When I was on active duty in Baghdad, we used to joke that with the clear skies, palm trees, and man-made lakes, the International Zone would make a great golf course in more peaceful days, which we would call "Tigris Woods."
Well, today AFP has a great little piece on Afghanistan's only golf course. Apparently, security hasn't been a problem thus far as "Deminers cleared the course, but as an extra precaution Afzal set
several thousand sheep roaming over it for five days -- they set off no
mines and all survived."
Tuesday, May 15, 2012
McMasters on Afghanistan
One of the most impressive officers I've met in recent years is Major General H.R. McMasters. I worked with him briefly while he was at U.S. Army TRADOC, and even more briefly when he headed the Task Force Shaffiyat in Afghanistan. Fellow officers who had him as their tactical officer at West Point raved about him, and his book Dereliction of Duty is one of the rare books that becomes zeitgeisty in military literary circles that actually lives up to the hype. He speaks with infectious enthusiasm on the driest of topics, from obscure Army doctrine debates to the origins of criminal patronage networks in Afghanistan.
This weekend the Wall Street Journal published a great interview by David Feith with MG H.R. McMasters on the war in Afghanistan. "Our soldiers, airmen, Marines and sailors, working alongside Afghanistan, have shut down the vast majority of the physical space in which the enemy can operate," McMasters says. "The question is, how do we consolidate those gains politically and psychologically."
McMasters goes on to argue that the fundamental reason the Taliban collapsed so quickly in 2001 was "that every Afghan was convinced of the inevitability of the Taliban's defeat." Unfortunately, I think that although the Strategic Partnership Agreement signed last week (which MG McMasters says is "immensely important") is a positive step, its complete absence of specifics, especially with regards to the future funding of the Afghan National Security Forces, risks undermining the psychological gains intended to sway those Afghans still sitting on the fence between supporting the government or the Taliban.
As they say, the entire feature is worth perusing.
This weekend the Wall Street Journal published a great interview by David Feith with MG H.R. McMasters on the war in Afghanistan. "Our soldiers, airmen, Marines and sailors, working alongside Afghanistan, have shut down the vast majority of the physical space in which the enemy can operate," McMasters says. "The question is, how do we consolidate those gains politically and psychologically."
McMasters goes on to argue that the fundamental reason the Taliban collapsed so quickly in 2001 was "that every Afghan was convinced of the inevitability of the Taliban's defeat." Unfortunately, I think that although the Strategic Partnership Agreement signed last week (which MG McMasters says is "immensely important") is a positive step, its complete absence of specifics, especially with regards to the future funding of the Afghan National Security Forces, risks undermining the psychological gains intended to sway those Afghans still sitting on the fence between supporting the government or the Taliban.
As they say, the entire feature is worth perusing.
Monday, May 14, 2012
Three Takes on Bin Laden
As the anniversary of Osama bin Laden's death recedes, the debate as to his role in al-Qa'ida a decade after 9/11 continues, stoked by the recent declassification of seventeen of the files removed by Navy SEALs from his compound in Abbottabad. Three interesting analyses of these documents and what they mean to the War on Terror are provided by Bruce Hoffman in the Wall Street Journal, Patrick Cockburn in The Independent (UK), and Fawaz Gerges in The Daily Beast.
Hoffman argues that the released documents provide a corrective to the "extravagant and incorrect claims about the weakness of al Qaeda and the irrelevance of its founding leader." Instead, he argues that "the picture that emerges from the seized Arabic-language documents is of a leader involved in both al Qaeda's day-to-day operations and long-term strategy," and that bin Laden "remained both determined and able to communicate his wishes to al Qaeda's growing stable of associates." Okay, but any crazy derelict on a DC street corner is "determined and able to communicate his wishes" to passers-by, the question is whether anybody is actually listening. Hoffman himself admits that the al-Qa'ida affiliates were "unresponsive," but rather cavalierly dismisses this as "a problem familiar to any manager coping with rapid expansion."
