Today in Manhunting History -- June 16, 2003: Capturing Saddam's Shadow

As the nascent insurgency coalesced in increasing attacks against coalition forces and Iraqi civilians in the summer of 2003, graffiti praising Saddam began to emerge in Iraq’s Sunni Triangle, bearing messages such as “Saddam is still our leader” and “Saddam the hero will be back.” CENTCOM commander General John Abizaid acknowledged: “It’s important even to know if he’s alive or dead; and if he’s alive, it’s important either to capture or kill him.” Ambassador Jerry Bremer agreed: “It is important to kill Saddam or capture him because his continued uncertain state has allowed people to play on that uncertainty and make the argument that, in some fashion, the Ba’athists would come back.” This sentiment was perhaps best expressed by an old Bedouin near Tikrit, who warned soldiers of the 4th Infantry Division that “Unless you catch Saddam and show his head to the people, they won’t believe he is gone. This will not end.”

An apparent breakthrough in the hunt for Saddam occurred on June 16, when U.S. forces captured Abid Hamid Mahmud al-Tikriti. Al-Tikriti, sometimes called “Saddam’s Shadow,” was the dictator’s personal secretary, and as the ace of diamonds on the deck of cards, the fourth-most wanted man in Iraq behind Saddam and his sons. Although the Associated Press declared “Captured Iraqi May Know Fate of Saddam,” al-Tikriti told interrogators he and Saddam’s sons had separated from the dictator in April after Saddam became convinced they could survive longer apart.

"Saddam's Shadow" captured June 16, 2003

The War on Terror Online

One of these days I hope to write a longer piece pointing out the one truly dangerous intellectual misconception at the heart of President Obama's NDU speech last month, specifically the notion that "all wars end," and that consequently so will the current war against al-Qa'ida once we leave Afghanistan having defeated al-Qa'ida. (The war in Afghanistan won't end when we leave Afghanistan, but that is a different post for another time). As much as I wish the President were right, it shows a frighteningly shallow understanding of who/what we are fighting.

Short version: almost since Islam's founding there have been individuals and groups who have chosen the most extreme interpretation of its scriptures possible and used this interpreation to justify violence against all non-believers (i.e. Jews, Christians, Atheists, Jews a second time just for good measure), and other Muslims who don't subscribe to their absolutist tenets. Examples of this include the original Assassins in the 12th century, Ibn Tammiya in the 14th century, and Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab in the 18th century. More modern versions include Sayyid Qutb, Mullah Omar, and Osama bin Laden.

In the old days if a Caliph wanted to suppress a radical movement, all he had to do was surround the offending village, kill everybody inside, and ensure that every scroll containing the forbidden teachings was destroyed. Yet even if the United States wanted to use such a scorched earth strategy (which we obviously don't because of its inherent immorality . . . i.e. we did not nuke Afghanistan post-9/11), given modern communications technology such as the internet we could never suppress the ideology completely. Hence the reason a lot of analysts (myself included) warned after Abbottabad that although bin Laden was dead, Bin Ladenism was still a threat.

Thus, the fight against al-Qa'ida and its affiliates' efforts online (whether to recruit, propagandize, disseminate tactical knowledge, or issue strategic guidance) is a critical component of the War on Terror, contra critics who claim were are just trying to kill our way to victory.

All of which is preamble to three interesting pieces on how modern communications and social networking platforms have become an important battle ground in the War on Terror. On Tuesday The Washington Post reported on U.S. intelligence operatives' effort to hack into and sabotage al-Qa'ida's online magazine, Inspire. This calls to mind the story I passed along two years ago about Great Britain's MI6's hacking of Inspire and substituting bomb-making recipes with cupcake recipes, although with greater urgency given the online magazine's link to the Boston Marathon bombings. Paul Cruickshank of CNN actually first reported the hack last month, but until now nobody had taken credit for the successful operation.

Also, on ForeignPolicy.com, Jonathan Schanzer reports on the debate over whether or not to shut down various terror groups Twitter feeds. On the one hand, their tweets are an endless source of propaganda/strategic communications that are central to the extremists' recruitment and strategy. On the other hand, intercepting and monitoring these communications tips off the intelligence community as to whom we should be tracking as possible terrorists.

Finally, as a bit of a palate cleanser, Wired's Danger Room's Spencer Ackerman had a fascinating Twitter interview with Omar Hammani, currently the most prominent American jihadi alive, who is on the run both from U.S. authorities (he currently has a $5 million bounty on his head) and his former colleagues in al-Shabaab. The occasionally congenial exchange recalls a lament that a former CIA counterterror analyst (Milton Bearden, I think, although I'm not 100% positive) once expressed, specifically how in the old days you could take a break from hunting your secular PLO terrorist enemy and have a drink and an interesting conversation with them, whereas nowadays all the terrorists in the Middle East were jihadists who didn't drink and would slit your throat if they were ever in the same room with you. Hammami falls somewhere in between, apparently, although he may not live long enough for anybody to find out face-to-face.

