Tuesday, December 27, 2011
Noriega's Playlists!
Thanks to the wonderful folks at George Washington University's National Security Archives, we can actually see the playlist used by the 4th PsyOps Group outside the Papal Nunciatura.
Hmmm . . . I think they would have had me out of there with the New Kids on the Block and Cher, but I have to admit to owning a few of these tunes on my iPod.
Today in Manhunting History -- December 27, 1989: "Voodoo Chile" for the Voodoo Dictator
On December 24, Delta Force had received a tip that Noriega was en route to the Nunciature, and was speeding through the air in six Black Hawks hoping to intercept the blue all-terrain vehicle carrying Noriega when they were told they were too late. Instead of capturing the dictator, they landed two helicopters on Avenida Balboa, the main street in front of the Nunciature. They were quickly joined by Armored Personnel Carriers, who pointed their .50 caliber machine guns outward to deter a rescue attempt by Noriega loyalists. Military police arrived and cordoned off the area with concertina wire.
In Washington, Secretary Cheney told Powell “Don’t let that guy out of the compound.” The State Department immediately informed the Vatican of the situation and requested it deny political asylum to Noriega. Since most of the Vatican hierarchy were about to celebrate Midnight Mass at Saint Peter’s, State did not receive an immediate response. However, on Christmas Day, the papal secretary of state responded to Secretary Baker’s request for Noriega’s release with a polite but firm refusal. A Church spokesman explained that Noriega was being urged to leave of his own free will, but “At the same time, we cannot force Noriega to leave nor . . . can we consign him to U.S. forces, which would be a decision against international law.”
On Christmas morning, General Thurman spoke personally with Monsignor Laboa at the gate of the Nunciature. American officers noticed that the third floor balcony of the Holiday Inn, less than 100 yards away, was filled with reporters, many of whom held long boom mikes directed at the Nunciature. Fearing they would use them to eavesdrop on either the negotiations or internal U.S. military discussions, General Thurman ordered loudspeakers be directed to create a sound barrier around the Nunciature.
In what would become one of the more comically surreal aspects of the Noriega manhunt, on December 27 the 4th Psychological Operations Group went to work. As Delta commander Jerry Boykin recalled: “Being twenty-year olds, the psy-ops guys started playing loud rock music. Really loud.” As the music blared around the clock, it became apparent it could also be used to keep Noriega – a reported opera aficionado – in a state of agitation. Consequently, the 4th Psy Ops utilized a playlist heavy on ironically titled songs such as “Voodoo Child,” “You’re No Good,” and “I Fought the Law.” Thurman embraced the tactic, proudly telling reporters “I am the music man.” However, the noise drove the Nunciatura staff crazy, keeping Laboa and others awake. (Noriega later claimed he could not hear the music). On December 29, Laboa insisted the music stop, and on day three of the operation a White House directive not to “make things any more difficult or unpleasant for Monsignor Laboa than necessary” led Powell to order Thurman to turn off the music. The music was replaced by Spanish language reports carrying stories of the surrender of the PDF in outlying areas in order to demoralize Noriega.
In Washington, Secretary Cheney told Powell “Don’t let that guy out of the compound.” The State Department immediately informed the Vatican of the situation and requested it deny political asylum to Noriega. Since most of the Vatican hierarchy were about to celebrate Midnight Mass at Saint Peter’s, State did not receive an immediate response. However, on Christmas Day, the papal secretary of state responded to Secretary Baker’s request for Noriega’s release with a polite but firm refusal. A Church spokesman explained that Noriega was being urged to leave of his own free will, but “At the same time, we cannot force Noriega to leave nor . . . can we consign him to U.S. forces, which would be a decision against international law.”
On Christmas morning, General Thurman spoke personally with Monsignor Laboa at the gate of the Nunciature. American officers noticed that the third floor balcony of the Holiday Inn, less than 100 yards away, was filled with reporters, many of whom held long boom mikes directed at the Nunciature. Fearing they would use them to eavesdrop on either the negotiations or internal U.S. military discussions, General Thurman ordered loudspeakers be directed to create a sound barrier around the Nunciature.
In what would become one of the more comically surreal aspects of the Noriega manhunt, on December 27 the 4th Psychological Operations Group went to work. As Delta commander Jerry Boykin recalled: “Being twenty-year olds, the psy-ops guys started playing loud rock music. Really loud.” As the music blared around the clock, it became apparent it could also be used to keep Noriega – a reported opera aficionado – in a state of agitation. Consequently, the 4th Psy Ops utilized a playlist heavy on ironically titled songs such as “Voodoo Child,” “You’re No Good,” and “I Fought the Law.” Thurman embraced the tactic, proudly telling reporters “I am the music man.” However, the noise drove the Nunciatura staff crazy, keeping Laboa and others awake. (Noriega later claimed he could not hear the music). On December 29, Laboa insisted the music stop, and on day three of the operation a White House directive not to “make things any more difficult or unpleasant for Monsignor Laboa than necessary” led Powell to order Thurman to turn off the music. The music was replaced by Spanish language reports carrying stories of the surrender of the PDF in outlying areas in order to demoralize Noriega.
Saturday, December 24, 2011
Today in Manhunting History -- December 24, 1989: Noriega Gets Religion
Leading up to the invasion, Noriega had been constantly tracked by members of Delta Force, aided by experts from the National Security Agency and Central Intelligence Agency. This surveillance and intelligence cell, code named CENTRA SPIKE, reported directly to General Thurman and monitored radio and telephone communications and directed a network of informants that traced the dictator’s movements. On the eve of the invasion, Noriega’s last known location was in a house in Colon at 6PM on December 19. Shortly thereafter, he left the Atlantic side of Panama and travelled in a convoy of cars and buses south towards Panama City along the Boyd-Roosevelt Highway. Part of the convoy turned off the road toward Tocumen and Torrijos airfields, while the other half headed straight toward the Comandancia. Although the Joint Special Operations Command was confident that Noriega had not returned to his headquarters, they could not definitely say where he actually was. At H-Hour, U.S. troops raided Noriega’s beach house at Farallon and his apartment near Colon, but found both of them empty.
In reality, Noriega had returned to Panama City around 8PM, heading straight to a PDF club. Despite the mounting evidence of the impending invasion, he dismissed the possibility of a U.S. attack, insisting the reports of troop mobilizations were disinformation designed to scare him into fleeing. A longtime alcoholic, he proceeded to get drunk, eventually deciding another form of entertainment was needed. A sergeant on his staff was dispatched to pick up a prostitute, who met the intoxicated strongman at the Ceremi Recreation Center, a PDF rest area just east of Tocumen military airfield. His dalliance was interrupted at 1AM, when the thumping sound of an AC-130 gunship’s 105mm and 40mm cannon prepping the objective at Tocumen for the 1st Ranger Battalion’s assault shook the room. Noriega’s bodyguard, Captain Ivan Castillo, went outside and saw the sky filled with 750 parachutes descending upon the airfield. Castillo rushed back inside to collect his boss, and the dictator’s entourage piled into the two Hyundai hatchbacks.
The next day, elements of Bravo Company, 1st Ranger Battalion secured the Recreation Center, discovering some of Noriega’s personal belongings, including his uniform and shoes.
Early on the morning of 24 December, Ivan Castillo left the Panama City apartment where he and Noriega had been hiding for the past three days. He told his boss he was searching for the next place to hide, and that if he did not return by 7AM Noriega was to move without him. Noriega trusted Castillo completely. It was the captain who had told him to put on civilian clothes rather than his uniform at the Ceremi Recreation Center, a decision that allowed him to evade U.S. forces. Later that night, as Noriega and some bodyguards were leaving an associate’s house and saw three U.S. Blackhawk helicopters descending nearby, it was Castillo who warned them to stop running lest they draw the attention of another gunship hovering above. Consequently, when Castillo talked, Noriega listened.
But Castillo was tired of running and ready to give up. He set out to look for an American to take him to Major General Marc Cisneros, the Spanish-speaking commander of U.S. Army South, to whom he hoped to betray Noriega in exchange for his own safety. At 6:30AM Castillo found a patrol from the 7th Infantry, but none of the soldiers spoke Spanish. Castillo tried to explain who he was, but was taken into custody as a prisoner of war, and Cisneros did not find out about Castillo’s surrender until 10:30AM after four precious hours had passed.
“General,” Castillo told Cisneros, “if I could have gotten word to you when I wanted to, I could have found you Noriega.
“Well, where could he be?” Cisneros asked.
Castillo handed Cisneros a list of possible hiding spots. Although it was now several hours past the time he told Noriega to leave from their last safe house, Castillo said Noriega probably left his baggage behind and might return to the location. But when the team arrived, they found nothing besides the dictator’s wallet and briefcase.
Castillo was not the only person trying to contact Cisneros on Christmas Eve. While the raid was being planned and executed, Monsignor Jose Sebastian Laboa, the papal nuncio to Panama, was desperately trying to reach Cisneros by telephone for hours to warn him that Noriega was seeking asylum. While U.S. commanders had stationed forces outside several foreign embassies to which Noriega might seek asylum – such as Cuba, Nicaragua, or Libya – they neglected to block the Vatican’s embassy. Although Noriega kept pictures of two popes on his office desk, he claimed to be a Buddhist and was known to practice black voodoo.
Around 3:30PM Laboa’s call finally got through to the general. As Cisneros picked up the phone, he heard the priest whisper: “He just walked in.”
While Delta Force was hunting for Noriega, elements of the 7th SFG were conducting what came do be called the “Ma Bell” operations. In order to avoid direct attacks on the remaining PDF garrisons spread throughout the Panamanian countryside and the casualties such missions would entail, Captain Charles Cleveland suggested they telephone the Panamanian commander at each barracks and give him an ultimatum to surrender peacefully or face a U.S. attack. Between December 22-31, these missions produced the surrender of 14 garrisons and 2,000 PDF troops.
