Weekend Fluff

A couple of manhunting/irregular warfare stories that caught my eye recently but didn't merit their own post:

• David Frum writes: "If the CIA had done a better job publicizing this photo of Che Guevera, a lot of student dorm rooms would look less morally idiotic."

Umm, I think it's been a long time since Frum has been in a dorm room, as a picture where the guerrilla leader appears to be getting loaded (on pina coladas, perhaps?) certainly wouldn't detract from his credibility to any 18-22 year old already dumb enough not to know about Che's crimes and general uselessness in the field.

• The Associated Press reports that Steven Spielberg has agreed to direct a movie biopic about the late-Navy SEAL and "American Sniper" author Chris Kyle. Given Spielberg's politics and the attempts of some gun control advocates to exploit Kyle's murder to further their agenda, there may be some cause for trepidation. But Spielberg demonstrated in both directing "Saving Private Ryan" and producing "Band of Brothers" that he knows how to treat military issues in an exciting and respectful way on the big screen.
• This week hundreds of Pakistanis paid tribute to Osama bin Laden on the second anniversary of his killing. Given how popular bin Laden once was in Pakistan -- particularly in the wake of the failed attempt to kill him with Tomahawk cruise missiles in 1998 -- and how unpopular the United States is in Pakistan, hundreds at a demonstration is almost a non-story.
• Finally, the Parkham Women's Institute in Southwest England is a venerable institution "devoted to home-spun handicrafts and good works." They also host a respectable speakers' series featuring authors of recent books. When the ladies heard that Captain Colin Darch would be appearing at the Institute to deliver a lecture on pirates, they decided to have some fun with the event and show up in costume: eye patches, swords, and fake parrots included. Alas, it was only when Captain Darch started speaking that they realized he was not an expert on English privateers on the Spanish main, but rather was giving a talk about his six week ordeal as a prisoner of Somali pirates in 2008!

Awkward! But apparently, Darch was a good sport about it, saying: "They gave me such an enthusiastic welcome, it almost made cry," Darch said. "And I managed to sell a few books too, which was nice." Which as any author can attest, makes up for almost any embarrassment/inconvenience at a book talk.

To Drone or Not To Drone . . .

Two recent dueling (albeit indirectly) essays on the utility of using drones in targeted killing campaigns:

• On the "pro" side, in The Atlantic, Amitai Etzioni with "Everything Libertarians and Liberals Get Wrong About Drones"; and     
• In the "con" corner, Steve Coll's New Yorker piece, "Remote Control: Our drone delusion"

I think I'm pretty clearly on the record as being "pro" on the drone question. As long as al-Qa'ida "Core" exists and remains dedicated to killing Americans in pursuit of ideological objectives (i.e. U.S. abandonment of our allies and interests in the Middle East as a first step towards a global caliphate) with which no compromise is possible, then we must continue to pursue and kill or capture its leaders and operatives. Because it is politically and/or logistically unfeasible to either invade or conduct raids in all the ungoverned regions in which al-Qa'ida seeks sanctuary, we must use whatever tools in our arsenal are most effective. To date, this has been drones, which compared to manned air or missile strikes allow for the most discriminate use of lethal force possible.

Are drones perfect? No, they are only as good as the men and women operating them. But they allow for more checks and greater accuracy in the targeting process than any comparable weapons system.

Has there been unintended civilian deaths due to drone strikes against al-Qa'ida leadership? Of course, and it is tragic. But collateral damage occurs during every war, and we simply can not choose to disengage in the fight against Salafist terrorists simply because they devalue life so much that they choose to hide behind human shields. At the risk of being crass, I would rather take a small risk of harming a limited number of extremist sympathizers (or those not discriminating enough to avoid houses or ceremonies with jihadist leaders) in order to reduce the risk of future attacks to American civilians.

