. Consequently, they pressed their U.S. and UN superiors to take the initiative and finish the job.

The perception in Washington, however, was shaped by the vivid television images of dead and naked bodies of U.S. soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. President Clinton was in a hotel room in San Francisco when he saw the horrifying pictures. Angered, he asked his staff “How could this happen?” even though the raid was the direct result of his policy decisions. Many in Congress demanded an immediate withdrawal from Somalia, and as was the case with the Sandino manhunt 60 years prior, the outrage over U.S. casualties caused the White House to throw in the towel.

To many Americans, this was the lasting image of the October 3-4 battle, as well as of the broader hunt for Mohammed Farah Aideed.

Today in Manhunting History -- October 3, 1993: The Battle of the Black Sea

On Sunday, October 3, 1993, Mohammed Farah Aideed’s top political advisor, Omar Salad, was the featured speaker at the weekly Habr Gidr rally on Via Lenin. When the rally broke up, his white Toyota Land Cruiser was tracked by Task Force Ranger air assets as it drove north toward the Bakara Market. Salad was observed entering a house one block north of the Olympic Hotel. Later, at 1:30PM the CIA station chief brought a Somali to the JOC. The Somali’s name had appeared on a list of wanted men Task Force Ranger had published after capturing Aideed's financier, Osman Ato. “My name shouldn’t have been on that list,” the Somali complained, and offered to reveal the location of a secret meeting between Salad, Abdi Awale, and many of Aideed’s lieutenants if his name were removed. Although nobody had actually seen him, the presence of so many Somali National Alliance (SNA) officials raised hopes Aideed might attend as well.

Bakara Market lay in the heart of an area Task Force Ranger called “the Black Sea,” a labyrinth of narrow alleys and walkways that was a SNA stronghold. The Olympic Hotel served as a virtual headquarters for the Habr Gidr militia, and MG William Garrison had once told his officers: “I will not send you in [the Barkara area] unless it is a lucrative target. I know if I send you guys in we’ll get in a gunfight.” When informed of the Task Force’s mission just minutes before it was launched, an astonished MG Thomas Montgomery (Deputy Commander of UNOSOM II) called Garrison. “Bill,” Montgomery said, “that’s really Indian country. That’s a bad place.” Although U.S. policy was to not even drive through Bakara Market, the chance of netting two “Tier One” targets was too good to resist.

Shortly after 3PM the CIA’s source marked the target for U.S. overhead sensors by stopping his car outside and raising the hood. The squared off, three-story building with whitewashed cinder block walls and windows with no glass that the source identified was the same house U.S. surveillance had watched Omar Salad enter earlier in the day. With their tip confirmed, Task Force Ranger went from briefing to mission launch in less than an hour. At 3:32PM, 14 helicopters from the 160th SOAR took off from Mogadishu airport. Three minutes later, a ground convoy of three five-ton trucks and nine Humvees moved out. In all, the mission on October 3 involved 160 men, 19 aircraft, and 12 vehicles.

At 3:40PM two Little Birds gave a final visual reconnaissance of the target building. They were immediately followed by four MH-6s, each carrying a four-man Delta team perched on the benches attached to each side of the helicopters. The Task Force swept in from the north, the beating blades of the rotors stirring up great clouds of orange dust. As the MH-6s settled on the street, the operators leapt from the skids and dashed into the building, while Rangers fast-roped from four Black Hawks to establish their security perimeter and blocking positions around the objective. The Delta operators, clad in black body armor, swept through the rooms, bellowing orders, and corralling the stunned Somalis together. Within 20 minutes they had secured 24 prisoners – including Salad and Awale – marching them out with their hands flex-cuffed behind their backs.

Other than a Ranger who had been critically injured due to a fall while fast-roping, the mission was going like clockwork. The raiders radioed “Laurie,” the brevity code for success, back to the JOC. At 4PM the ground convoy commanded by LTC Danny McKnight – a veteran of the Ranger’s jump into Rio Hato during the Noriega manhunt – headed toward the secured objective. As the vehicles arrived at the target building, both Delta and the Rangers pulling security on the perimeter were beginning to draw increasingly heavy fire. The passing bullets “made a loud snap, like cracking a stick of dry hickory.” The volume of fire built steadily as thousands of people grabbed weapons and poured into the streets. Garrison and the officers watching the mission from the JOC could see them racing from all directions toward the Bakara Market, as if the raiders “had poked a stick into a hornet’s nest.”

The Somalis began firing RPGs, and the Delta ground commander called the command-and-control helicopter overhead. “Hey, boss, I think we’ve got the guys you sent in for,” he told LTC Gary Harrell, the C Squadron commander. “We’re ready to get out of Dodge.”