Perhaps the most significant capitulation was the first one, when Major Del Cid in Chiriqui, the linchpin to a potential guerrilla war strategy, announced he would surrender on December 23. The news depressed Noriega, who subsequently told an intermediary to call Monsignor Laboa and request asylum. Noriega requested the Vatican’s emissary pick him up at the Panama City Dairy Queen. There, a visibly exhausted Noriega – wearing a T-shirt, Bermuda shorts, and an oversized baseball cap – jumped into the backseat of the nunciature’s car, and sunk low in his seat to avoid being seen on the short drive to the nuciature, arriving at the Vatican’s embassy at 3:30PM.
Manuel Noriega had begun the invasion with a prostitute. He would end it surrounded by nuns.
In reality, Noriega had returned to Panama City around 8PM, heading straight to a PDF club. Despite the mounting evidence of the impending invasion, he dismissed the possibility of a U.S. attack, insisting the reports of troop mobilizations were disinformation designed to scare him into fleeing. A longtime alcoholic, he proceeded to get drunk, eventually deciding another form of entertainment was needed. A sergeant on his staff was dispatched to pick up a prostitute, who met the intoxicated strongman at the Ceremi Recreation Center, a PDF rest area just east of Tocumen military airfield. His dalliance was interrupted at 1AM, when the thumping sound of an AC-130 gunship’s 105mm and 40mm cannon prepping the objective at Tocumen for the 1st Ranger Battalion’s assault shook the room. Noriega’s bodyguard, Captain Ivan Castillo, went outside and saw the sky filled with 750 parachutes descending upon the airfield. Castillo rushed back inside to collect his boss, and the dictator’s entourage piled into the two Hyundai hatchbacks.
The next day, elements of Bravo Company, 1st Ranger Battalion secured the Recreation Center, discovering some of Noriega’s personal belongings, including his uniform and shoes.
Early on the morning of 24 December, Ivan Castillo left the Panama City apartment where he and Noriega had been hiding for the past three days. He told his boss he was searching for the next place to hide, and that if he did not return by 7AM Noriega was to move without him. Noriega trusted Castillo completely. It was the captain who had told him to put on civilian clothes rather than his uniform at the Ceremi Recreation Center, a decision that allowed him to evade U.S. forces. Later that night, as Noriega and some bodyguards were leaving an associate’s house and saw three U.S. Blackhawk helicopters descending nearby, it was Castillo who warned them to stop running lest they draw the attention of another gunship hovering above. Consequently, when Castillo talked, Noriega listened.
But Castillo was tired of running and ready to give up. He set out to look for an American to take him to Major General Marc Cisneros, the Spanish-speaking commander of U.S. Army South, to whom he hoped to betray Noriega in exchange for his own safety. At 6:30AM Castillo found a patrol from the 7th Infantry, but none of the soldiers spoke Spanish. Castillo tried to explain who he was, but was taken into custody as a prisoner of war, and Cisneros did not find out about Castillo’s surrender until 10:30AM after four precious hours had passed.
“General,” Castillo told Cisneros, “if I could have gotten word to you when I wanted to, I could have found you Noriega.
“Well, where could he be?” Cisneros asked.
Castillo handed Cisneros a list of possible hiding spots. Although it was now several hours past the time he told Noriega to leave from their last safe house, Castillo said Noriega probably left his baggage behind and might return to the location. But when the team arrived, they found nothing besides the dictator’s wallet and briefcase.
 |
| Major General Marc Cisneros, Commander of the U.S. Army South during Operation Just Cause |
Around 3:30PM Laboa’s call finally got through to the general. As Cisneros picked up the phone, he heard the priest whisper: “He just walked in.”
While Delta Force was hunting for Noriega, elements of the 7th SFG were conducting what came do be called the “Ma Bell” operations. In order to avoid direct attacks on the remaining PDF garrisons spread throughout the Panamanian countryside and the casualties such missions would entail, Captain Charles Cleveland suggested they telephone the Panamanian commander at each barracks and give him an ultimatum to surrender peacefully or face a U.S. attack. Between December 22-31, these missions produced the surrender of 14 garrisons and 2,000 PDF troops.
Perhaps the most significant capitulation was the first one, when Major Del Cid in Chiriqui, the linchpin to a potential guerrilla war strategy, announced he would surrender on December 23. The news depressed Noriega, who subsequently told an intermediary to call Monsignor Laboa and request asylum. Noriega requested the Vatican’s emissary pick him up at the Panama City Dairy Queen. There, a visibly exhausted Noriega – wearing a T-shirt, Bermuda shorts, and an oversized baseball cap – jumped into the backseat of the nunciature’s car, and sunk low in his seat to avoid being seen on the short drive to the nuciature, arriving at the Vatican’s embassy at 3:30PM.
Manuel Noriega had begun the invasion with a prostitute. He would end it surrounded by nuns.
Wednesday, December 21, 2011
Today in Manhunting History -- December 21, 1989: Hunting Noriega
"This operation is . . . pretty well wrapped up,” President George H. W. Bush said on December 21, 1989, but “I won’t be satisfied until we see [Noriega] come to justice.” A $1 million bounty for information leading to Noriega’s capture was announced, although one senior officer cautioned: “We don’t want to make him a fugitive bandit being hunted by marines. He’s not Pancho Villa, he’s John Dillinger.”
The avenues of escape were slammed shut throughout Panama by various special operations forces. Charlie Company, 7th SFG was assigned the mission of shutting down Radio Nacional. Thirty-six Green Berets deployed in three helicopters, and at 7PM the broadcaster announced “The invader’s helicopter is on top of the building.” Within a few minutes music replaced the steady stream of pro-Noriega propaganda that had filled the airwaves throughout the day.
As SEALs watched Panama’s ports and 7th Group’s Green Berets combed the streets of the capital, primary responsibility for hunting Noriega was given to Delta Force, which during H-Hour had conducted an audaciously brilliant raid to rescue an American citizen from the notorious Modelo Prison. Noriega sightings flooded into the SOUTHCOM intelligence network, and analysts tried to separate truth from falsehood. In Colon, an old woman appeared at the front gate of the hotel being used as headquarters for the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, “pointing a crooked finger and raving that Noriega had a secret tunnel under the hotel that he had used for an escape route upon the 7th Infantry’s arrival.” Other locals corroborated this claim, but a search of the hotel’s basement quickly dismissed the notion of a secret tunnel. For intelligence that was deemed credible, Delta Force could go “from tip to takeoff” in 30 minutes, and between December 21-24 launched 42 raids on every known or suspected safe house where Noriega could hide.
Yet for all of Delta’s considerable skill, they could apparently never catch up to the elusive dictator. Often they thought they were getting close: at one seaside villa on the Pacific Ocean, U.S. forces found lit cigarettes and warm coffee cups; at other locations they found PDF soldiers. But no matter how rapidly they kicked down doors and poured in through windows, the operators would be told Noriega had either just left or was at another location. As this cycle repeated itself in the days after the invasion, raiding troops made a series of bizarre discoveries. At Noriega’s residence at Fort Amador, U.S. troops found pictures of Hitler, an extensive pornography collection, a “witches diary” chronicling visits by two voodoo priestesses from Brazil, and 50 kilograms of white powder initially believed to be cocaine, but later identified as flour for making tamales. At Noriega’s home at Altos del Golfo, Delta uncovered more stacks of hardcore pornography, $8 million in U.S. currency, and two religious altars, one of which was decorated with jars containing human internal organs.
But there still was no sign of Noriega.
The avenues of escape were slammed shut throughout Panama by various special operations forces. Charlie Company, 7th SFG was assigned the mission of shutting down Radio Nacional. Thirty-six Green Berets deployed in three helicopters, and at 7PM the broadcaster announced “The invader’s helicopter is on top of the building.” Within a few minutes music replaced the steady stream of pro-Noriega propaganda that had filled the airwaves throughout the day.
As SEALs watched Panama’s ports and 7th Group’s Green Berets combed the streets of the capital, primary responsibility for hunting Noriega was given to Delta Force, which during H-Hour had conducted an audaciously brilliant raid to rescue an American citizen from the notorious Modelo Prison. Noriega sightings flooded into the SOUTHCOM intelligence network, and analysts tried to separate truth from falsehood. In Colon, an old woman appeared at the front gate of the hotel being used as headquarters for the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, “pointing a crooked finger and raving that Noriega had a secret tunnel under the hotel that he had used for an escape route upon the 7th Infantry’s arrival.” Other locals corroborated this claim, but a search of the hotel’s basement quickly dismissed the notion of a secret tunnel. For intelligence that was deemed credible, Delta Force could go “from tip to takeoff” in 30 minutes, and between December 21-24 launched 42 raids on every known or suspected safe house where Noriega could hide.
Yet for all of Delta’s considerable skill, they could apparently never catch up to the elusive dictator. Often they thought they were getting close: at one seaside villa on the Pacific Ocean, U.S. forces found lit cigarettes and warm coffee cups; at other locations they found PDF soldiers. But no matter how rapidly they kicked down doors and poured in through windows, the operators would be told Noriega had either just left or was at another location. As this cycle repeated itself in the days after the invasion, raiding troops made a series of bizarre discoveries. At Noriega’s residence at Fort Amador, U.S. troops found pictures of Hitler, an extensive pornography collection, a “witches diary” chronicling visits by two voodoo priestesses from Brazil, and 50 kilograms of white powder initially believed to be cocaine, but later identified as flour for making tamales. At Noriega’s home at Altos del Golfo, Delta uncovered more stacks of hardcore pornography, $8 million in U.S. currency, and two religious altars, one of which was decorated with jars containing human internal organs.