That being said, I found Etzioni's article to be flawed. He is correct to note that "it is difficult to reach conclusive judgments [about civilian casualties], as neither critics nor proponents of drones are actually there to observe the effects of drone strikes. Instead we often have to rely upon reports from locals, who are notoriously unreliable." But I think he is too quick to dismiss the argument that the drone strikes may be counterproductive because they turn local populations against us, create more terrorists and sympathizers in the process, and therefore undermine our own strategic goals. While theoretically possible, I don't think we've hit this tipping point yet. But that is not to say that concern should be dismissed out-of-hand. Secondly, it is a legitimate concern to worry that the Obama administration is conducting the war with next to no oversight by Congress. Also writing in The Atlantic, Conor Friedersdorf flatly contradicts Etzioni's assertions regarding Congressional oversight, and quite frankly has the better of the argument.

(I do strongly disagree, however, with Friedersdorf's conclusion that because the Obama administration refuses to defend its program before Congress, ipso facto it is indefensible. I think a simpler answer is because they are arrogant and realize there is nothing Congress can do to stop them: Democrats will not embarrass a President from their own party, and Republicans are generally supportive of the policy. The original decision to intervene in Libya, in my opinion, was eminently defensible, even if the conduct of that operation and subsequent post-conflict policy has been badly mishandled. But the Obama administration similarly never felt compelled to make a case for the air campaign to oust Gaddafi even though he likely had the votes for a Congressional authorization of the use of military force).

However, despite the flaws in Etzioni's piece, I think Coll's is far worse, and this kills me, because Stephen Coll is one of the best writers on international affairs out there. (Ghost Wars is the definitive book on U.S. policy towards Afghanistan pre-9/11, and The Bin Ladens was entertaining and insightful as well. I haven't read his book on ExxonMobil's empire in the Middle East yet, but it is on my list if I ever finish the book I'm currently writing). Coll makes what I see as three fundamental errors in his peace: First, he is surprisingly sloppy in defining the difference between assassinations and targeted killings, and even when he acknowledges this difference repeatedly contradicts himself. In Wanted Dead or Alive I suggest the following distinction between targeted killings and assassinations: whereas the former are a form of decapitation strategy directed against the leadership network or chain-of-command of an organization in an effort to achieve a broader strategic goal (i.e. we kill Joe Smith not because he is uniquely Joe Smith, but rather because he is the #14 ranking officer in an organization in a declared state of war with the United States), assassination is directed at one specific individual whose demise is a strategic goal in and of itself. Coll himself acknowledges this, admitting: "An assassination campaign against suspected terrorists is not the same as one that occasionally rubs out unfriendly political leaders of nation-states," and in the next sentence referring to it properly as a "program of targeted killing." But then he goes on to us the term "assassination" to describe the drone campaign against al-Qa'ida five times. The only reason to contradict himself like this is to lead the reader to associate the decapitation campaign against al-Qa'ida with the moral opprobrium (rightly) applied to assassination. This is a cheap ploy unworthy of as excellent a writer as Coll.

(And again, it is a legitimate argument to claim the killing of American citizens without trial via drone via drone is unconstitutional and against our values. I disagree with it when applied to individuals we know have sworn fealty to al-Qa'ida's leadership, but it is certainly an argument that must always be kept in mind).

Second, Coll argues that it is "far from clear that killing leaders is even a reliable means of disrupting terrorist groups like Al Qaeda." This is a legitimate question, and one that I've tackled before in my work, concluding that operational success in strategic manhunts (or by extension, decapitation campaigns) only correlate to strategic success because of broader counterinsurgency policies. However, even if drone strikes aren't strategically decisive in and of themselves, against an enemy with whom no political accommodation is possible (i.e. al-Qa'ida) sometimes all you can do is whack-a-mole to keep them from planning and launching effective operations themselves. Coll favorably cites academic studies by Jenna Jordan and Aaron Mannes, without citing similar studies that contradict their findings and argue for the utility of decapitation by Patrick Johnston of RAND and Byran Price.

Finally, Coll argues that "America's drone campaign is . . . creating an ominous global precedent," and ask that when China is able to field armed drones (note to Mr. Coll: they already do) "How might its Politburo apply Obama's doctrines to Tibetan activists holding meetings in Nepal?" Alas, I don't think the Chinese pay much attention to international norms as a check on their behavior when they feel their national security or internal stability is threatened. Were the Chinese inhibited by international norms in Tiannamen Square in 1989, or in their persistent harassment of human rights advocates whom they perceive as a threat to the current power structure within China? No. Like most states, they define their national interests as they see fit, and determine the morality of their actions accordingly irrespective of the United States' actions.