But almost immediately another radio call grabbed the attention of those listening.




Danny McKnight, commander of Task Force Ranger's ground element on October 3, 1993


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Chief Warrant Officer (CWO) Cliff Wolcott had earned the nickname “Elvis” from his buddies in the 160th both for his unflappable cool and his uncanny impression of the “King of Rock and Roll.” On January 3, 1990, when Manuel Noriega surrendered, it was Wolcott who piloted the Black Hawk carrying the deposed strongman from the Papal Nunicature to Howard Air Force Base. On October 3, 1993, after disgorging his chalk of Rangers at 3:45PM, his Black Hawk, Super Six One, provided fire support to the Rangers on the perimeter using its sniper team to disperse the growing crowd. At 4:15PM, however, his voice broke through the radio clutter, calmly saying: “Six-One is going down.” Wolcott’s Black Hawk had been hit by a RPG-7 grenade, and dropped like a stone 300 yards east of the target building. The two crew chiefs and three Delta snipers survived, albeit badly injured, but the two pilots were killed on impact.

The Somalis had gotten Task Force Ranger’s “Elvis” before the Americans could get theirs’.

CWO Cliff "Elvis" Wolcott: The pilot who took Manuel Noriega into U.S. custody in 1990, but whose shoot down over Mogadishu on October 3, 1993, precipitated the "Black Hawk Down" battle

**********************************************

General Garrison had anticipated the loss of a helicopter, and with his planners had drafted three contingency plans:

· Insert 15 soldiers from a combat-search-and-rescue (CSAR) Black Hawk circling nearby;

· Alert the 10th Mountain’s Quick Reaction Force(QRF); and

· Move the main body of Task Force Ranger from the target building to the crash site to provide more firepower.

Garrison executed all three contingencies almost simultaneously.

McKnight ordered the raiders to split up, and Delta operators and two chalks of Rangers dashed to the crash site through the narrow streets and alleyways against a growing barrage of gunfire emanating from seemingly every doorway, alley, and window. They reached Super 61 at 4:28PM, just moments ahead of the onrushing mob of armed Somalis and established a perimeter round the wreckage. At the same time, the lone CSAR helicopter – “Super 68” – moved over the downed Black Hawk to insert its medics and Ranger security team. As the last two men of the CSAR team fast-roped down, Super 68 was hit by an RPG. The helicopter was badly damaged, but managed to limp back to base.

Garrison directed McKnight to move the convoy – with the prisoners and initial wave of Task Force wounded aboard the trucks – to reinforce the perimeter around Super 61. As the trucks bounded east, every building spat tracers and RPGs. McKnight’s lead Humvee – disoriented by dust, smoke, and roadblocks – quickly got last in Mogadishu’s maze of constricted, unfamiliar streets. As “scattered small arms fire . . . became a metal storm,” the convoy went in circles, twice passing near the crash site but unable to link up with the detachment defending it. Of the 65 men who started from the original objective an hour earlier, nearly half – including McKnight – were wounded. There were now more casualties in the convoy than there were at the crash site. When the procession of shot-up vehicles passed the Olympic Hotel a second time at 5:15PM, Garrison ordered McKnight to get his precious cargo of prisoners back to the headquarters at the airport. For if the SNA leaders were not evacuated, the raid would certainly be a failure. Even then, the convoy had to fight its way back to the airport, suffering still more casualties before it made it back to base.

While McKnight was enduring the abattoir, a second Black Hawk –Super 64 – took an RPG through its tail and crashed about two miles south of the target building. As there was no pre-existing plan to react to a second downed aircraft, Garrison and his staff tried several desperate courses of action, each unsuccessful. First, at about 5:03PM, an improvised QRF of 27 Rangers was dispatched from the airport to the second crash site. But this small force was quickly ambushed and pinned down at the K-4 traffic circle. A half-hour later, Charlie Company from the 10th Mountain’s QRF left the airfield, but within 10 minutes was ambushed. Fighting for their lives, 100 U.S. soldiers fired nearly 60,000 rounds of ammunition and hundreds of grenades in 30 minutes before being forced to retreat.

Another Black Hawk, Super 62, made a low pass over Super 64 and could see that pilot CWO Mike Durant, his co-pilot, and two crew chiefs had survived the crash, but were badly injured. They also saw what seemed to be thousands of armed, angry Somalis massing and moving towards the crash site. Knowing the horrific fate of those who fell into the clutches of Somali mobs, two Delta snipers on board Super 62 volunteered to try to save Super 64’s survivors. LTC Harrell rejected Master Sergeant Gary Gordon and Sergeant First Class Randall Shugart’s request twice, but after learning of the QRF ambushes, approved their third request for insertion.