But there still was no sign of Noriega.
 |
| Cash found at one of Noriega's residences. Posting pictures of his porn stash would have just led to trouble . . . |
Speaking of Drones . . .
Bill Roggio reports that the United States has not launched a drone strike against a terrorist target in Pakistan in 33 days, the longest such break in between attacks since 2008 when we stopped informing the Pakistani government/military beforehand. Roggio, who is the best analyst of open-source data on drone strikes, says U.S. officials claim this is due to fear of escalating an already tense relationship with Pakistan rather than a paucity of targets or technical issues.
On Drones and Arms Races
International law professor and blogger Kenneth Anderson -- possibly the most articulate commentator on the legality of drones and targeted killings -- offers some interesting assessments on two articles on drones and targeted killings from his perch over at The Volokh Conspiracy.
I'm rushing through my to-do list (including pre-posting a slew of historical posts) so that I can hit the road for the holidays, so will defer full commentary until a later date.
However, Anderson attempts to answer a question raised by Adam Entous and Julian Barnes' piece in the Wall Street Journal as to whether the United State is triggering an arms race in drones. Although Anderson's analysis is interesting, he is overthinking this. As someone whose (sadly, never-to-be-published) doctoral dissertation was on arms races, the spread of drone technology is similar to the spread of dreadnoughts prior to World War I. After the war, some historians claimed it was a mistake for Great Britain to introduce this technology, as it inspired other competitors (especially Germany) to follow suit, and therefore mooted Britain's overwhelming lead in conventional wooden ships.
In fact, John Abizaid made this argument in response to a question I asked regarding . . . well, okay, I forgot what I asked that prompted his response . . . at a national security seminar at Harvard in 2000 or 2001 when he was a three-star and the J-5 for the Joint Chiefs.
But in reality, Japan and the United States' navies were already experimenting with all big-guns designs by the time Great Britain christened the HMS Dreadnought in 1906. Had the British navy not introduced this class of ship when they did, others would have. Similarly, even had the U.S. military and intelligence agencies never developed its extensive drone capabilities, the basic technology of unmanned flight is fairly diffuse, and would have been put toward military applications by a potential competitor eventually regardless of U.S. actions.
I'm rushing through my to-do list (including pre-posting a slew of historical posts) so that I can hit the road for the holidays, so will defer full commentary until a later date.
However, Anderson attempts to answer a question raised by Adam Entous and Julian Barnes' piece in the Wall Street Journal as to whether the United State is triggering an arms race in drones. Although Anderson's analysis is interesting, he is overthinking this. As someone whose (sadly, never-to-be-published) doctoral dissertation was on arms races, the spread of drone technology is similar to the spread of dreadnoughts prior to World War I. After the war, some historians claimed it was a mistake for Great Britain to introduce this technology, as it inspired other competitors (especially Germany) to follow suit, and therefore mooted Britain's overwhelming lead in conventional wooden ships.
In fact, John Abizaid made this argument in response to a question I asked regarding . . . well, okay, I forgot what I asked that prompted his response . . . at a national security seminar at Harvard in 2000 or 2001 when he was a three-star and the J-5 for the Joint Chiefs.
But in reality, Japan and the United States' navies were already experimenting with all big-guns designs by the time Great Britain christened the HMS Dreadnought in 1906. Had the British navy not introduced this class of ship when they did, others would have. Similarly, even had the U.S. military and intelligence agencies never developed its extensive drone capabilities, the basic technology of unmanned flight is fairly diffuse, and would have been put toward military applications by a potential competitor eventually regardless of U.S. actions.
Tuesday, December 20, 2011
Today in Manhunting History -- December 20, 1989: Operation Just Cause
General Thurman set H-Hour for Operation Just Cause at 1AM, December 20, the timing of which proved to be the worst kept secret in Panama as the massive movement of U.S. aircraft to Panama compromised strategic surprise. At 10PM Dan Rather appeared on a CBS News special report to announce: “U.S. military transport planes have left Fort Bragg. The Pentagon declines to say whether or not they’re bound for Panama. It will only say that the Fort Bragg-based 18th Airborne Corps has been conducting what the Army calls an emergency readiness measure.” Similar stories and images compromising the secrecy of the invasion appeared on CNN and NBC. At midnight, the Comandancia sent out a message to PDF commanders: “They’re coming. The ballgame is at 1AM. Report to your units . . . draw your weapons and prepare to fight.” Consequently, General Thurman ordered the special operations forces to launch their operations 15 minutes ahead of schedule at 12:45AM.
Because SOUTHCOM could not be sure of Noriega’s location at H-Hour, an emphasis was placed on cutting off his potential means of escape. If intelligence, radar, or AWACS planes discovered Noriega trying to escape by air, F-16 fighters or AC-130 gunships would intercept his aircraft and force it to land. If the dictator’s pilot refused to obey, the U.S. military aircraft, upon authorization of Secretary Cheney, were to shoot down the suspected aircraft.
In order to cut off another potential escape route for Noriega, two combat rubber raider craft departed Rodman Naval Station at 11PM. They silently crossed the canal in the darkness and tied up in a mangrove stand near the docks at Balboa Harbor. Two two-man SEAL teams slipped over the sides of the crafts, and using sophisticated scuba gear that left no trail of air bubbles, swam to their target – the Panamanian fast patrol boat Presidente Poras, which U.S. commanders feared Noriega would use to flee Panama. The SEAL demolition teams placed haversacks filled with explosives in the propeller shaft, set the detonators for 1AM, and quickly swam away to their extraction point. Above the water’s surface they could already hear the roar of the initial firefights erupting between U.S. and Panamanian forces. At 1AM the explosion ripped a hole in the Presidente Poras, rocking downtown Panama City as the vessel slowly sank to the bottom of the harbor.
As one team of SEALs was navigating the waters of Balboa Harbor, SEAL Team Four was coming ashore at Panama City’s downtown Paitilla Airport, where Noriega based his personal LearJet. At 12:45AM the 62-man force – comprised of three 16-man SEAL platoons and a command element led by Lieutenant Commander Pat Toohey – came ashore. The SEALs hurried up the trail from the beach and snuck through a hole in the airport’s security fence. Two platoons each started moving up one side of the runway, while a third platoon remained on the southern edge of the airfield to provide security. By 1:05 the SEALs had reached their assault positions in front of the three northernmost hangars. One squad of nine commandos lay prone on the tarmac in front of the middle hangar that housed Noriega’s jet. Another platoon was positioned just to the north, providing cover and observing the northern side of the airfield.
A radio transmission reported that three PDF armored vehicles were racing down the road that circles the northern end of Paitilla airfield. Toohey quickly ordered the northernmost platoon to move to the road to either ensure the vehicles passed by the airport or, if necessary, ambush them. As the SEAL team rose from the tarmac, a Panamanian guard in the northernmost hangar saw them and raised his weapon. A SEAL fired first, but missed. A split second later the crack of AK-47 fire echoed through the humid night as the guard fired a burst on automatic. The bullets ripped through the line of exposed SEALs, two of whom were killed instantly. The remaining SEALs dove for cover in a drainage ditch, but were struck by shots ricocheting off the tarmac, wounding six others. The SEALs in front of Noriega’s hangar unleashed a hail of covering fire at the northern hangar, which now appeared to hold at least two Panamanians, but their line of fire was obstructed by two small aircraft parked in front of the hanger. The third platoon to the south was ordered up to attack the hangar.
A minute of intense fire gave way to a heavy silence. The hangar was riddled with bullet holes, the Panamanians were dead, and anti-armor rockets had destroyed the cockpit of Noriega’s plane. But although SEAL Team Four achieved its objective, the price paid was steep: four SEALs dead and eight more wounded. The unexpected casualties from such an elite force shocked the Special Operations community and would remain a source of controversy for years.
In addition to cutting off Noriega’s avenues of escape, another critical H-Hour mission was to destroy the units that had come to his rescue during the October coup. The PDF numbered nearly 12,800 troops, but only a third of these could be classified as combat troops. Although the infantry units were judged “a well-trained and disciplined force at the small unit, tactical level,” they suffered from reliance on overly centralized command and control. The two exceptions were the 7th Infantry Company and Battalion 2000.
The black uniformed, bearded “Macho de Monte” (literally, “Mountain Men”) of the 7th Infantry were a well-armed commando unit trained by Cuban military advisors for a single purpose: to protect and, if necessary, rescue Noriega. They were stationed at Rio Hato about 65 miles from Panama City on the Pacific Coast, but as demonstrated during the Giroldi Coup, were able to rapidly deploy by air to the capital. The mission of attacking Rio Hato was given to the U.S. Army’s elite light infantry, the 75th Ranger Regiment under Colonel William F. “Buck” Kernan.
At precisely 1AM, two F-117A “Stealth” bombers, in their first-ever combat mission, swooped in at 4,000 feet to drop a pair of 2,000-pound bombs next to the 7th Infantry’s barracks. The idea was to terrify and confuse the Panamanians into surrendering quickly. Yet instead of stunning the Macho de Monte, the massive bombs roused the Panamanians from their beds and out of their barracks, leaving them better prepared to resist the incoming Rangers.
The Mountain Men moved into position, while 13 C-130 transports carried 1,300 Rangers from the 2nd and 3rd Ranger battalions into battle. As they prepared to jump into the warm, humid night, one Ranger recalled: we “just went around and started hitting one another on the head and got motivated, because if anybody deserved to be slammed, [Noriega] was the one. Because he was an evil man . . . There was no death wish, but we wanted to get him bad, and he deserved to be got.” The lights of the airfield and barracks were visible as the planes approached, leading the Rangers to think they had achieved strategic surprise. But as soon as they began to exit the aircraft, the skies filled with tracer fire.