Again, one could argue that the drone campaign is strategically counterproductive. One could argue that the Obama administration must be much more transparent with the relevant Congressional committees. And one could plausibly argue that killing American citizens abroad without a trial is a violation of their constitutional rights regardless of their role within al-Qa'ida and hence a betrayal of our values. But to say we shouldn't use this tool to protect ourselves because the Chinese might abuse the technology someday is a very thin reed upon which to make an anti-drone argument.

Okay, wow, that turned out much longer than planned. I guess it is because I admire Coll as a writer so much that I got a bit carried away here. Next time, I'll just provide some links and not pontificate so much. 

Have a good weekend!

Ambinder on Manhunt

Tonight, HBO premieres Greg Barker's documentary Manhunt*, based largely on Peter Bergen's book of the same name with some additional interviews/reveals.

In his column for The Week, Marc Ambinder sneak previews what he believes is the documentary's key message, titilatingly titled "How the CIA really caught bin Laden's trail." Ambinder says the key moment in the search was the 2004 capture of Hassan Ghul by Kurdish forces. The documentary reveals that although the Kurds eventually remanded Ghul to U.S. custody, he willingly told the Kurds "that bin Laden uses a single courier with the nomme de guerre 'Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti'" before the CIA could interrogate him (and, by implication, was subsequently tortured).

This account is certainly plausible, but I have three brief observations:
1- Ghul's role in the evidence chain is hardly news . . . hell, even I mentioned it in Wanted Dead or Alive (p. 224, tyvm) in a section that my publisher gave me three days to put together in the week following Bin Laden's death on May 1, 2011. (Oh, btw, Happy Anniversary!)

2- I love the Kurds. I've been a guest of their hospitality in the KRG and Baghdad, and I believe they will be one of America's key allies in the Middle East for decades to come. But given the reputation of their intelligence services -- which emerged in order to counter Saddam Hussein's attempts to infiltrate the Kurdish leadership before Operation Iraqi Freedom -- I'm a little skeptical that Ghul gave up such critical information . . . voluntarily. I'm not saying it didn't happen, but just that it would be surprising somebody so highly placed in al-Qa'ida (Ambinder claims he was sent by bin Laden to supercede Zarqawi) would give up such important information without a glove being laid on him. Whatever one thinks about the morality of enhanced interrogations, I can not think of another example of somebody from al-Qaida core singing so quickly.

3- Regarding Ghul's role, this is the first account I've seen that put him at a level above courier, much less bin Laden's "envoy to personally supervise" al-Qa'ida in Iraq. Most accounts place Ghul being arrested on the Kurdish-Iranian border carrying a CD with a letter from Zarqawi to bin Laden, which would be very odd given Ambinder/Barker's version of events. Again, this may be correct. But if, as Ambinder claims, the CIA knew he was high-level enough that he would be given command of al-Qa'ida's most important affiliate, why would the Agency turn around and hand him over to Pakistan's ISI, who subsequently released him! It seems equally plausible that he may have given al-Kuwaiti up in an attempt to say something like "Hey, I didn't know I was carrying this stuff. The guy who would be carrying it is that al-Kuwaiti guy!" in other words, as a smoke screen to minimize his own importance as a courier.

(As I noted when this story broke in June 2011, imagine how awkward it must have been for Ghul trying to explain to his al-Qa'ida buddies that he was the one who gave up bin Laden's courier. If he somehow survived that revelation by the Associated Press, for his sake I hope they don't get HBO in wherever in Pakistan he is hiding!

In all, Ambinder seems to be leaning a little too far forward to destroy the claims that enhanced interrogations had anything whatsoever to do with finding Osama bin Laden.

I'll withhold judgment on the documentary itself until I see it*, but I find some elements of Ambinder's account here to be highly dubious.

* Note: And just by coincidence, my household recently switched from a cable company that featured HBO and Starz to one featuring Showtime and Cinemax. @#$! Although to be honest, I'm a little more bummed about missing the final season of Spartacus and the next season of Boardwalk Empire than the documentary.

