Bin Laden Documents Now Even . . . Secreter

Today the Associated Press reported that shortly after the Abbottabad raid that killed Osama bin Laden in May 2011, Special Operations Command commander Admiral William McRaven ordered military files about the operation to be transferred from Defense Department computers to the CIA, where they are more difficult to access via Freedom of Information Act requests.

On the one hand, Thomas Blanton of the National Security Archives when he describes this as a "shell game in place of open government."

On the other hand, however, I think that given the potential threat to the SEALs who conducted the operation, as well as the need to protect SOCOM's tactics, techniques, and planning considerations for future operations, these files deserve unique protection. Considering how quickly elements of the operation leaked from other sources in DOD, McRaven's actions seem not only to be justified, but also prescient.

The problem is that the Obama Administration, which promised to be "the most transparent in U.S. history," has gone to such extreme lengths in the past to create smoke screens (i.e. the Caribou Coffee meetings to avoid signing guests into the Executive Office Building; the EPA chief and other senior officials conducting Administration business on fake personal accounts to avoid scrutiny; the refusal to share the legal justification for drone strikes against U.S. citizens with Congress; the firing and failure to replace Inspectors General, etc.) has rendered even perfectly reasonable actions suspect.

Nirvana, Soundgarden, and the Taliban: The Jason Everman Story

In case you missed it over the holiday weekend, the New York Times Magazine has a fascinating story about Jason Everman, a Green Beret who participated in the initial stages of Operation Enduring Freedom and Afghanistan (and by extension, the hunt for Osama bin Laden)* and numerous other capture/kill missions during multiple deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq before retiring from the Army in 2006 to pursue a degree in philosophy from Columbia University.

But as interesting as Everman's military accomplishments -- about which he says little -- may be, what makes him uniquely interesting are the "failures" that Everman overcame before enlisting. Specifically:

Jason Everman has the unique distinction of being the guy who was kicked out of Nirvana and Soundgarden, two rock bands that would sell roughly 100 million records combined. At 26, he wasn’t just Pete Best, the guy the Beatles left behind. He was Pete Best twice.

Okay, so this may be at best tangential to manhunting/counter-terrorism. But given that Seattle Grunge was the soundtrack of my youth (i.e. Soundgarden at Bender Arena in DC was my last concert before reporting for active duty at Ft. Sill back in 1994), this easily makes Everman one of the coolest military/CT stories of the past decade.

* Given that the article's author, Clay Tarver, notes that Everman was "one of those bearded guys riding around on horseback in Afghanistan fighting the Taliban," I'm making the assumption that he was in Afghanistan sometime between October and December 2001, when the SOF fought as "Horse Soldiers" alongside the Northern Alliance. If our SOF still used horses after Tora Bora, Everman may have not actually had anything to do with the hunt for bin Laden, in which case . . . this is still a pretty cool story, and Everman is still just as impressive!

Jason Everman (top right) with Nirvana in 1989

Everman (top) with Soundgarden



Everman somewhere downrange more than a decade later . . . Thank you for your service, Jason!

 

Apparently Anwar al-Awlaki Loved Pizza and Prostitutes

Josh Gerstein of Politico reports that, according to documents obtained by Judicial Watch under the Freedom of Information Act, FBI surveillance trailed Anwar al-Awlaki around Northern Virginia in the weeks after the 9/11 attacks in 2001 looking for possible links between Osama bin Laden and the then-leader of a mosque in Falls Church, VA. Among the more interesting observations were his taking the Metro into Foggy Bottom to eat at the Bertucci's near George Washington University (alas, no word on which toppings he preferred), and that at least seven times in late 2001 and early 2002 he hired "high end escorts" who charged several hundred dollars for their . . . um, services.

Awlaki eventually moved to England later in 2002, and then to Yemen in 2004, where he became the spiritual leader/chief propagandist for al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula, and later was involved in organizing the 2009 Underwear Bomber attack before being killed by a U.S. drone strike in September 2011.

Anwar al-Awlaki: Loved his hos and Bertucci's

In the weeks after the September 11 attacks, the FBI tailed Muslim cleric Anwar Al-Awlaki around the Washington area, following him to an NPR interview and watching him as he munched on pizza at Bertucci's, according to documents obtained by the conservative watchdog group Judicial Watch - See more at: http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/overnightbrief070313#sthash.18Oc92uL.dpuf

In the weeks after the September 11 attacks, the FBI tailed Muslim cleric Anwar Al-Awlaki around the Washington area, following him to an NPR interview and watching him as he munched on pizza at Bertucci's, according to documents obtained by the conservative watchdog group Judicial Watch. - - See more at: http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/overnightbrief070313#sthash.oNcfJ1pw.dpuf

Joseph Kony: Elephant Poacher

As if the massacres, large-scale mutilations and child kidnapping (for use as child soldiers and sex slaves) weren't bad enough, according to the Enough Project, Joseph Kony and the Lord's Resistance Army have now branched out into ivory poaching in the Congo's Garamba National Park as a means to raise funds and obtain arms/supplies.