Super 62 dropped the snipers off 100 meters from the crash site in a deserted, garbage-strewn alley. When word was passed to the operators that it was time to jump, Gordon grinned and – despite the near hopelessness of their task – gave an excited thumbs-up. As they moved towards Super 64 and saw the hundreds of Somalis surging towards the wreckage, they must have known they would not survive. Super 62 hovered above the wreckage and pointed down – using its rotors to create a wind to blast back the mob – long enough for Gordon and Shugart to reach the downed bird. An RPG slammed through 62’s cockpit, knocking the co-pilot unconscious and ripping the leg off the door gunner. Super 62’s co-pilot, CWO Michael Goffena, could not make it back to the airfield but managed a crash landing in the secure area near Mogadishu’s port.

At the crash site, the operators freed the crew from Super 64’s wreckage. For a few minutes they held their own, methodically firing round after round in aimed fire at the onrushing crowd. But with the helicopters gone and their ammunition running low, the tide of Somalis pressed closer. Durant heard Gordon cry out as he was fatally wounded on the other side of the wreckage. Shugart brought the immobilized pilot Gordon’s rifle and handed the weapon to Durant.

“Good luck,” he said, and then returned to battle the Somalis who were now within 30 feet. Shugart defended the crash site with his pistol until he too went down and Super 64 was overrun. Gordon and Shugart’s heroism bought enough time for SNA leaders to gain control of the mob before it finished off Durant. Durant was taken prisoner, while laughing Somalis desecrated the bodies of the other Americans. For their sacrifice, Gordon and Shugart were awarded the first Medals of Honor since the Vietnam War.




SFC Randall Shugart and MSG Gary Gordon: American Heroes


**************************************************

The roughly 90 soldiers defending Super 61 took shelter in four houses near the downed helicopter. The troops termed the three city blocks around the wreckage “The Alamo,” a fitting name given that their survival was uncertain. More armed Somalis were arriving, and ammunition was running dangerously low. AK-47 bullets flew overhead with a loud pop, punctuated by the ominous SWOOSH of RPGs exploding every five or ten minutes. Even if they had been willing to abandon the bodies trapped in the helicopter, seven of every ten soldiers had been wounded, many of whom were unable to walk, thereby making it impossible for the raiders to fight their way out on foot. Consequently, the Rangers and Delta operators hunkered down for the night.

Even though it risked making a bad situation worse, at about 7PM General Garrison ordered a helicopter to resupply the besieged troops. As soon as the Black Hawk roared in and began hovering above the crash site, Somali gunfire and RPGs erupted from every direction. Two Delta operators kicked out water, ammunition, and IV bags, as the pilots held steady until the resupply was complete. Then, shot full of holes and leaking fluid, the helicopter returned to base, unable to fly again. The Little Birds, which were capable of firing thousands of rounds per minute, made running and diving fire attacks against Somali groups throughout the night. Like Major Rusty Rowell at Ocotal 66 year earlier, the repeated sorties by the 160th’s AH-6 pilots probably saved the besieged Americans from being overrun.

****************************************************

Another relief force was organized, consisting of a platoon of four Pakistani M485 tanks; two companies of 28 Malaysian Condor armored personnel carriers (APCs) and four command APCs; most of the Rangers, and all the Delta operators, SEALs, and air force combat controllers still at the airfield; Alpha and Charlie Company of 2-14th Infantry, and a platoon from Charlie Company, 1-87th Infantry. About 500 men strong, the convoy included nearly 100 vehicles and stretched almost two miles long. At 11:15PM the convoy departed from the port into the pitch black city and fought its way to the surrounded Rangers and Delta operators, who could hear the rumble of its engines and thunderclap of its guns from miles away, steadily edging closer. At 1:55AM, October 4, the relief convoy finally reached Task Force Ranger’s perimeter. The dash through the Somali gauntlet resulted in three 10th Mountain soldiers killed and more than 30 wounded.

TOMORROW:  The "Mogadishu Mile" and the battle's aftermath.

Operation Troy

Although as with the Abbottabad raid in May, all initial accounts should be taken with a grain of salt, the Telegraph (UK) has an interesting account of how Anwar al-Awlaki was finally caught.

Although he was successfully targeted by a drone, the key to locating the radical cleric was apparently the capture of a junior courier by Yemeni agents.  This is consistent with the broader history of strategic manhunts which emphasizes the importance of human intelligence and cooperation with indigenous forces, and together with the previous New York Times account highlighting the difference in support for al-Awlaki and AQAP in southern Yemen (AQAP's base of operations) and northern Yemen (where he was killed), this supports the conclusion that human terrain was the most important factor in targeting al-Awlaki.