#KonyFail?

The Washington Post reports that Ugandan and American troops have suspended their joint hunt for Lord's Resistance Army commander Joseph Kony due to the political turmoil in the Central African Repulic (i.e. rebel forces capturing the capital and sending the President into exile).

As I noted in Wanted Dead or Alive in my Foreign Affairs piece on the Kony manhunt, successful manhunts depend upon favorable human terrain more than physical terrain, and a key element of this variable is the cooperation of other nations that could potentially provide safe havens to the targeted individual. In other words, no matter how many Green Berets (or other SOF) or adavanced satellites and drones we deploy in pursuit of Kony and his associates, it will not matter if whatever government emerges from the chaos in the CAR refuses to cooperate.

This also reinforces a point I didn't have space to mention in the Foreign Affairs piece, specifically that although Joseph Kony is a monster who definitely deserves to meet justice either in the defendant's dock at the Hague or via the working end of an AK-47, his elimination will have little long-term effect on the various humanitarian crises that plague central Africa. The CAR coup/rebellion had nothing to do with the LRA, and reiterates the sad fact that that region's problems are deeply structural in nature, and will not be resolved simply by killing or capturing Joseph Kony.

Coincidentally, yesterday the State Department made a "previously planned" announcement of a $5 million reward for information leadeing to the arrest or conviction of Kony and two other LRA leaders, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen. As I argued in the context of the hunt for Mommar Gaddafi in 2011, bounties rarely produce decisive results in strategic manhunts. People who are in a position to turn Kony in already have signficant incentives to do so (i.e. they are either past or potential victims of the LRA's atrocities, or are confederates seeking to avoid being indicted themselves by the International Criminal Court), and exhorbitant bounties tend to produce a flood of false leads that overwhelm the intelligence analysts attempting to track the targeted individuals (i.e. the "Elvis sightings" of Noriega, Muhammad Farah Aideed, and Saddam Hussein).

But again, given the difficulty of obtaining reliable assistance from regional allies such as the CAR, U.S. policymakers have disappointingly few arrows in their quiver with which to pursue the fugitive war criminal.

The Central African Republic is supposedly very nice this time of year . . .

No, Who REALLY Shot Bin Laden???

Two pieces today (by Peter Bergen on CNN.com and in The Hill) reporting on SEAL Team Six members calling shenanigans on Esquire's account of the Abbottabad raid, based upon "The Shooter"'s version of events. Today's accounts largely conform to what an anonymous SEAL wrote on Brandon Webb's blog, a reputable source of information on the SOF community.

Numerous Navy, SOCOM, and Veterans Affairs' spokespeople have already poked holes in reporter Phil Bronstein's claim that "The Shooter" has been abandoned by the military and is now unemployed and ineligible to receive health benefits. But if Webb and Bergen's SEAL sources are correct, the puzzle becomes clearer . . . well, at least a little bit. If the "The Shooter" was indeed fired from the DevGru due to repeated indiscretions regarding Operation Neptune Spear, it is understandable why he would want to get out before reaching the 20-year mark for full retirement benefits, and why he'd want to stick it to the Navy and SOCOM by making false claims about his benefits.  Moreover, the new SEAL speaking anonymously would appear to largely corroborate "Mark Owen"'s account of the raid in No Easy Day.

Again, I say "a little bit" clearer because we are still talking about a "He Said/He Said" situation between anonymous sources, neither which version can be corroborated without reliance on more anonymous sources. But while I respect and appreciate "The Shooter"'s service (which extends beyond any tall tales he may tell about Abbottabad), "Mark Owen" and the third SEAL's account is more plausible from a tactical angle. Additionally, for my money Bergen comes off as more credible than Bronstein (who is not a bad reporter by any means), given the depth of his experience on the topic and that he isn't also trying to push an alternate angle to the story that would be embarrassing to the military for allegedly abandoning a hero (which isn't to say the VA isn't a hot mess a lot of the time in providing veterans with services).