Hoffman does make an interesting point when he cites an August 27, 2010 communique in which bin Laden expresses concern for the safety of his followers in Pakistan not because of potential military action, but because of the massive flooding that summer. Hoffman concludes that "this assertion alone speaks volumes about how comfortable he and his minions found their refuge there." Hmm . . . . maybe. But there are dozens of other reports of al-Qa'ida leaders urging their fighters to seek other sanctuaries in Yemen, Somalia, or even Iran because of the drone strikes in Pakistan's tribal areas, not to mention the arrest of numerous al-Qa'ida senior leaders in Pakistan (i.e. Khalid Sheikh Muhammad). Hoffman could be right in this interpretation, but given that only seventeen out of thousands of documents have been released, how do we know that this one is in any way a representative sample, a fact that Hoffman himself bemoans later in calling for a full release of the Abbottabad files?
In other words, Hoffman tends to undermine his own assertions quite a bit here.
Patrick Cockburn takes an almost diametrically opposed interpretation as Hoffman, writing:
Cockburn's account and analysis certainly seem intuitively plausible. My only caveat is that his main source for the scoop (via the investigative website Truthout) is a retired Pakistani general. Again, it is plausible that Shaukat Qadir is correct in his details about bin Laden's isolation, but this assertion comes just after Cockburn's caution that we can't take anything Pakistan's ISI says at face value. (Yes Qadir is retired, but the narrative that everything the Obama administration has said about Abbottabad is a lie veers to close to conspiracy theory for my tastes).
Finally, Fawaz Gerges argues that "even more than the killing of bin Laden, the Arab uprisings . . . have not only shaken the very foundation of the regional authoritarian order but unraveled the standard terrorism narrative." Whereas al-Qa'ida's leadership decries democracy, preaching that only violent terrorism will bring about political change, "The millions of Arabs who took to the streets openly have shown that politics matters and that peaceful protests are more effective at delivering change. The ballot box and parliamentarianism, not the sword and the caliphate, are their rallying cry, an utter rejection of what al Qaeda stands for."
I think Gerges is right, broadly speaking, that al-Qa'ida's "core ideology is intrinsically incompatible with the universal aspirations of the Arabs." Yet whereas the instability created by Arab Spring will not lead to al-Qa'ida taking over countries in the Middle East, I think Gerges understates the near-term risks of the Arab autocracies' security apparatuses crumbling, thereby creating space for local Salafist terrorist groups to operate. Additionally, I think he is too quick to dismiss the Khomeini analogy. The Iranian Revolution is much closer to the historical norm of a first wave being surpassed by more zealous ideologues in later stages. Consequently, if the newly elected, moderately Islamic parties are unable to resolve the deep systemic problems that helped to trigger the Arab Spring in the first place, there is a significant danger that the frustrated populations will be susceptible to more extremist voices.
Hoffman argues that the released documents provide a corrective to the "extravagant and incorrect claims about the weakness of al Qaeda and the irrelevance of its founding leader." Instead, he argues that "the picture that emerges from the seized Arabic-language documents is of a leader involved in both al Qaeda's day-to-day operations and long-term strategy," and that bin Laden "remained both determined and able to communicate his wishes to al Qaeda's growing stable of associates." Okay, but any crazy derelict on a DC street corner is "determined and able to communicate his wishes" to passers-by, the question is whether anybody is actually listening. Hoffman himself admits that the al-Qa'ida affiliates were "unresponsive," but rather cavalierly dismisses this as "a problem familiar to any manager coping with rapid expansion."
Hoffman does make an interesting point when he cites an August 27, 2010 communique in which bin Laden expresses concern for the safety of his followers in Pakistan not because of potential military action, but because of the massive flooding that summer. Hoffman concludes that "this assertion alone speaks volumes about how comfortable he and his minions found their refuge there." Hmm . . . . maybe. But there are dozens of other reports of al-Qa'ida leaders urging their fighters to seek other sanctuaries in Yemen, Somalia, or even Iran because of the drone strikes in Pakistan's tribal areas, not to mention the arrest of numerous al-Qa'ida senior leaders in Pakistan (i.e. Khalid Sheikh Muhammad). Hoffman could be right in this interpretation, but given that only seventeen out of thousands of documents have been released, how do we know that this one is in any way a representative sample, a fact that Hoffman himself bemoans later in calling for a full release of the Abbottabad files?