The Rangers jumped from an altitude of only 500 feet, 300 feet below the standard training jump. This meant their main parachutes would open at just 100 feet. While limiting their exposure to ground fire, it also meant their reserve parachutes were virtually useless in case of a malfunction, and with their 100-pound packs, every Ranger was assured a brutal landing. Four soldiers were killed on the jump, and another 86 formed part of an “orthopedic nightmare” of broken legs and ankles.
Although the runway was cleared within 30 minutes, the fighting in the barracks area was intense. The PDF withdrew through the rear of a building and took up firing positions in nearby gullies or trenches. When the Rangers worked through to the building’s exit, the PDF ambushed them and withdrew to the next building to repeat the tactic. Finally, after five hours of room-to-room, building-to-building combat, the Macho de Monte had all either surrendered or melted into the surrounding jungle.
The other PDF unit that concerned U.S. commanders was Battalion 2000, an elite fighting unit of 200 mechanized infantry that had smashed the abortive October revolt. One of Noriega’s most loyal units, they were stationed at Fort Cimarron, approximately 16 miles from Panama City’s Torrijos-Tocumen Airport, which could serve as either an escape hatch for Noriega or an entry point for Cuban or Nicaraguan reinforcements. Thus, another critical H-Hour mission was to seize the airport complex before Battalion 2000 could secure it.
While 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment captured the airfields, elements of 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (SFG) were tasked with conducting surveillance missions at Fort Cimarron and the Pacora River Bridge to monitor Battalion 2000’s movements. Major Kevin Higgins was preparing to take off in three helicopters with a 24-man element of Company A, 3/7th SFG, when an intelligence officer came running onto the helipad. “We just got reports that . . . a ten-vehicle convoy is leaving Cimarron Cuartel for Panama City,” he said. Higgins’ mission instantly shifted from reconnaissance to direct action, with the goal of seizing Pacora River Bridge and blocking Battalion 2000 from entering the capital.
As the helicopters approached the bridge at 12:45AM, the lead pilot spotted six PDF vehicles on the road. It was now a race between the Green Berets and the Panamanians to see who could get to the bridge first. The helicopters dropped Higgins’ element on the western shore of the river. His men quickly clambered up the steep slope to the road and found themselves directly in the headlights of the first PDF vehicle crossing the bridge from the east. The soldiers hit the lead vehicle with two light anti-tank weapons and poured machine gun fire and M203 launched grenades into the column. The Air Force Combat controller with Higgins’ element directed AC-130 fire onto the stalled column, driving the Panamians from their trucks. The battle continued for several hours, as the Panamanians attempted to outflank the small element, but Higgins’ men repelled all PDF attempts to cross the bridge or the river.
Meanwhile, 11 transport aircraft approached Tocumen airfield in a straight line over the runway. At 1:03AM, the clear evening sky filled with the dark silhouette of parachutes as the 1st Ranger Battalion jumped from the planes. The seizure of the airfield was flawless, and once again, more Rangers suffered torn knee ligaments, broken legs, and other injuries from the low jumping altitude and unforgiving concrete of the tarmac than from hostile fire. As the other Ranger companies assaulted objectives held by the PDF, Bravo 1/75th was tasked to secure the perimeter and establish roadblocks around the airfield. Bravo landed on target and received only sporadic enemy fire as it quickly moved to its blocking positions. The biggest obstacle these Rangers faced were Panamanian vehicles ignoring its warning sign and barricades. These vehicles typically turned and fled once the Rangers fired warning shots. But one convoy of two hatchbacks refused to heed the warnings and hurtled towards Bravo Company at full speed. The Rangers took aim and shot out the front tires of the lead vehicle. The second car came to a screeching halt and turned around, disappearing into the night.
It would not be discovered until later that General Noriega was in the car that got away.
The simultaneous H-Hour assault on dozens of targets with overwhelming force decimated the PDF, who proved to be no match for American firepower and training, and had little stomach for a genuine fight. “Essentially, the leaders didn’t show,” said Major General James Johnson, commander of the 82nd Airborne. “The troops were deserted.” The Panamanians would typically empty the magazines of their rifles and disappear. The exception to this pattern was at the Comandancia, where elements of the PDF’s 6th, 7th, and 8th Rifle Companies, reinforced by two public order companies, vigorously defended PDF headquarters for a day. Resistance finally collapsed on the morning of December 21, thereby immobilizing resistance in outlying provinces as well.
American forces were greeted by the long-suffering Panamanian people as liberators. In Colon, one officer recalled, “the streets came alive as people appeared from every door and window, cheering us.” In a scene eerily foreshadowing the liberation of Baghdad more than a decade later, “People were out there looting their asses off. They had armfuls of televisions, pillows, anything they could get. When they saw us, they shouted, ‘Viva Bush! Viva the United States!’” Another soldier noted: “There was people out partying and waving U.S. flags and cheering for us. And then we would turn a corner and start heading down another way, and all of a sudden we’d start getting shot at.”
On the home front, however, the failure to capture Noriega dominated the perception of Operation Just Cause. At the first press conference on the morning of December 20, reporters wanted to know about Noriega. “If we did not catch him, what was the point of invading Panama?” they asked Powell. “Wouldn’t it make life miserable for the U.S. forces down there, a reporter asked, if Noriega was still running around in the Panamanian wilds?”
Powell assured the press that “we’ll chase him and we will find him. I’m not quite sure he’s up to being chased around the countryside by Army Rangers, Special Forces, and light infantry units.”
But the reporters persisted: “Could we really consider Just Cause successful as long as we did not have Noriega in custody?”
Because SOUTHCOM could not be sure of Noriega’s location at H-Hour, an emphasis was placed on cutting off his potential means of escape. If intelligence, radar, or AWACS planes discovered Noriega trying to escape by air, F-16 fighters or AC-130 gunships would intercept his aircraft and force it to land. If the dictator’s pilot refused to obey, the U.S. military aircraft, upon authorization of Secretary Cheney, were to shoot down the suspected aircraft.
As one team of SEALs was navigating the waters of Balboa Harbor, SEAL Team Four was coming ashore at Panama City’s downtown Paitilla Airport, where Noriega based his personal LearJet. At 12:45AM the 62-man force – comprised of three 16-man SEAL platoons and a command element led by Lieutenant Commander Pat Toohey – came ashore. The SEALs hurried up the trail from the beach and snuck through a hole in the airport’s security fence. Two platoons each started moving up one side of the runway, while a third platoon remained on the southern edge of the airfield to provide security. By 1:05 the SEALs had reached their assault positions in front of the three northernmost hangars. One squad of nine commandos lay prone on the tarmac in front of the middle hangar that housed Noriega’s jet. Another platoon was positioned just to the north, providing cover and observing the northern side of the airfield.
A radio transmission reported that three PDF armored vehicles were racing down the road that circles the northern end of Paitilla airfield. Toohey quickly ordered the northernmost platoon to move to the road to either ensure the vehicles passed by the airport or, if necessary, ambush them. As the SEAL team rose from the tarmac, a Panamanian guard in the northernmost hangar saw them and raised his weapon. A SEAL fired first, but missed. A split second later the crack of AK-47 fire echoed through the humid night as the guard fired a burst on automatic. The bullets ripped through the line of exposed SEALs, two of whom were killed instantly. The remaining SEALs dove for cover in a drainage ditch, but were struck by shots ricocheting off the tarmac, wounding six others. The SEALs in front of Noriega’s hangar unleashed a hail of covering fire at the northern hangar, which now appeared to hold at least two Panamanians, but their line of fire was obstructed by two small aircraft parked in front of the hanger. The third platoon to the south was ordered up to attack the hangar.
A minute of intense fire gave way to a heavy silence. The hangar was riddled with bullet holes, the Panamanians were dead, and anti-armor rockets had destroyed the cockpit of Noriega’s plane. But although SEAL Team Four achieved its objective, the price paid was steep: four SEALs dead and eight more wounded. The unexpected casualties from such an elite force shocked the Special Operations community and would remain a source of controversy for years.
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| Noriega's Lear Jet, destroyed at H-Hour+1, but at the cost of four SEALs killed. |
The black uniformed, bearded “Macho de Monte” (literally, “Mountain Men”) of the 7th Infantry were a well-armed commando unit trained by Cuban military advisors for a single purpose: to protect and, if necessary, rescue Noriega. They were stationed at Rio Hato about 65 miles from Panama City on the Pacific Coast, but as demonstrated during the Giroldi Coup, were able to rapidly deploy by air to the capital. The mission of attacking Rio Hato was given to the U.S. Army’s elite light infantry, the 75th Ranger Regiment under Colonel William F. “Buck” Kernan.
At precisely 1AM, two F-117A “Stealth” bombers, in their first-ever combat mission, swooped in at 4,000 feet to drop a pair of 2,000-pound bombs next to the 7th Infantry’s barracks. The idea was to terrify and confuse the Panamanians into surrendering quickly. Yet instead of stunning the Macho de Monte, the massive bombs roused the Panamanians from their beds and out of their barracks, leaving them better prepared to resist the incoming Rangers.
The Mountain Men moved into position, while 13 C-130 transports carried 1,300 Rangers from the 2nd and 3rd Ranger battalions into battle. As they prepared to jump into the warm, humid night, one Ranger recalled: we “just went around and started hitting one another on the head and got motivated, because if anybody deserved to be slammed, [Noriega] was the one. Because he was an evil man . . . There was no death wish, but we wanted to get him bad, and he deserved to be got.” The lights of the airfield and barracks were visible as the planes approached, leading the Rangers to think they had achieved strategic surprise. But as soon as they began to exit the aircraft, the skies filled with tracer fire.