Regardless, one reads all these accounts and comes away amazed at the tactical acumen, selfless courage, and incredible discipline of "The Point Man," who likely got off the fatal shot on Osama Bin Laden, subsequently used his body to shield his teammates from potential suicide belts on bin Laden's wives (which they fortunately were not wearing), and perhaps more amazing, has managed to remain silent about these events to this day.

Today in Manhunting History (Special Anniversary Edition) -- March 19, 2003: The Dora Farms Mission

(Originally posted March 19, 2012, but reposted in conjunction with all the 10th anniversary remembrances of the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom)

 

After months of steady military buildup in the Persian Gulf region and Sisyphean diplomacy at the United Nations, on March 17, 2003, President George W. Bush announced that Saddam could avoid war under one condition: if he and his sons left Iraq within 48 hours. Speaking from the White House following a meeting abroad with allied leaders, Bush declared: “The decades of deceit and cruelty have now reached an end,” and that if Saddam and his sons did not accept this final offer, their refusal “will result in military conflict.” The intricately planned military timetable for “D-Day” – which involved commando raids, the beginning of the “Shock and Awe” air strikes, and the ground invasion led by the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force and the Army’s V Corps – was synchronized with the expiration of President Bush’s deadline.

The next day on March 18, however, a CIA source learned of a possible meeting that night at Dora Farms, an estate owned by Saddam’s wife southeast of Baghdad on the bank of the Tigris River. Although it was unclear who would be present, indications were that Saddam’s sons Uday and Qusay, and perhaps the entire family, might be planning a meeting there to discuss what to do if the Coalition invaded. “At that point,” CIA Director George Tenet recalled, “we ordered U.S. overhead reconnaissance to examine the site closely. What we saw was a large contingent of security vehicles, precisely the kinds that would typically precede and accompany Saddam’s movements, hidden under trees at the farm.” Sometime after 12:30 PM (8:30PM Baghdad time) the CIA’s source on the scene reported Uday and Qusay were definitely at the farm, that he had actually seen Saddam, and that the dictator would be returning to spend the night with his sons sometime between 3-3:30 AM Baghdad time. Tenet told the President’s war cabinet: “It’s as good as it gets. I can’t give you 100 percent assurance, but this is as good as it gets.”

Given CENTCOM’s elaborate plan of attack, attempting to strike Dora Farms posed a significant risk. If Saddam was not present, the United States would be telegraphing that a major air and ground attack was forthcoming, thereby forfeiting strategic surprise. Yet when President Bush met with his war cabinet that afternoon, all of Bush’s advisors recommended the strike, with Secretary of State Colin Powell saying: “If we’ve got a chance to decapitate them, it’s worth it.”

The latest information indicated that while at Dora Farms Saddam would be staying in a manzul, an Arabic word that could be translated either as “place of refuge” or “basement/bunker.” If there were a bunker at Dora Farms, cruise missiles would not be able to take it out. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Meyers called CENTCOM commander General Tommy Franks on a secure phone. Could a stealth fighter be loaded with EGBU-27 bunker busting bombs in time for the attack?

“Absolutely not,” Franks replied. “We don’t have the F-117 ready to go.” Franks checked further, however, and learned that the Air Force been following the intelligence and had prepared the planes at Al Udeid airbase in Qatar. Franks sent word to the White House that an attack would indeed be possible.

There was one important tactical problem, however. To execute the mission the F-117s would have to fly into the heart of Iraq’s air defenses, which surrounded the capital with surface-to-air missile sites and antiaircraft artillery. Although F-117s are virtually invisible to radar and ground observers while flying at night at high altitude, in daylight they become relatively slow, defenseless targets. According to the weather and light data, first twilight – when aircraft become visible from the ground – would be at 5:39 AM.

General Meyers called again, asking how long the President had to make a final decision on the attack. “Tom, I need your drop-dead, no-shit decision time.”

In order to get the planes in and out of Iraqi airspace before dawn, Franks said, “Time on target must be no later than 0530 Iraq time, Dick, with takeoff from Al Udeid no later than 0330. . . . I need the President’s decision by 0315, so the jets can start engines and taxi.”

It was already 2:27 AM.