In other words, Hoffman tends to undermine his own assertions quite a bit here.
Patrick Cockburn takes an almost diametrically opposed interpretation as Hoffman, writing:
Immediately after the killing, administration officials portrayed Bin Laden as a spider at the centre of a conspiratorial web, the well-hidden but operationally active commander in chief of al-Qa'ida. They later retreated from these claims that were obviously at odds with his demonstrably limited contacts with the world outside his compound in Abbottabad.He concludes that "a striking feature of these letters is that there is no evidence that their recipients made any effort to carry out their leader's instructions," and proceeds to weave a fascinating tale of how bin Laden was marginalized by al-Qa'ida after 2003, when the terror network's leaders "decided to keep the Saudi as a titular leader but quietly remove him from all operational control."
Cockburn's account and analysis certainly seem intuitively plausible. My only caveat is that his main source for the scoop (via the investigative website Truthout) is a retired Pakistani general. Again, it is plausible that Shaukat Qadir is correct in his details about bin Laden's isolation, but this assertion comes just after Cockburn's caution that we can't take anything Pakistan's ISI says at face value. (Yes Qadir is retired, but the narrative that everything the Obama administration has said about Abbottabad is a lie veers to close to conspiracy theory for my tastes).
Finally, Fawaz Gerges argues that "even more than the killing of bin Laden, the Arab uprisings . . . have not only shaken the very foundation of the regional authoritarian order but unraveled the standard terrorism narrative." Whereas al-Qa'ida's leadership decries democracy, preaching that only violent terrorism will bring about political change, "The millions of Arabs who took to the streets openly have shown that politics matters and that peaceful protests are more effective at delivering change. The ballot box and parliamentarianism, not the sword and the caliphate, are their rallying cry, an utter rejection of what al Qaeda stands for."
I think Gerges is right, broadly speaking, that al-Qa'ida's "core ideology is intrinsically incompatible with the universal aspirations of the Arabs." Yet whereas the instability created by Arab Spring will not lead to al-Qa'ida taking over countries in the Middle East, I think Gerges understates the near-term risks of the Arab autocracies' security apparatuses crumbling, thereby creating space for local Salafist terrorist groups to operate. Additionally, I think he is too quick to dismiss the Khomeini analogy. The Iranian Revolution is much closer to the historical norm of a first wave being surpassed by more zealous ideologues in later stages. Consequently, if the newly elected, moderately Islamic parties are unable to resolve the deep systemic problems that helped to trigger the Arab Spring in the first place, there is a significant danger that the frustrated populations will be susceptible to more extremist voices.
Thursday, May 10, 2012
The Most Dangerous Man in the World?
In appearances publicizing my book, I've said several times that if the United States could successfully target any individual in the world, it would not be the Ayman al-Zawahiri, but rather Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri, the deadly genius behind AQAP's "underwear" and printer-cartridge bombs, and the suspected designer of the device recently smuggled out of Yemen by a U.S. double-agent. Yesterday The Washington Post had an excellent profile on al-Asiri, whom the reporters describe as representing "the CIA's worst fears."
Although I recommend the entire article, there were three key takeaways I found particularly interesting:
- There is a debate as to how al-Asiri, a 30-year-old chemistry major, learned to make such sophisticated bombs. One expert says he was taught by a Pakistani bombmaker linked to al-Qa'ida, while Bruce Riedel says "He seems to be largely self-educated." The latter is especially dangerous, as it suggests the threat of lone-wolfs learning to make sophisticated devices via manuals and other resources on the Internet is viable.