The Rangers jumped from an altitude of only 500 feet, 300 feet below the standard training jump. This meant their main parachutes would open at just 100 feet. While limiting their exposure to ground fire, it also meant their reserve parachutes were virtually useless in case of a malfunction, and with their 100-pound packs, every Ranger was assured a brutal landing. Four soldiers were killed on the jump, and another 86 formed part of an “orthopedic nightmare” of broken legs and ankles.
Although the runway was cleared within 30 minutes, the fighting in the barracks area was intense. The PDF withdrew through the rear of a building and took up firing positions in nearby gullies or trenches. When the Rangers worked through to the building’s exit, the PDF ambushed them and withdrew to the next building to repeat the tactic. Finally, after five hours of room-to-room, building-to-building combat, the Macho de Monte had all either surrendered or melted into the surrounding jungle.
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| Rangers raise the U.S. flag after an intense battle versus Noriega's elite "Mountain Men" at Rio Hato |
While 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment captured the airfields, elements of 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (SFG) were tasked with conducting surveillance missions at Fort Cimarron and the Pacora River Bridge to monitor Battalion 2000’s movements. Major Kevin Higgins was preparing to take off in three helicopters with a 24-man element of Company A, 3/7th SFG, when an intelligence officer came running onto the helipad. “We just got reports that . . . a ten-vehicle convoy is leaving Cimarron Cuartel for Panama City,” he said. Higgins’ mission instantly shifted from reconnaissance to direct action, with the goal of seizing Pacora River Bridge and blocking Battalion 2000 from entering the capital.
As the helicopters approached the bridge at 12:45AM, the lead pilot spotted six PDF vehicles on the road. It was now a race between the Green Berets and the Panamanians to see who could get to the bridge first. The helicopters dropped Higgins’ element on the western shore of the river. His men quickly clambered up the steep slope to the road and found themselves directly in the headlights of the first PDF vehicle crossing the bridge from the east. The soldiers hit the lead vehicle with two light anti-tank weapons and poured machine gun fire and M203 launched grenades into the column. The Air Force Combat controller with Higgins’ element directed AC-130 fire onto the stalled column, driving the Panamians from their trucks. The battle continued for several hours, as the Panamanians attempted to outflank the small element, but Higgins’ men repelled all PDF attempts to cross the bridge or the river.
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| Pacora River Bridge, where 24 Green Berets backed by close air support held off "Battalion 2000" |
It would not be discovered until later that General Noriega was in the car that got away.
The simultaneous H-Hour assault on dozens of targets with overwhelming force decimated the PDF, who proved to be no match for American firepower and training, and had little stomach for a genuine fight. “Essentially, the leaders didn’t show,” said Major General James Johnson, commander of the 82nd Airborne. “The troops were deserted.” The Panamanians would typically empty the magazines of their rifles and disappear. The exception to this pattern was at the Comandancia, where elements of the PDF’s 6th, 7th, and 8th Rifle Companies, reinforced by two public order companies, vigorously defended PDF headquarters for a day. Resistance finally collapsed on the morning of December 21, thereby immobilizing resistance in outlying provinces as well.
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| Noriega's military headquarters, La Comandancia, where the incidents that finally provoked Operation Just Cause occurred on December 16, was one of the strongman's last bastions to hold out against U.S. forces on December 20. |
American forces were greeted by the long-suffering Panamanian people as liberators. In Colon, one officer recalled, “the streets came alive as people appeared from every door and window, cheering us.” In a scene eerily foreshadowing the liberation of Baghdad more than a decade later, “People were out there looting their asses off. They had armfuls of televisions, pillows, anything they could get. When they saw us, they shouted, ‘Viva Bush! Viva the United States!’” Another soldier noted: “There was people out partying and waving U.S. flags and cheering for us. And then we would turn a corner and start heading down another way, and all of a sudden we’d start getting shot at.”
On the home front, however, the failure to capture Noriega dominated the perception of Operation Just Cause. At the first press conference on the morning of December 20, reporters wanted to know about Noriega. “If we did not catch him, what was the point of invading Panama?” they asked Powell. “Wouldn’t it make life miserable for the U.S. forces down there, a reporter asked, if Noriega was still running around in the Panamanian wilds?”
Powell assured the press that “we’ll chase him and we will find him. I’m not quite sure he’s up to being chased around the countryside by Army Rangers, Special Forces, and light infantry units.”
But the reporters persisted: “Could we really consider Just Cause successful as long as we did not have Noriega in custody?”
How many times do 75 percent of al Qaeda's top leaders need to be killed before the terror group is dead?
This is the interesting question posed by Bill Roggio over at The Long War Journal.
Although I think his skepticism regarding the limits of our metrics of success is warranted, I wish he would propose an alternative means of measuring progress against al-Qa'ida. Until such a metric exists, political leaders don't have much choice but to use body counts from our decapitation campaign to signal at least operational (if not strategic) success.
Although I think his skepticism regarding the limits of our metrics of success is warranted, I wish he would propose an alternative means of measuring progress against al-Qa'ida. Until such a metric exists, political leaders don't have much choice but to use body counts from our decapitation campaign to signal at least operational (if not strategic) success.
Monday, December 19, 2011
AP's Top News Stories of 2011
The Associated Press released its "Top News Stories of 2011" this weekend, two of which were featured prominently here on Wanted Dead or Alive:
#1 - "OSAMA BIN LADEN'S DEATH: He'd been the world's most-wanted terrorist for nearly a decade, ever since a team of his al-Qaida followers carried out the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. In May, the long and often-frustrating manhunt ended with a nighttime assault by a helicopter-borne special operations squad on his compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Bin Laden was shot dead by one of the raiders, and within hours his body was buried at sea."
#7 - "GADHAFI TOPPLED IN LIBYA: After nearly 42 years of mercurial and often brutal rule, Moammar Gadhafi was toppled by his own people. Anti-government protests escalated into an eight-month rebellion, backed by NATO bombing, that shattered his regime, and Gadhafi finally was tracked down and killed in the fishing village where he was born."
Alas, the third story I focused on in 2011 -- Kim Kardashian's wedding and divorce -- failed to make the cut.
#1 - "OSAMA BIN LADEN'S DEATH: He'd been the world's most-wanted terrorist for nearly a decade, ever since a team of his al-Qaida followers carried out the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. In May, the long and often-frustrating manhunt ended with a nighttime assault by a helicopter-borne special operations squad on his compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Bin Laden was shot dead by one of the raiders, and within hours his body was buried at sea."
#7 - "GADHAFI TOPPLED IN LIBYA: After nearly 42 years of mercurial and often brutal rule, Moammar Gadhafi was toppled by his own people. Anti-government protests escalated into an eight-month rebellion, backed by NATO bombing, that shattered his regime, and Gadhafi finally was tracked down and killed in the fishing village where he was born."
Alas, the third story I focused on in 2011 -- Kim Kardashian's wedding and divorce -- failed to make the cut.
Saturday, December 17, 2011
Today in Manhunting History -- December 17, 1989: The Decision to Hunt Noriega
The evening after Manuel Noriega's declaration of war, four U.S. officers took a wrong turn in Panama City and approached a checkpoint at the Comandancia, headquarters of the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF). Guards brandishing AK-47s stopped the car and tried to drag the Americans from the car. The driver hit the gas pedal and, as the car sped away, the PDF opened fire. Two Americans were hit, 24-year old Marine Corps Lieutenant Roberto Paz in the spine. The driver raced to Gorgas Army Community Hospital, but the emergency room doctors were unable to save Paz.
The Paz shooting was witnessed by an American naval officer and his wife, who had been stopped at the same checkpoint about a half-hour earlier. They were subsequently blindfolded with masking tape, put in a pickup truck, and driven to an unknown location. For the next four hours the lieutenant was severely beaten – repeatedly kicked in the head and groin – as his wife was forced to watch. The PDF soldiers threw her against a wall and threatened to rape her. Finally, at about 1AM, December 17, the Panamanians gave up and released the couple three blocks from the Comandancia.
Although U.S. commanders had previously not considered Noriega worth expending American lives to depose, these events erased any doubts within the military regarding the advisability of using force.
Sunday, December 17, 1989 was supposed to be a day of celebration at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. The halls of the White House were festively decked as President George H.W. Bush entertained old friends and family at one of the Bushes’ numerous Christmas parties. The normally reserved President embodied the holiday spirit by accessorizing his blue blazer and gray slacks with gaudy, bright red socks, one emblazoned with the word “Merry,” the other with “Christmas.” At 2PM, as carolers in 18th-century costume entertained the guests, Bush politely excused himself and headed upstairs to the second-floor residence.
Bush was met there in his office by his “War Council”: Secretary of State James Baker; Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell and his operations officer Lieutenant General Tom Kelly; National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates; and Vice President Dan Quayle. They rose while the President took a seat beneath the large oil painting “The Peacemakers,” depicting Lincoln and with his top military leaders near the end of the Civil War.
Perhaps no man has entered the presidency as experienced in foreign affairs as George H.W. Bush. A decorated fighter pilot in World War II, he had served as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, U.S. Ambassador to China, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, and as Vice President for eight years. At the outset of the war council, President Bush said: “Look, here are my objectives. I want to get Noriega.” He asked whether a large troop deployment was necessary instead of a smaller commando raid to apprehend the dictator. Powell explained that Noriega had been trained as an intelligence officer and was extraordinarily skilled at hiding. He rarely slept in the same location on consecutive nights, and traveled in as many as seven identical limousines. Despite the efforts of an elite tracking team, General Thurman said SOUTHCOM only knew his whereabouts perhaps 80 percent of the time and could not reliably predict where he would appear next. Consequently, Powell could offer no assurance that a covert operation to kidnap or arrest Noriega would be successful. Worse, if the U.S. military went after Noriega and missed, the lives of every American in the Canal Zone would be in jeopardy. Even if they did nab Noriega his loyalists within the PDF might target Americans in retribution or seeking an exchange.