Alabama-born jihadist (and current drone target) Omar Hammimi during a press conference in Mogadishu prior to his split from al-Shabaab (Photo: Farah Abdi Warsameh / AP)

Speaking of Africa . . .

1. Last Thursday the State Department announced it was offering more than $10 million in rewards for information leading to the apprehension of the leaders of several al-Qa'ida affiliated networks in Africa, including $7 million for Abubakar Shekau, leader of Nigerian based Boko Haram, and $5 million for Mokhtar Belmokhtar, leader of the "Signed in Blood Battalion" offshoot of al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

Shekau's Boko Haram has killed more than 2,800 people in its campaign to overthrow the Nigerian government and establish Sharia (its name literally means "Western education is forbidden"), has threatened Western targets in Nigeria (its August 2011 attack against a United Nations facility in Abuja, Nigeria, killed 23 people) and the United States, and has begun aligning itself with AQIM and the Somali-based al-Shabaab. Bekmokhtar, a.k.a. "The Marlboro Man" (a reference to acquiring funding for his splinter group through cigarette smuggling, not because he looks rugged on horseback in magazine ads), was the mastermind behind the raid on British Petroleum's facility in In Amenas, Algeria, that ultimately resulted in the death of 37 hostages, including three Americans.

Although I'm on the record as being a skeptic regarding the utility of bounties in manhunts, if nothing else this is significant as an acknowledgement that these groups pose a threat to U.S. interests, and possibly as a first step toward helping our allies combat these groups before they grow strong enough to directly threaten U.S. targets. Bill Roggio, as always, provides a useful background of Shekau, Belmokhtar, and the Reward for Justice program's other new targets over at The Long War Journal.

(One side note: I appreciated the depiction of the bureaucratic friction that cased Belmokhtar to formally split from AQIM. Apparently, in a memo recovered in a building abandoned by al-Qa'ida fighters in Mali, AQIM described how Belmokhtar "didn't answer his phone when they called, failed to turn in his expense reports, ignored meetings, and refused time and again to carry out" spectacular attacks. Substitute "business development" for "spectacular attacks" and it sounds like any corporate headquarters in America!)

Hostage taking and mass murder aside, I think we can all sympathize with
micromanaging bosses like Mokhtar Belmokhtar's.

2. More disturbingly, the Associated Press also found manuals with Arabic instructions on how to use SA-7 surface-to-air missiles, which are capable of shooting down commercial aircraft. (In Kenya in 2002, for example, suspected Islamic extremists fired two SA-7s at a Boeing 757 carrying 271 Israeli vacationers, fortunately missing their target). In addition to the recovery of the SA-7's battery pack and launch tube by French troops in Mali in March, this suggests that AQIM may have acquired loose MANPADS looted in the wake of Moammar Qaddafi's overthrow in 2011. (Boy, sure glad we learned the post-war lessons from Iraq with regards to securing weapons materiel! In conjunction with the Benghazi consulate attack, suddenly the Obama administration's immaculate intervention model isn't looking so hot anymore).

Noted Georgetown University terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman tells the AP: "If terrorists start training and learn how to use [SA-7s], we'll be in a lot of trouble." This was a concern back when I worked AFRICOM issues in Congress in 2011, and one that I felt was never adequately addressed. A shootdown of a commercial plane could be a game changer in the War on Terror in North Africa, forcing a more direct U.S. involvement against these groups.

French soldiers in March 2013 examining SA-7 battery pack and launch tube abandoned by retreating al-Qa'ida fighters in Mali. This is potentially VERY bad news. Photo by ECPAD, via AP.

Today in Manhunting History -- June 12, 1993: The Attack on Radio Mogadishu

For a month prior to the June 5 ambush of Pakistani peacekeepers, Radio Mogadishu – also known as “Radio Aideed” – had launch a no-holds barred propaganda campaign against UNOSOM II, accusing the UN of “imperialist designs” and “colonization” and calling upon Somalis to defend their sovereignty. After the massacre of 24 Pakistanis, Radio Mogadishu declared the firefights a victory for the Somali people.

At 4AM on June 12, a “steady, ominous buzz” was audible in the sky over Mogadishu. A distant pop was quickly followed by a deep thud – pa-Daa, pa-Daa, pa-Daa – again and again. American AC-130 Spectre gunships fired 10 rounds at Radio Mogadishu and some of the SNA’s weapons cantonments. The attack ended almost as quickly as it began, an orange glow from fires illuminating the city as the buzz of the gunships faded away.