Al-Asiri Update

The Washington Post reports the Yemeni government says Saudi-born AQAP bombmaker Ibrahim al-Asiri was not killed in Friday's drone strike. 

If true, this would be disappointing, as his capabilities would be difficult for AQAP to replace in the near-term.  But given that there were several near-misses against Anwar al-Awlaki prior to Friday's strike, it is encouraging that we may have figured out a way to target al-Asiri and that his days are likely numbered.

Awl al-Awlaki, Awl the Time

Some interesting reading in the wake of the drone strike that killed Anwar al-Awlaki.

The New York Times summarizes the two-year hunt for al-Awlaki.  The money quote, in that it supports my argument that the "human terrain" is decisive in strategic manhunts:

In 2009 and 2010, Mr. Awlaki seems to have been mostly in the southern heartland of his own powerful tribe, the Awaliq, where killing him would have been politically costly for the government, and capturing him nearly impossible. The area where Mr. Awlaki was finally killed, in the remote north, did not afford him the same tribal protection. There are also many tribal leaders in the far north who receive stipends from Saudi Arabia — the terrorist group’s chief target — and who would therefore have had more motive to assist in killing him.

The hunt for Mr. Awlaki has involved some close calls, including the failed American drone strike in May, and the previously unreported operation in the Yemeni village. Yemen’s elite counterterrorism commandos, backed by weapons from Yemen’s regular armed forces, formed a ring around the town as commanders began negotiating with local leaders to hand Mr. Awlaki over, said one member of the unit.

“We stayed a whole week, but the villagers were supporting him,” said the counterterrorism officer, who is not authorized to speak on the record. “The local people began firing on us, and we fired back, and while it was happening, they helped him to escape.”

The Washington Post weighs in with two articles.  One noting the strike demonstrates the increased cooperation between the CIA and the JSOC, another highlighting the Obama administration's legal justification for killing an American citizen absent a conviction in an American court: 

“As a general matter, it would be entirely lawful for the United States to target high-level leaders of enemy forces, regardless of their nationality, who are plotting to kill Americans both under the authority provided by Congress in its use of military force in the armed conflict with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces as well as established international law that recognizes our right of self-defense,” an administration official said in a statement Friday.

Although there is no real doubt that Awlaki was actively targeting U.S. civilians for attack, it is not difficult to imagine how this precedent could be abused in the future in a less-clear cut case.  A serious and useful debate on this question is taking place over at National Review Online between Andrew McCarthy (pro) and Kevin Williamson (con). 

Finally, an interesting contrast of views on the strategic significance of the strike.  In Foreign Policy, Daniel Byman argues al-Awlaki's death is a signficant blow to al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula.  In The Daily Beast,  Bruce Hoffman argues it is nothing more than a glancing blow to AQAP, and that al-Awlaki was more effective as a communicator than an operational leader.

Although I think Hoffman is correct that the threat posed by AQAP is not over, I tend to agree more with Byman.  Awlaki was unique because of his ability to radicalize and inspire American Muslims, who once recruited into the various al-Qa'ida affiliates or cells, pose a greater risk to U.S. security than foreign jihadists.  (Here I'll add the obligatory disclaimer that 99.9% of American Muslims pose zero threat whatsoever, which is absolutely true, but also masks the significance of the threat posed by those who are radicalized).  Awlaki inspired not only AQAP attacks against the U.S. homeland, but also the deadliest attack on U.S. soil since 9/11 (Nidal Hussein's lone wolf shooting spree at Fort Hood in 2009) and Faisal Shahzad's failed May 2010 attack in Times Square, conducted under the auspices of the Tehrik-E-Taliban (the Pakistani Taliban).  This represents more significant attacks than al-Qa'ida core under Osama bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri has been able to conduct in the last five years. 

Moreover, if the Associated Press is correct that AQAP bombmaker Ibrahim Hassan Tali al-Asiri was also killed in the attack, this represents a significant blow to AQAP's operational capacity.  Al-Asiri was widely believed to be something of an evil genius when it came to bomb design, creating the innovative explosive device hidden in his brother's . . . um, well, ass . . . that wounded Saudi Prince Muhammad bin Nayef bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, the Deputy Minister of the Interior, in February 2009.  He also designed the "underwear bomb" that made it onto a transatlantic flight in December 2009, and the printer cartridge bombs from November 2010.  Although AQAP undoubtedly has other bombmakers, it will take some time before any of them acquire al-Asiri's skill level. 

Consequently, the drone strike may have killed several AQAP leaders that possessed unique skills that contributed to that affiliate's lethality, and which can not be quickly replaced.

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