Consequently, Powell presented General Thurman’s preferred option: to use massive force to overwhelm and demolish the PDF. This would minimize the time available for the PDF to seize U.S. citizens as hostages. Even if Noriega escaped at H-Hour, he would have no forces to command. “Wherever he is,” Powell told the President, “he won’t be El Jefe. He won’t be able to show his face.” Bush probed Powell and Kelly, asking hard and detailed questions on the myriad diplomatic and logistical details of the proposed military action. Finally, Powell concluded: “My recommendation is that we go with the full [invasion] plan. I can tell you that the chiefs agree with me to a man.”
Cheney concurred: “I support what the Chairman just recommended to you.”
Baker told Bush, “I think we ought to go,” and Scowcroft agreed the time for diplomacy had passed.
The President sat pensively, his chin resting on his chest, chewing his lower lip. Noriega, he said finally, “is not going to lay off. It will only get worse.”
At 3:50PM, he gripped the arms of his chair and rose to his feet. “Okay, let’s do it,” he quietly said. “The hell with it!”
The execute order was given for an operation involving 23,000 U.S forces – including the 13.000 already stationed in Panama – to invade and remove Noriega from power.
The Paz shooting was witnessed by an American naval officer and his wife, who had been stopped at the same checkpoint about a half-hour earlier. They were subsequently blindfolded with masking tape, put in a pickup truck, and driven to an unknown location. For the next four hours the lieutenant was severely beaten – repeatedly kicked in the head and groin – as his wife was forced to watch. The PDF soldiers threw her against a wall and threatened to rape her. Finally, at about 1AM, December 17, the Panamanians gave up and released the couple three blocks from the Comandancia.
Although U.S. commanders had previously not considered Noriega worth expending American lives to depose, these events erased any doubts within the military regarding the advisability of using force.
Sunday, December 17, 1989 was supposed to be a day of celebration at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. The halls of the White House were festively decked as President George H.W. Bush entertained old friends and family at one of the Bushes’ numerous Christmas parties. The normally reserved President embodied the holiday spirit by accessorizing his blue blazer and gray slacks with gaudy, bright red socks, one emblazoned with the word “Merry,” the other with “Christmas.” At 2PM, as carolers in 18th-century costume entertained the guests, Bush politely excused himself and headed upstairs to the second-floor residence.
Bush was met there in his office by his “War Council”: Secretary of State James Baker; Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell and his operations officer Lieutenant General Tom Kelly; National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates; and Vice President Dan Quayle. They rose while the President took a seat beneath the large oil painting “The Peacemakers,” depicting Lincoln and with his top military leaders near the end of the Civil War.
Perhaps no man has entered the presidency as experienced in foreign affairs as George H.W. Bush. A decorated fighter pilot in World War II, he had served as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, U.S. Ambassador to China, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, and as Vice President for eight years. At the outset of the war council, President Bush said: “Look, here are my objectives. I want to get Noriega.” He asked whether a large troop deployment was necessary instead of a smaller commando raid to apprehend the dictator. Powell explained that Noriega had been trained as an intelligence officer and was extraordinarily skilled at hiding. He rarely slept in the same location on consecutive nights, and traveled in as many as seven identical limousines. Despite the efforts of an elite tracking team, General Thurman said SOUTHCOM only knew his whereabouts perhaps 80 percent of the time and could not reliably predict where he would appear next. Consequently, Powell could offer no assurance that a covert operation to kidnap or arrest Noriega would be successful. Worse, if the U.S. military went after Noriega and missed, the lives of every American in the Canal Zone would be in jeopardy. Even if they did nab Noriega his loyalists within the PDF might target Americans in retribution or seeking an exchange.
Consequently, Powell presented General Thurman’s preferred option: to use massive force to overwhelm and demolish the PDF. This would minimize the time available for the PDF to seize U.S. citizens as hostages. Even if Noriega escaped at H-Hour, he would have no forces to command. “Wherever he is,” Powell told the President, “he won’t be El Jefe. He won’t be able to show his face.” Bush probed Powell and Kelly, asking hard and detailed questions on the myriad diplomatic and logistical details of the proposed military action. Finally, Powell concluded: “My recommendation is that we go with the full [invasion] plan. I can tell you that the chiefs agree with me to a man.”
Cheney concurred: “I support what the Chairman just recommended to you.”
Baker told Bush, “I think we ought to go,” and Scowcroft agreed the time for diplomacy had passed.
The President sat pensively, his chin resting on his chest, chewing his lower lip. Noriega, he said finally, “is not going to lay off. It will only get worse.”
At 3:50PM, he gripped the arms of his chair and rose to his feet. “Okay, let’s do it,” he quietly said. “The hell with it!”
The execute order was given for an operation involving 23,000 U.S forces – including the 13.000 already stationed in Panama – to invade and remove Noriega from power.
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| President George H.W. Bush and his national security team (during the Gulf War). |
Shameless "Bleg"
. . . "bleg" being defined as a "blogging beg," in which a blogger shamelessly uses his web log to ask a favor. (Hey, Glenn Reynolds used to do this all the time at Instapundit!)
Apparently General Odierno is asking for recommendations for the new Army Chief of Staff Professional Reading List.
If you have read and enjoyed Wanted Dead or Alive, I would greatly appreciate anybody who takes a quick minute to go to the link above and say some few kind words about my book (i.e. how it reads like a novel, gives practical policy recommendations, is more applicable to the modern strategic environment than yet another book about the War of 1812, etc).
Either way, starting Wednesday I'll be on travel for the holidays. I'm going to try to pre-program a slew of historical posts for the holidays. But if I don't get the chance to write during "vacation," have a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year.
Ben
Apparently General Odierno is asking for recommendations for the new Army Chief of Staff Professional Reading List.
If you have read and enjoyed Wanted Dead or Alive, I would greatly appreciate anybody who takes a quick minute to go to the link above and say some few kind words about my book (i.e. how it reads like a novel, gives practical policy recommendations, is more applicable to the modern strategic environment than yet another book about the War of 1812, etc).
Either way, starting Wednesday I'll be on travel for the holidays. I'm going to try to pre-program a slew of historical posts for the holidays. But if I don't get the chance to write during "vacation," have a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year.
Ben
Friday, December 16, 2011
R.I.P. Hitch
Christopher Hitchens died last night after a lengthy battle with esophageal cancer. The obituaries in the coming days will be ubiquitous, and I will not try to duplicate the efforts of those who knew him well.
But it suffices to say that anybody who has ever picked up a pen and wanted to call himself a writer (myself included) would do well to emulate Hitchens. When writing on the War on Terror he was simply brilliant, and even when I thought he was badly wrong (i.e. his early leftism, his views on Israel, and his antipathy towards the very concept of religion) was intelligent, and, damn it, interesting, something too few writers are anymore.
His wit and wisdom will be greatly missed.
But it suffices to say that anybody who has ever picked up a pen and wanted to call himself a writer (myself included) would do well to emulate Hitchens. When writing on the War on Terror he was simply brilliant, and even when I thought he was badly wrong (i.e. his early leftism, his views on Israel, and his antipathy towards the very concept of religion) was intelligent, and, damn it, interesting, something too few writers are anymore.
His wit and wisdom will be greatly missed.
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| Christopher Hitchens, 1949-2011 |
Thursday, December 15, 2011
Today in Manhunting History: December 15, 1989 -- Noriega Declares War on U.S.
On December 15, 1989, nearly two years after he was indicted by two U.S. grand juries on narcotics trafficking and money laundering charges, General Manuel Noriega strode triumphantly to the podium of Panama's National Assembly. His puppet legislature had just declared him “Maximum Leader of National Liberation” and head of government, and the Assembly proceeded to pass a resolution declaring Panama “to be in a state of war” with the United States. Wielding a machete over his head, Noriega boasted: “We the Panamanian people will sit along the banks of the canal to watch the dead bodies of our enemies pass by.”
Thus began the immediate chain of events that triggered the U.S. strategic manhunt for Noriega, Operation Just Cause.
Thus began the immediate chain of events that triggered the U.S. strategic manhunt for Noriega, Operation Just Cause.
Wednesday, December 14, 2011
Today in Manhunting History -- December 14, 2003: "Ladies and Gentlemen, We Got Him!"
[Note: I really, really, really wanted to post the video of this, but apparently lack either the correct program or simply the IT acumen to save and post either the C-Span video of the press conference, or the simple YouTube capture of the announcement. Someday . . .]
The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)’s conference center was packed tightly on Sunday, December 14, 2003, as the three men walked to the podium. Adnan Pachachi, the silver-haired patrician serving as President of the Iraqi Governing Council, led the way. He was followed by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, the handsome statesman in charge of America’s struggling effort to reconstruct Iraq. Following the two diplomats was Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, the dour commander of Coalitions forces in Iraq. When they reached the massive podium emblazoned with the CPA’s seal, they turned to face the crowd of western, Iraqi, and regional Arab reporters who filled every seat. A tangible electricity was in the air when Bremer approached the microphone at 3:15 PM Baghdad time.
“Ladies and gentlemen,” he said, pausing briefly, “We got him!”