- Even if al-Asiri is unique in his learning capacity and ingenuity, analysts say al-Asiri "is training the next generation of bombmakers in the event he is killed." The possibility of al-Asiri creating a "starfish network" of sophisticated bombmakers is truly frightening, and underscores the need to kill him as quickly as possible.
- Al-Asiri's first significant bomb utilized 100 grams of PETN, "a white, powdery explosive that was virtually undetectable" and was targeted at Saudi Arabia's counterterrorism chief, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef. The bomber selected to conduct the suicide mission was Abdullah al-Asiri, Ibrahim Hassan's brother. In other words, al-Asiri is one cold-hearted bastard.
Although I recommend the entire article, there were three key takeaways I found particularly interesting:
- There is a debate as to how al-Asiri, a 30-year-old chemistry major, learned to make such sophisticated bombs. One expert says he was taught by a Pakistani bombmaker linked to al-Qa'ida, while Bruce Riedel says "He seems to be largely self-educated." The latter is especially dangerous, as it suggests the threat of lone-wolfs learning to make sophisticated devices via manuals and other resources on the Internet is viable.
- Even if al-Asiri is unique in his learning capacity and ingenuity, analysts say al-Asiri "is training the next generation of bombmakers in the event he is killed." The possibility of al-Asiri creating a "starfish network" of sophisticated bombmakers is truly frightening, and underscores the need to kill him as quickly as possible.
- Al-Asiri's first significant bomb utilized 100 grams of PETN, "a white, powdery explosive that was virtually undetectable" and was targeted at Saudi Arabia's counterterrorism chief, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef. The bomber selected to conduct the suicide mission was Abdullah al-Asiri, Ibrahim Hassan's brother. In other words, al-Asiri is one cold-hearted bastard.
 |
| Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri: The single most important target in the War on Terror. |
Wednesday, May 9, 2012
Meanwhile, in Yemen . . .
As if to illustrate my point that Osama bin Laden's death, or even the potential decimation of al-Qa'ida Core doesn't mean the end of Salafist terrorism, yesterday it was announced that the CIA foiled an airplane bomb plot by AQAP timed to coincide with the anniversary of the Abbottabad raid.
On its own merits, this would be good news. But early reports of how they foiled the plot make this especially interesting, specifically the Los Angeles Times report that the CIA infiltrated AQAP with an operative who was able to escape to Saudi Arabia with a non-metallic explosive device that was a refined version of the "underwear bomb" used in the failed Christmas Day 2009 AQAP attack.
Successful infiltrations into al-Qa'ida and its affiliates has been exceedingly rare, much less getting close enough to access AQAP's cutting-edge devices. I can't wait for Hollywood to produce a film version of this operation!
On its own merits, this would be good news. But early reports of how they foiled the plot make this especially interesting, specifically the Los Angeles Times report that the CIA infiltrated AQAP with an operative who was able to escape to Saudi Arabia with a non-metallic explosive device that was a refined version of the "underwear bomb" used in the failed Christmas Day 2009 AQAP attack.
Successful infiltrations into al-Qa'ida and its affiliates has been exceedingly rare, much less getting close enough to access AQAP's cutting-edge devices. I can't wait for Hollywood to produce a film version of this operation!
Tuesday, May 8, 2012
Meanwhile, in Guatanamo . . .
I don't pretend to be a legal expert, so won't expound at length on the beginning of the military tribunal trying Khalid Sheikh Muhammad and other 9/11 conspirators. (I found today's Wall Street Journal editorial on the trial to be fairly persuasive, however).
But one tidbit from this MSNBC report jumped out at me:
I think it is safe to say the defense will do everything in its power to ensure the trial is a fiasco (i.e. requesting that female prosecutors wear hijabs so as not to offend the defendants) as a strategy to obscure the magnitude of the crimes committed on 9/11 and planned beyond that date.