Time passed slowly in CENTCOM’s headquarters. At 2:59 AM Franks received word that the aircraft were armed, and the pilots were briefed and sitting on the runway in their planes.

Finally, at 3:12 AM, the phone rang. “The mission is a go, Tom,” General Meyers said. “Please execute.”

At 3:38 Qatari time, Lieutenant Colonel Dave Toomey and Major Mark Hoehn were airborne, flying north towards Baghdad in a race with the dawn. An hour later, 45 Tomahawk land attack missiles (TLAMs) were fired from surface vessels and submarines in the North Arabian Gulf. Each TLAM carried a 1,000-pound warhead, and once launched was impossible to recall.

The campaign to kill Saddam Hussein was under way.

As Toomey and Hoehn neared Baghdad, the GPS on one of Toomey’s bombs went dead. The EGBU-27’s had never been used in combat, and had only arrived in Qatar the day before the mission. So Toomey, a combat veteran and the squadron’s director of operations, literally pulled out the instruction manual, rebooted the computerized guidance system, and hoped for the best. As Toomey and Hoehn approached Dora Farms along oval flight paths from the east and west, the sun was almost above the horizon. Clouds shielded them from ground observation, but also hid the target complex. At the last moment, however, the pilots found a break in the clouds that gave them six seconds to visually identify the targets and drop the bombs at 5:36 AM Baghdad time.

Although Toomey and Hoehn could not know if they had gotten Saddam, reconnaissance photos showed all four bombs hit their target squarely. When the first intelligence reports from the scene started coming in, the CIA’s source reported that someone who looked to be Saddam was pulled from the rubble, looking blue and receiving oxygen. He had been put on a stretcher and loaded into the back of an ambulance, which did not move for half an hour before leaving the complex. Around 4:30 AM Tenet called the White House Situation Room and told the duty officer: “Tell the President we got the son of a bitch!”

Several hours later, however, Saddam appeared on Iraqi television. He was wearing an army uniform, a beret, and glasses. For seven minutes he read from a notepad, denouncing the American attack. It was not clear to U.S. analysts whether the address was live or taped, whether it was Saddam or a body double.

The remains of Saddam's alleged bunker at Dora Farms.

Today in Manhunting History: December 13, 2003 -- The Capture of Saddam Hussein

[This is a repost of last year's commemoration of the anniversary of Saddam's apprehension.  With Zero Dark Thirty about to hit theaters, there has been A LOT of commentary on the Abbottabad raid and the hunt for Bin Laden that I will try to find time to post on in the next week].

At 10:50 AM, December 13, Colonel James Hickey – commander of 1st BCT 4ID – received a call notifying him that Task Force 121 had Muhammad Ibrahim al-Musslit in custody, and requesting he prepare a covering force for a seizure mission that night. After four hours of grueling interrogation, Muhammad Ibrahim had finally revealed two likely locations for Saddam: a house and a farm in the town of Ad Dawr, a Ba’athist stronghold about 15 kilometers southeast of Tikrit. Hickey, certain that this time they would capture Saddam, assembled a 600-plus strong force mounted in 25 M2/M3 Bradley fighting vehicles and 30 HMMWVs to support the two dozen special operators of Task Force 121. The mission was codenamed “Operation Red Dawn,” and the two objectives were labeled “Wolverine One” and “Wolverine Two.” These names were fortuitous if somewhat coincidental. The operations staff for the “Raider” Brigade was in the habit of naming each day’s operations after the movies they had watched the night before. Had they viewed “When Harry Met Sally” or “The Wedding Planner” the previous night, it is possible the names for the operation would have evoked less martial images than those inspired by the 1980s movie about teenage guerrillas resisting a Soviet invasion of the United States.

Saddam Hussein before the March-December 2003 strategic manhunt

At 6PM Hickey’s force moved out of the brigade base at Camp Raider, a former palace built on a bluff overlooking the Tigris south of Tikrit. The night was cold and crisp as the covering force moved out to an assembly area at an old granary north of Ad Dawr, while engineers secured the west bank of the Tigris several hundred meters away. The force then moved quietly into position to block any escape and reinforcement routes and stand ready to reinforce Task Force 121 in case of heavy resistance. At 8PM, the special operators – identifiable by their black uniforms and NVGs – fast-roped onto the objectives from hovering helicopters.