Bremer did not have to even say a name for the assembled throng to know to whom he was referring. Instantly, Iraqi reporters sprang to their feet and began cheering wildly, forcing Bremer to wait half-a-minute for the emotional outburst subsided before resuming his remarks. Later, when LTG Sanchez showed video of the haggard looking fugitive undergoing a medical exam, there were again shouts, cries, and weeping from the Iraqis in the audience. Several Iraqi reporters cast aside any semblance of objectivity and vented the emotions suppressed during 35 years of tyranny, shouting: “Death to Saddam! Down with Saddam!”
Outside the heavily fortified International Zone, Baghdad erupted in joy. People took to the streets, many in tears and holding tattered pictures of family members killed during Iraq’s reign of terror. The normally reserved Iraqi judges and lawyers studying the Iraqi High Tribunal statute – under which the dictator would eventually be tried – “dissolved in a frenzy of joy and palpable relief as Iraqis literally jumped and hugged and cried on each other’s shoulders. It was a scene of joyful pandemonium.” Celebratory gunfire was audible throughout the Iraqi capital, and continued to crackle throughout the night.
For a brief period of time, U.S. forces and the Iraqi people once again were united in joy and a sense of deliverance. For the first time since the early days of the occupation of Iraq, American flags appeared on the streets of Baghdad. Moreover, in the weeks following Saddam’s capture, U.S. forces obtained the best intelligence they had seen in months. Along with the money and guns, Task Force 121 found a briefcase with Saddam that contained a letter from a Baghdad insurgent leader. Contained in the message were the minutes from a meeting of a number of resistance leaders who came together in the capital. These documents provided targets for further raids in the ensuing days, and within a week these raids had netted over 200 wanted personnel. Knowing Saddam was in U.S. custody, some detainees who had previously withheld information about insurgent networks began talking. At one point some 500 insurgents petitioned for amnesty, and cell leaders put out feelers for surrender.
Consequently, in the four weeks after Saddam’s capture, attacks against Coalition forces in Iraq dropped 22 percent. After suffering 83 deaths in November 2003, U.S. forces reported fewer than half that number – 38 – in December. Major General Ray Odierno, who saw attacks against his 4th ID soldiers drop from 22/day to 6/day, told the media in January 2004 that loyalists of the former regime “have been brought to their knees.” LTG Sanchez was even more optimistic, saying: “I expect that the detention of Saddam Hussein will be regarded as the beginning of reconciliation for the people of Iraq and as a sign of Iraq’s rebirth.”
Other U.S. officials were more restrained in their assessments than Sanchez. In his address marking Saddam’s capture, President Bush congratulated U.S. forces, but warned: “The capture of Saddam Hussein does not mean the end of violence in Iraq. We still face terrorists who would rather go on killing the innocent than accept the rise of liberty in Iraq.” On December 17, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) concluded: “Saddam’s capture will have little impact on foreign terrorist operational planning in Iraq. Sunni extremist groups are fighting against the U.S.-led occupation, not to restore the Hussein regime to power. Saddam’s capture will have little impact on their motivation and operational capacity.”
Events would unfortunately prove President Bush and the DIA to be more prescient than LTG Sanchez.
The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)’s conference center was packed tightly on Sunday, December 14, 2003, as the three men walked to the podium. Adnan Pachachi, the silver-haired patrician serving as President of the Iraqi Governing Council, led the way. He was followed by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, the handsome statesman in charge of America’s struggling effort to reconstruct Iraq. Following the two diplomats was Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, the dour commander of Coalitions forces in Iraq. When they reached the massive podium emblazoned with the CPA’s seal, they turned to face the crowd of western, Iraqi, and regional Arab reporters who filled every seat. A tangible electricity was in the air when Bremer approached the microphone at 3:15 PM Baghdad time.
“Ladies and gentlemen,” he said, pausing briefly, “We got him!”
Bremer did not have to even say a name for the assembled throng to know to whom he was referring. Instantly, Iraqi reporters sprang to their feet and began cheering wildly, forcing Bremer to wait half-a-minute for the emotional outburst subsided before resuming his remarks. Later, when LTG Sanchez showed video of the haggard looking fugitive undergoing a medical exam, there were again shouts, cries, and weeping from the Iraqis in the audience. Several Iraqi reporters cast aside any semblance of objectivity and vented the emotions suppressed during 35 years of tyranny, shouting: “Death to Saddam! Down with Saddam!”
Outside the heavily fortified International Zone, Baghdad erupted in joy. People took to the streets, many in tears and holding tattered pictures of family members killed during Iraq’s reign of terror. The normally reserved Iraqi judges and lawyers studying the Iraqi High Tribunal statute – under which the dictator would eventually be tried – “dissolved in a frenzy of joy and palpable relief as Iraqis literally jumped and hugged and cried on each other’s shoulders. It was a scene of joyful pandemonium.” Celebratory gunfire was audible throughout the Iraqi capital, and continued to crackle throughout the night.
For a brief period of time, U.S. forces and the Iraqi people once again were united in joy and a sense of deliverance. For the first time since the early days of the occupation of Iraq, American flags appeared on the streets of Baghdad. Moreover, in the weeks following Saddam’s capture, U.S. forces obtained the best intelligence they had seen in months. Along with the money and guns, Task Force 121 found a briefcase with Saddam that contained a letter from a Baghdad insurgent leader. Contained in the message were the minutes from a meeting of a number of resistance leaders who came together in the capital. These documents provided targets for further raids in the ensuing days, and within a week these raids had netted over 200 wanted personnel. Knowing Saddam was in U.S. custody, some detainees who had previously withheld information about insurgent networks began talking. At one point some 500 insurgents petitioned for amnesty, and cell leaders put out feelers for surrender.
Consequently, in the four weeks after Saddam’s capture, attacks against Coalition forces in Iraq dropped 22 percent. After suffering 83 deaths in November 2003, U.S. forces reported fewer than half that number – 38 – in December. Major General Ray Odierno, who saw attacks against his 4th ID soldiers drop from 22/day to 6/day, told the media in January 2004 that loyalists of the former regime “have been brought to their knees.” LTG Sanchez was even more optimistic, saying: “I expect that the detention of Saddam Hussein will be regarded as the beginning of reconciliation for the people of Iraq and as a sign of Iraq’s rebirth.”
Other U.S. officials were more restrained in their assessments than Sanchez. In his address marking Saddam’s capture, President Bush congratulated U.S. forces, but warned: “The capture of Saddam Hussein does not mean the end of violence in Iraq. We still face terrorists who would rather go on killing the innocent than accept the rise of liberty in Iraq.” On December 17, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) concluded: “Saddam’s capture will have little impact on foreign terrorist operational planning in Iraq. Sunni extremist groups are fighting against the U.S.-led occupation, not to restore the Hussein regime to power. Saddam’s capture will have little impact on their motivation and operational capacity.”
Events would unfortunately prove President Bush and the DIA to be more prescient than LTG Sanchez.
"Bin Laden Hunter" Gary Faulkner Jailed
Gary Brooks Faulkner is not having a good year.
Don't remember the name? Well, Faulkner is the man who in June 2010 was picked up by police in Chitral, Pakistan, carrying various night-vision devices, a hand gun, a knife, a samurai sword, and Christian literature, claiming he was on a one-man mission to capture Osama bin Laden.
On May 1st, the SEALs beat him to bin Laden.
On September 1st, he was arrested in Greeley, Colorado for possession of a weapon as an ex-convict. He apparently hasn't been able to make bail, and has been residing in the Weld County Jail for over three months.
Hopefully he doesn't have plans for New Year's Day, since he doesn't seem to have much luck on the first of the month.
Don't remember the name? Well, Faulkner is the man who in June 2010 was picked up by police in Chitral, Pakistan, carrying various night-vision devices, a hand gun, a knife, a samurai sword, and Christian literature, claiming he was on a one-man mission to capture Osama bin Laden.
On May 1st, the SEALs beat him to bin Laden.
On September 1st, he was arrested in Greeley, Colorado for possession of a weapon as an ex-convict. He apparently hasn't been able to make bail, and has been residing in the Weld County Jail for over three months.
Hopefully he doesn't have plans for New Year's Day, since he doesn't seem to have much luck on the first of the month.
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| Gary Brooks Faulkner, the man who hunted bin Laden with a samurai sword. |
Tuesday, December 13, 2011
Today in Manhunting History -- December 13, 2003: The Capture of Saddam Hussein
At 10:50 AM, December 13, Colonel James Hickey – commander of 1st BCT 4ID – received a call notifying him that Task Force 121 had Muhammad Ibrahim al-Musslit in custody, and requesting he prepare a covering force for a seizure mission that night. After four hours of grueling interrogation, Muhammad Ibrahim had finally revealed two likely locations for Saddam: a house and a farm in the town of Ad Dawr, a Ba’athist stronghold about 15 kilometers southeast of Tikrit. Hickey, certain that this time they would capture Saddam, assembled a 600-plus strong force mounted in 25 M2/M3 Bradley fighting vehicles and 30 HMMWVs to support the two dozen special operators of Task Force 121. The mission was codenamed “Operation Red Dawn,” and the two objectives were labeled “Wolverine One” and “Wolverine Two.” These names were fortuitous if somewhat coincidental. The operations staff for the “Raider” Brigade was in the habit of naming each day’s operations after the movies they had watched the night before. Had they viewed “When Harry Met Sally” or “The Wedding Planner” the previous night, it is possible the names for the operation would have evoked less martial images than those inspired by the 1980s movie about teenage guerrillas resisting a Soviet invasion of the United States.
At 6PM Hickey’s force moved out of the brigade base at Camp Raider, a former palace built on a bluff overlooking the Tigris south of Tikrit. The night was cold and crisp as the covering force moved out to an assembly area at an old granary north of Ad Dawr, while engineers secured the west bank of the Tigris several hundred meters away. The force then moved quietly into position to block any escape and reinforcement routes and stand ready to reinforce Task Force 121 in case of heavy resistance. At 8PM, the special operators – identifiable by their black uniforms and NVGs – fast-roped onto the objectives from hovering helicopters.