But one tidbit from this MSNBC report jumped out at me:
Human rights groups and defense lawyers say the secrecy of Guantanamo and the military tribunals will make it impossible for the defense. They argued the U.S. kept the case out of civilian court to prevent disclosure of the treatment of prisoners like Mohammed, who was waterboarded 183 times.Really, weren't the issues of waterboarding and the conditions at Guantanamo (which are generally viewed as a model for military detention, but consistently decried by al-Qa'ida for propaganda purposes) disclosed a hundred times over during the Bush administration?
I think it is safe to say the defense will do everything in its power to ensure the trial is a fiasco (i.e. requesting that female prosecutors wear hijabs so as not to offend the defendants) as a strategy to obscure the magnitude of the crimes committed on 9/11 and planned beyond that date.
Monday, May 7, 2012
Senior AQAP Leader Killed
The Long War Journal, citing statements by the Yemeni Embassy in Washington, D.C., and al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula, reported that Fahd al Quso (a.k.a. Abu Huthayfa) was killed in a drone strike in Yemen yesterday. Quso was wanted by the FBI for involvement in the October 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole, and has also been identified as one of the AQAP operatives involved in the unsuccessful "Underwear Bomber" attack on Christmas Day, 2009.
As I alluded to in my Weekly Standard piece below, the center-of-gravity in the war against al-Qa'ida may be gradually shifting from Afghanistan/Pakistan to other theaters as U.S. forces successfully attrit the terror network's core leadership there. Thus, the cumulative effect of attacks such as that which apparently killed Quso will likely be more strategically consequential than bin Laden's death.
This is particularly true in Yemen, where earlier today AQAP overran a Yemeni military base, killing 32 soldiers. Once upon a time, such a tactical setback would have been relatively inconsequential to U.S. national security. Unfortunately, given that AQAP has demonstrated its ability to attack the U.S. homeland, we are likely looking at another prolonged campaign.
As I alluded to in my Weekly Standard piece below, the center-of-gravity in the war against al-Qa'ida may be gradually shifting from Afghanistan/Pakistan to other theaters as U.S. forces successfully attrit the terror network's core leadership there. Thus, the cumulative effect of attacks such as that which apparently killed Quso will likely be more strategically consequential than bin Laden's death.
This is particularly true in Yemen, where earlier today AQAP overran a Yemeni military base, killing 32 soldiers. Once upon a time, such a tactical setback would have been relatively inconsequential to U.S. national security. Unfortunately, given that AQAP has demonstrated its ability to attack the U.S. homeland, we are likely looking at another prolonged campaign.
 |
| Fahd al Quso, involuntarily retired from the War on Terror, May 6, 2012. |
I'm Back . . . and in The Weekly Standard
I'm back from my computer crash imposed hiatus that prevented me from blogging in April. (Although as a wise sage I know once said, "Every now and then everybody needs to go hermit for a while.")
Below is my latest publication, which appears in this week's Weekly Standard, assessing what we know about the strategic significance of killing Osama bin Laden a year after the SEALs' raid in Abbottabad.
Much more material to follow in the days to come as I not only return to blogging, but intend to expand the blog's focus somewhat to include other topics of unconventional warfare beyond strategic manhunts.
At a year’s remove from the Abbottabad raid, it is possible to make some initial judgments about bin Laden’s operational role in al Qaeda, the prospects for the strategic defeat of the terrorist network, and the implications of the raid for the broader struggle against jihadist terrorism.
Leaked reports of the files seized at the compound (significant portions of the cache remain highly classified) suggest that a decade after 9/11 bin Laden remained better connected to his deputies and allies than previously imagined. He was corresponding with Ayman al Zawahiri, Mullah Omar, and Lashkar e-Taiba chief Hafiz Saeed, among others. Bin Laden was kept informed of the operational plans for the major al Qaeda plots of the past decade, including the 7/7 London subway attack (2005) and the failed plot to bomb the New York City subway system (2009). Then-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen concluded that bin Laden “was very active in terms of leading” and “very active in terms of operations.”