As dawn broke over Mogadishu, Somalis woke to find Radio Aideed destroyed.

Over the next two nights the AC-130s attacked Aideed’s headquarters and the workshop where the SNA’s financier – Osman Ato – converted stolen cars into battle wagons. At Aideed’s residence, American PSYOPS units used mobile speakers similar to those that taunted Noriega to blast Aideed’s house with the sounds of helicopter rotors, tank engines, and machine gunfire in an attempt to intimidate the warlord.

 



An AC-130 Spectre firing at night. Its arsenal includes a 105mm cannon (firing 10 44lb shells/ minute), a 40mm Bofors gun (100 rounds/minute), and twin Vulcan 20mm guns (firing up to 1,000 rounds/minute).



 

Al-Qa'ida's Complaint Department

No, really. According to a notice posted last week in Raqqa, Syria, where al-Qa'ida affiliated militias control parts of the rebel-held city's administration: "Any one who might have a complaint against any element of the Islamic state, whether the Emir or an ordinary soldier, can come and submit their complaint in any headquarters building of the Islamic state. The complaint should be in writing, provide details and give evidence. We promise that we will ensure accountability for anyone committing violations . . ."

Okay. Given that these are the same guys who just two months ago burned all the books in Raqqa's schools because they taught Syrian children "immorality," anybody who takes the jihadists up on their offer is either incredibly brave or incredibly stupid.



Because at al-Nusra, customer service is our top priority (after suicide
bombings, beating "heretics" to death, and  book burning)!





On Jeremy Scahill

Last week The New York Times published an interview with Jeremy Scahill publicizing his new documentary "Dirty Wars," investigating the same topic as his book of the same name on the Obama Administration's targeted killing campaign against al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia.

For a scathing rebuttal of Scahill's oeuvre in general, see Bruce Bawer's review of the book in The Weekly Standard last month.

Without having read the book yet, nor seen the movie (look, I still have The Avengers sitting on my DVR, so I'm a bit behind cinematically-speaking), my quick take comes closer to Bawer's. While since the Boston Marathon bombing Scahill has been careful to cast his opposition to the "Drone War" in terms of strategy ("We are encouraging a self-fulfilling prophecy. We are making more new enemies than we are killing actual terrorists"), he still repeatedly describes it perjoratively as an assassination campaign.

At best, Scahill is poorly informed about the types of operations that target individuals, or more likely, is just being dishonest in order to skew the debate before it has even started. Targeted killings, whether successful or not, are a form of decapitation strategy in which strikes are directed against an adversary's key leadership in hopes of rendering that country/organization's forces operationally ineffective. Assassination, on the other hand, targets a specific individual during peacetime in hopes that whoever succeeds him will alter the adversary's policy. Whether one is for or against the Drone War, it is grossly inaccurate to conflate it with assassination, since al-Qa'ida is indisputably in a declared state of war with the United States, one that preceded the advent of drone strikes by half a decade.

Although Scahill is an occasionally interesting reporter (i.e. the details about the hunt for Anwar al-Awlaki in this piece from The Nation), he would be a fairer reporter if he actually noted how intractable the jihadists enmity towards the West predating the Drone War genuinely is (i.e. Sayyid Qutb wrote the most vicious jihadist tracts while U.S. foreign policy was tilted against Israel in the 1950s; Osama bin Laden conceived of al-Qa'ida at a time when we were supporting the mujhaddin in Afghanistan) and showed the victims -- American and Muslim -- of the attacks that precipitated the Drone War.

Furthermore, although he is correct that we can't strictly "kill our way to victory," this is a straw man, since even supposed hard-liners such as Donald Rumsfeld famously asked in October 2003 whether we were creating more terrorists than we are killing and, just as in any war, clearly there are some al-Qa'ida leaders and operatives who won't stop trying to attack us unless they are killed. Right, Mr. Scahill?

Unfortunately, as Bawer points out, Scahill never seems to articulate this basic point, instead preferring to excoriating the side that is trying not to kill civilians (whether we are doing a good enough job is open to debate, of course) rather than the side that deliberately targets them.

Gentlemen, Stop Fighting, We're Jihadists!

Reminiscent of the classic line from "Doctor Strangelove," Reuters reports al-Qa'ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri has told the Iraqi and Syrian branches of the terrorist network to "stop arguing," presumably because whether you are executing children for heresy or indiscriminately murdering thousands of civilians in May, there is no room for discord and strife.

Ayman al-Zawahiri also hates it when his kids fight in the backseat during long car trips, apparently.