Whereas it is true that after more than two decades of terrorizing the region, Kony has attained bogeyman status, and villagers tend to ascribe almost all banditry and crime to his group, the Enough Project's reporting is pretty damning. There is also no shortage of precedent for ideologically-founded militias converting to criminality in order to raise funds (i.e. the FARC's transition from Marxist vanguard to narcotics empire, or Hezbollah's deep involvement in narcotics trafficking), so it would not be surprising to see the LRA make a similar transition in order to survive.

Unfortunately for the elephants, the persistent political instability amongst the human governments in central Africa has translated into a lack of the bilateral support necessary for a successful manhunt, which in this case has actually led to the suspension of the hunt for Joseph Kony.

Because when you've spent two decades destroying villages, hacking off limbs, and enslaving children, elephant poaching really isn't much of a step down, morally speaking.

Al-Qa'ida and Leaks

Apropos of the news that General (Ret.) James Cartwright is under investigation for allegedly leaking details of U.S. involvement in the Stuxnet attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, two recent stories explore how al-Qa’ida takes advantages of U.S. intelligence leaks.

Yesterday the Associated Press reported that prosecutors in the PFC Bradley Manning court-martial introduced uncontested evidence that al-Qa’ida sought to benefit from the classified documents Manning downloaded and released through WikiLeaks, “urging members to study them before devising ways to attack the United States.”

Similarly, last week the AP’s Kimberly Dozier reported that intelligence officials are already observing changes in al-Qa’ida’s communications patterns in the wake of Edward Snowden’s leak revealing the NSA’s secret PRISM surveillance program. In particular, they say that al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula – the affiliate responsible for the “Underwear Bomber” who in 2009 nearly detonated an explosive on a flight to Detroit – “has been among the first to alter how it reaches out to its operatives. Dozier notes that Osama bin Laden quit using his Thuraya satellite phone in 1998 after newspapers revealed that U.S. intelligence was able to intercept his calls, and quotes one forensic intelligence expert as saying that many terrorists “are increasingly switching the temporary phones or SIM cards they use and throw them away more often” due to books and media coverage of how U.S. forces mine information from cellphones found at sites raided in war zones.

The U.S. Military in Africa

Just as I was writing about the saga of Sheikh Aweys and the infighting within al-Shabaab, two accounts of the growing U.S. military mission in Africa happened to appear. (Okay, given that President Obama was in Africa for the past week, these articles are pretty far from a coincidence). James Kitfield of the National Journal focuses on the counterterrorism aspect of AFRICOM’s mission, whereas Reuters’ account focuses on the use of broader training missions such as clearing landmines and anti-piracy patrols to win influence in a rising Africa (particularly vis-à-vis China) in addition to the effort to counter al-Qa’ida and other militant groups.

Although Major General H.R. McMaster has warned against over-reliance on SOF raiders and proxy forces, I think Africa is the perfect theater in which to test such a model. Although the continent has been experiencing both an economic boom of late and a rise in jihadist activity, the United States has few vital strategic interests there. Consequently, what better place to see whether John Nagl’s idea for an Army Advisory Corps could build partnership capacity on a national scale, or whether al-Qa’ida affiliates can be defeated through a combination of decapitation strikes and SOF conducting FID missions, possibly supported by broader civil affairs operations?

Which Way for Mr. Aweys and al-Shabaab?

There were conflicting reports last week on the status of Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, the firebrand cleric seen by many Somalis as the spiritual leader of al-Shabaab, but who recently has been mired in a power struggle within the group over the question of whether al-Shabaab should be a nationalist insurgency for Somali Islamists or welcome foreign fighters as part of al-Qa’ida’s global jihad.

On Wednesday, Reuters reported that Aweys had been arrested in central Somalia by a regional government friendly to the Somali Federal Government.

On Friday, however, the BBC reported that elders from Aweys’ Habr Gidr clan said he was travelling with permission of the administration in Adado, and that he had not surrendered to local authorities. (The Habr Gidr was also Mohammed Farah Aideed's clan, which is ironic given that Aideed offered to conduct joint operations against Somali Islamists before UN forces started targeting him in June 1993).

But on Saturday Reuters reported that Aweys had been flown to Mogadishu “to hold talks with the federal government about his fate,” and published the photo below. Aweys is believed to have participated in the Battle of the Black Sea fighting against U.S. forces in 1993, and was linked to terrorism by the United States shortly after 9/11. Although he is on a UN Security Council terrorism sanctions list, it is unclear how much influence Aweys currently has within al-Shabaab, and therefore whether his arrest or reconciliation will have much of an effect on al-Shabaab's capabilities.

Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, spiritual leader of al-Shabaab, in custody of the Somali government and en route to Mogadishu.

Meanwhile, two of al-Shabaab’s top leaders were apparently killed in the same infighting that may have driven Aweys into the arms of the Somali government, including Ibrahim al Afghani, whom the BBC described as al-Shabaab’s second-in-command, and for whom the Rewards for Justice program offered a $5 million reward for information leading to his apprehension earlier this month. Interestingly, according to Bill Roggio at The Long War Journal, al Afghani, Aweys, and other al-Shabaab leaders had criticized its top leader Ahmed Abdi Godane for being too heavy-handed in his treatment of American jihadist Omar Hammami, and Roggio reports that Hammami is now thought to be dead. (See an earlier post on Hammami here). In the meantime, al-Shabaab noted on its official Twitter account that it is conducting an internal purge.

As they say, interesting . . .