Or was he? Although bin Laden was aware of these plots, no clear evidence has been released that he directed the planning; he may simply have been kept informed. Nor is it clear that anyone heeded his calls for attacks on U.S. railroads and the assassination of President Obama and General David Petraeus. David Ignatius has described bin Laden as a “lion in winter,” and one U.S. official quoted in a McClatchy report last June called him “the cranky old uncle that people weren’t listening to.” In the end, bin Laden’s operational importance to al Qaeda may lie in the eye of the beholder.
From the history of manhunts, we know that destroying the fugitive’s support network is as important strategically as killing or capturing the individual himself in cases where the network could carry on the struggle without him. To its credit, the Obama administration has successfully targeted other key al Qaeda leaders. In the past year, U.S. drone strikes have killed Atiyah Abd-al Rahman (the new number two), Ilyas Kashmiri (arguably its most effective operational leader), and Anwar al-Awlaki (its most dangerous propagandist). The success of the “drone war” in Pakistan’s tribal areas—which by some accounts has killed 75 percent of al Qaeda’s senior leadership—has impeded the network’s ability to communicate and hence plan and execute attacks against the United States. As a result, various administration officials have claimed we are on the verge of defeating al Qaeda.
Even if we are successful in severely degrading bin Laden’s organization, however, al Qaeda writ large is far from finished. The most dangerous plots on American soil—the “underwear bomber” (2009) and the failed Times Square bombing (2010)—were initiated by al Qaeda affiliates and allies, whose operations have not abated since Abbottabad. Michael Leiter, then director of the National Counterterrorism Center, testified before Congress in February 2011—just three months before Abbottabad—that Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula posed “probably the most significant risk to the U.S. homeland.”
Moreover, the ultimate effect of the Arab Spring on al Qaeda remains uncertain. While the overthrow of Arab autocrats through popular uprisings rather than violent jihad undermines a key tenet of bin Laden’s ideology, it also may weaken the security apparatuses that for years suppressed many terrorist cells throughout the Middle East. There are already signs of al Qaeda-affiliated resurgences in Libya and Yemen, with the Assad regime’s murderous suppression of antigovernment demonstrations creating still other opportunities for jihadists.
Although it is unclear whether a loose constellation of affiliates will pose the same strategic threat to America as the centrally controlled network that initiated the African embassy bombings (1998), the attack on the USS Cole (2000), and the 9/11 attacks (2001), it is evident the demise of bin Laden and the attrition of Al Qaeda Central have not eliminated Salafist terrorism.
In the end, Osama bin Laden’s death was indisputably a boost for U.S. morale in the war on terror and a triumph of justice over evil. President Obama deserves credit for launching the raid, even if it is disconcerting that so many of his handpicked advisers opposed it. But regardless of how much the president’s reelection campaign may trumpet that successful operation over the next six months, the drone strikes against al Qaeda’s broader network and the leaders of affiliated terror groups will likely prove more significant. It is President Obama’s decision to treat the war on terror as an actual war rather than reverting to a pre-9/11 law enforcement mentality—that is, his continuation of the policy initiated by the Bush administration—that may prove strategically decisive.
Below is my latest publication, which appears in this week's Weekly Standard, assessing what we know about the strategic significance of killing Osama bin Laden a year after the SEALs' raid in Abbottabad.
Much more material to follow in the days to come as I not only return to blogging, but intend to expand the blog's focus somewhat to include other topics of unconventional warfare beyond strategic manhunts.
The Bin Laden Raid, a Year Later
Al Qaeda is down but not out.
Benjamin Runkle
May 14, 2012, Vol. 17, No. 33
Even before the celebrations a year ago had ended, terrorism experts
were debating the strategic significance of Osama bin Laden’s death at
the hands of U.S. Navy SEALs. Some argued that bin Laden would prove
irreplaceable to al Qaeda; others claimed he had been in hiding so long
he was operationally and strategically irrelevant to the war on terror.