The beam of red-lensed Maglite flashlights and laser sights on rifles sweeping across the ground contrasted with the clear night sky over Ad Dawr. Task Force 121 searched the two objectives, but they appeared to be empty of any targets. The team leaders conferred and talked with Muhammad Ibrahim, who had been flown from Baghdad to Tikrit, and then brought to the farm by the special operations team. Al-Muslit suggested another nearby location, northwest of Wolverine Two, where a ramshackle shack stood. There was an animal stench in the air, mingled with the scent of some nearby fruit trees. The operators burst into the structure, which indeed had been an orange-picker’s hut, and seized two men. One was Saddam’s cook, the other was the cook’s brother and owner of the farm, Qies Niemic Jasim, a former bodyguard. The operators found two AK-47s and $750,000, but Saddam was not there.

U.S. forces appeared to have struck another “dry hole” in the search for Saddam.

Picture from On Point II, as available at GlobalSecurity.org.

**************************************************************************

To the support and command elements following the operation’s progress via radio, the code words used suggested the operators were fruitlessly going back over the same ground, desperately searching for any signs leading to their quarry.

Then a call went over the command net: “We have Jackpot.”

The Joint Operations Center operations officer coordinating the mission asked for clarification, and an excited operator replied: “We’ve got Jackpot.”

A voice that had never been heard before on the Task Forces’ countless missions came on the radio. Admiral William McRaven, Task Force 121’s commander and a living legend within the Special Operations Forces community, asked: “Do you mean Big Jackpot?”

“Yes, we have Big Jackpot.”

Picture from On Point II, as available at GlobalSecurity.org

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Minutes earlier, Muhammad Ibrahim had yelled at Qies Niemic Jasim in Arabic to show the operators where Saddam was hiding. The Fat Man apparently knew the exact spot, but wanted to be able to say that it was Qies who had betrayed Saddam. Finally, he realized it was going to be up to him, and moved to an area a few meters away from where the U.S. forces were concentrated. He began kicking the ground until he had uncovered a length of rope. The operators noticed Muhammad Ibrahim’s activities, and dug up the rope to reveal a trapdoor. The door was opened to reveal the entrance shaft to a “spider hole,” about six feet deep.

A sergeant shone a flashlight down the shaft. I think there’s something down there, an operator said, as another took the pin out of his grenade.

Then someone shouted, “Movement! We have something coming up.”

The operators held their fire when they saw the upraised hands of a dirty, bearded man with unkempt gray hair, appear. Although armed with a 9mm Markarov pistol, he put up no resistance as the soldiers grabbed him and yanked him out of the hole. As he was deposited on the ground, what looked like a vagrant said in halting English: “I am Saddam Hussein, the president of Iraq. I am willing to negotiate.”

“President Bush sends his regards,” the operators replied.


Task Force 121's interpreter, an exiled Iraqi-American named Samir,
posing with the captured tyrant just outside his spiderhole in Ad Dawr.

**************************************************************************

At 8:26PM, December 13, the hunt for Saddam Hussein came to a successful conclusion. Saddam was captured on the same farm where he had taken refuge in 1959 when, as a young hit man for the Ba’ath party, he had been part of a failed assassination attempt on Iraqi President Abdul Kareem Qassem, an episode that served as the founding myth to the dictator’s legend. The Arab scholar Fouad Ajami observed, great evil

never quite lives up to our expectations. The image of Saddam Hussein in captivity was true to Arendt’s theme. The haggard, disoriented man at the bottom of the ‘spider hole’ was the very same man who had inflicted unspeakable sorrow on his people, and on the peoples of two neighboring lands. The discovery of the smallness of the men behind the most terrible of deeds is always an affront: if Eichmann was only a clerk, Saddam was only a thug.

In the end, the tyrant who had terrified millions and buried hundreds of thousands of his own citizens in mass graves; who had urged his countrymen to violently resist U.S. forces and bragged about going down in a blaze of glory and defiance was captured without a shot being fired.