Of course, it was too soon to know for sure.At a year’s remove from the Abbottabad raid, it is possible to make some initial judgments about bin Laden’s operational role in al Qaeda, the prospects for the strategic defeat of the terrorist network, and the implications of the raid for the broader struggle against jihadist terrorism.
Leaked reports of the files seized at the compound (significant portions of the cache remain highly classified) suggest that a decade after 9/11 bin Laden remained better connected to his deputies and allies than previously imagined. He was corresponding with Ayman al Zawahiri, Mullah Omar, and Lashkar e-Taiba chief Hafiz Saeed, among others. Bin Laden was kept informed of the operational plans for the major al Qaeda plots of the past decade, including the 7/7 London subway attack (2005) and the failed plot to bomb the New York City subway system (2009). Then-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen concluded that bin Laden “was very active in terms of leading” and “very active in terms of operations.”
Or was he? Although bin Laden was aware of these plots, no clear evidence has been released that he directed the planning; he may simply have been kept informed. Nor is it clear that anyone heeded his calls for attacks on U.S. railroads and the assassination of President Obama and General David Petraeus. David Ignatius has described bin Laden as a “lion in winter,” and one U.S. official quoted in a McClatchy report last June called him “the cranky old uncle that people weren’t listening to.” In the end, bin Laden’s operational importance to al Qaeda may lie in the eye of the beholder.
From the history of manhunts, we know that destroying the fugitive’s support network is as important strategically as killing or capturing the individual himself in cases where the network could carry on the struggle without him. To its credit, the Obama administration has successfully targeted other key al Qaeda leaders. In the past year, U.S. drone strikes have killed Atiyah Abd-al Rahman (the new number two), Ilyas Kashmiri (arguably its most effective operational leader), and Anwar al-Awlaki (its most dangerous propagandist). The success of the “drone war” in Pakistan’s tribal areas—which by some accounts has killed 75 percent of al Qaeda’s senior leadership—has impeded the network’s ability to communicate and hence plan and execute attacks against the United States. As a result, various administration officials have claimed we are on the verge of defeating al Qaeda.
Even if we are successful in severely degrading bin Laden’s organization, however, al Qaeda writ large is far from finished. The most dangerous plots on American soil—the “underwear bomber” (2009) and the failed Times Square bombing (2010)—were initiated by al Qaeda affiliates and allies, whose operations have not abated since Abbottabad. Michael Leiter, then director of the National Counterterrorism Center, testified before Congress in February 2011—just three months before Abbottabad—that Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula posed “probably the most significant risk to the U.S. homeland.”
Moreover, the ultimate effect of the Arab Spring on al Qaeda remains uncertain. While the overthrow of Arab autocrats through popular uprisings rather than violent jihad undermines a key tenet of bin Laden’s ideology, it also may weaken the security apparatuses that for years suppressed many terrorist cells throughout the Middle East. There are already signs of al Qaeda-affiliated resurgences in Libya and Yemen, with the Assad regime’s murderous suppression of antigovernment demonstrations creating still other opportunities for jihadists.
Although it is unclear whether a loose constellation of affiliates will pose the same strategic threat to America as the centrally controlled network that initiated the African embassy bombings (1998), the attack on the USS Cole (2000), and the 9/11 attacks (2001), it is evident the demise of bin Laden and the attrition of Al Qaeda Central have not eliminated Salafist terrorism.
In the end, Osama bin Laden’s death was indisputably a boost for U.S. morale in the war on terror and a triumph of justice over evil. President Obama deserves credit for launching the raid, even if it is disconcerting that so many of his handpicked advisers opposed it. But regardless of how much the president’s reelection campaign may trumpet that successful operation over the next six months, the drone strikes against al Qaeda’s broader network and the leaders of affiliated terror groups will likely prove more significant. It is President Obama’s decision to treat the war on terror as an actual war rather than reverting to a pre-9/11 law enforcement mentality—that is, his continuation of the policy initiated by the Bush administration—that may prove strategically decisive.
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