The beam of red-lensed Maglite flashlights and laser sights on rifles sweeping across the ground contrasted with the clear night sky over Ad Dawr. Task Force 121 searched the two objectives, but they appeared to be empty of any targets. The team leaders conferred and talked with Muhammad Ibrahim, who had been flown from Baghdad to Tikrit, and then brought to the farm by the special operations team. Al-Muslit suggested another nearby location, northwest of Wolverine Two, where a ramshackle shack stood. There was an animal stench in the air, mingled with the scent of some nearby fruit trees. The operators burst into the structure, which indeed had been an orange-picker’s hut, and seized two men. One was Saddam’s cook, the other was the cook’s brother and owner of the farm, Qies Niemic Jasim, a former bodyguard. The operators found two AK-47s and $750,000, but Saddam was not there.
U.S. forces appeared to have struck another “dry hole” in the search for Saddam.
**************************************************************************
To the support and command elements following the operation’s progress via radio, the code words used suggested the operators were fruitlessly going back over the same ground, desperately searching for any signs leading to their quarry.
Then a call went over the command net: “We have Jackpot.”
The Joint Operations Center operations officer coordinating the mission asked for clarification, and an excited operator replied: “We’ve got Jackpot.”
A voice that had never been heard before on the Task Forces’ countless missions came on the radio. Admiral William McRaven, Task Force 121’s commander and a living legend within the Special Operations Forces community, asked: “Do you mean Big Jackpot?”
“Yes, we have Big Jackpot.”
**************************************************************************
Minutes earlier, Muhammad Ibrahim had yelled at Qies Niemic Jasim in Arabic to show the operators where Saddam was hiding. The Fat Man apparently knew the exact spot, but wanted to be able to say that it was Qies who had betrayed Saddam. Finally, he realized it was going to be up to him, and moved to an area a few meters away from where the U.S. forces were concentrated. He began kicking the ground until he had uncovered a length of rope. The operators noticed Muhammad Ibrahim’s activities, and dug up the rope to reveal a trapdoor. The door was opened to reveal the entrance shaft to a “spider hole,” about six feet deep.
A sergeant shone a flashlight down the shaft. I think there’s something down there, an operator said, as another took the pin out of his grenade.
Then someone shouted, “Movement! We have something coming up.”
The operators held their fire when they saw the upraised hands of a dirty, bearded man with unkempt gray hair, appear. Although armed with a 9mm Markarov pistol, he put up no resistance as the soldiers grabbed him and yanked him out of the hole. As he was deposited on the ground, what looked like a vagrant said in halting English: “I am Saddam Hussein, the president of Iraq. I am willing to negotiate.”
“President Bush sends his regards,” the operators replied.
**************************************************************************
At 8:26PM, December 13, the hunt for Saddam Hussein came to a successful conclusion. Saddam was captured on the same farm where he had taken refuge in 1959 when, as a young hit man for the Ba’ath party, he had been part of a failed assassination attempt on Iraqi President Abdul Kareem Qassem, an episode that served as the founding myth to the dictator’s legend. The Arab scholar Fouad Ajami observed, great evil
 |
| Saddam Hussein before the March-December 2003 strategic manhunt |
The beam of red-lensed Maglite flashlights and laser sights on rifles sweeping across the ground contrasted with the clear night sky over Ad Dawr. Task Force 121 searched the two objectives, but they appeared to be empty of any targets. The team leaders conferred and talked with Muhammad Ibrahim, who had been flown from Baghdad to Tikrit, and then brought to the farm by the special operations team. Al-Muslit suggested another nearby location, northwest of Wolverine Two, where a ramshackle shack stood. There was an animal stench in the air, mingled with the scent of some nearby fruit trees. The operators burst into the structure, which indeed had been an orange-picker’s hut, and seized two men. One was Saddam’s cook, the other was the cook’s brother and owner of the farm, Qies Niemic Jasim, a former bodyguard. The operators found two AK-47s and $750,000, but Saddam was not there.
U.S. forces appeared to have struck another “dry hole” in the search for Saddam.
 |
| Picture from On Point II, as available at GlobalSecurity.org. |
To the support and command elements following the operation’s progress via radio, the code words used suggested the operators were fruitlessly going back over the same ground, desperately searching for any signs leading to their quarry.
Then a call went over the command net: “We have Jackpot.”
The Joint Operations Center operations officer coordinating the mission asked for clarification, and an excited operator replied: “We’ve got Jackpot.”
A voice that had never been heard before on the Task Forces’ countless missions came on the radio. Admiral William McRaven, Task Force 121’s commander and a living legend within the Special Operations Forces community, asked: “Do you mean Big Jackpot?”
“Yes, we have Big Jackpot.”
 |
| Picture from On Point II, as available at GlobalSecurity.org |
**************************************************************************
Minutes earlier, Muhammad Ibrahim had yelled at Qies Niemic Jasim in Arabic to show the operators where Saddam was hiding. The Fat Man apparently knew the exact spot, but wanted to be able to say that it was Qies who had betrayed Saddam. Finally, he realized it was going to be up to him, and moved to an area a few meters away from where the U.S. forces were concentrated. He began kicking the ground until he had uncovered a length of rope. The operators noticed Muhammad Ibrahim’s activities, and dug up the rope to reveal a trapdoor. The door was opened to reveal the entrance shaft to a “spider hole,” about six feet deep.
A sergeant shone a flashlight down the shaft. I think there’s something down there, an operator said, as another took the pin out of his grenade.
Then someone shouted, “Movement! We have something coming up.”
The operators held their fire when they saw the upraised hands of a dirty, bearded man with unkempt gray hair, appear. Although armed with a 9mm Markarov pistol, he put up no resistance as the soldiers grabbed him and yanked him out of the hole. As he was deposited on the ground, what looked like a vagrant said in halting English: “I am Saddam Hussein, the president of Iraq. I am willing to negotiate.”
“President Bush sends his regards,” the operators replied.
 |
| Task Force 121's interpreter, an exiled Iraqi-American named Samir, posing with the captured tyrant just outside his spiderhole in Ad Dawr. |
At 8:26PM, December 13, the hunt for Saddam Hussein came to a successful conclusion. Saddam was captured on the same farm where he had taken refuge in 1959 when, as a young hit man for the Ba’ath party, he had been part of a failed assassination attempt on Iraqi President Abdul Kareem Qassem, an episode that served as the founding myth to the dictator’s legend. The Arab scholar Fouad Ajami observed, great evil
never quite lives up to our expectations. The image of Saddam Hussein in captivity was true to Arendt’s theme. The haggard, disoriented man at the bottom of the ‘spider hole’ was the very same man who had inflicted unspeakable sorrow on his people, and on the peoples of two neighboring lands. The discovery of the smallness of the men behind the most terrible of deeds is always an affront: if Eichmann was only a clerk, Saddam was only a thug.In the end, the tyrant who had terrified millions and buried hundreds of thousands of his own citizens in mass graves; who had urged his countrymen to violently resist U.S. forces and bragged about going down in a blaze of glory and defiance was captured without a shot being fired.
While I Was Away
Sorry for the hiatus, but the day job required an 80-hour work week and two straight weekends at the office. Fortunately, it is no great loss to miss a Redskins game these days, although I did get to see the Army-Navy game. (Btw, who the hell runs an option play on 4th and 7 with five minutes left in the game? Coach Ellerson, your quarterback had already completed two passes -- practically an Aaron Rodgers-like performance for an Army QB -- why not let him throw it?!? Damn it, I'm sick and tired of losing to those squids!)
Anyways, while I was otherwise occupied:
- Eli Lake, one of the best national security reporters working today, examined hidden U.S.-Pakistani counter-terrorism cooperation in the Daily Beast. As I noted in Wanted Dead or Alive, one of the keys to targeting individuals is cooperation with indigenous forces. Although Lake only discusses the capture of al-Qa'ida's external operations chief, Younis al-Mauritani, U.S. intelligence agencies similarly used local Pakistani agents to surveil Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti and the compound in Abbottabad where Osama bin Laden was killed.
- Speaking of Abbottabad, ABC reported that Pakistan is preparing to release Osama bin Laden's wives from custody. The article notes that "In the months after the raid, both Pakistani and U.S. officials described the wives as uncooperative and it's not clear that they knew much about bin Laden's work." This isn't surprising, as bin Laden somehow always struck me as somebody who would not have a problem telling his wives not to inquire about his business, i.e. Michael Corleone or Tony Soprano.
- Speaking of the Mafia, Michele Zagaria, head of Naples' Casalesi clan, was captured Wednesday, September 7, after Italian police drilled into his concrete bunker in his hometown of Casapesenna. Although this isn't technically a "strategic" manhunt, in that Zagaria never left Italy, he had been on the run for 16 years. (Although what is the point of being a mob boss if you are forced to live in an underground bunker? Unless he had a really great satellite dish and, um, plenty of conjugal visitors, how different would that be from prison?)
- Finally, another person not going to breathe fresh air anytime soon is Manuel Noriega, who on Sunday was extradited from France to Panama. Sunday marks the first time the deposed strongman has set foot in Panama since surrendering to U.S. forces almost 21 years ago, an event I'll be writing on in some detail over the upcoming weeks. The 77-year old Noriega faces multiple murder charges of various political opponents in Panama from his years as dictator there. Otherwise, Miami to Paris to Panama would sound a like a pretty nice travel itinerary.
Anyways, while I was otherwise occupied:
- Eli Lake, one of the best national security reporters working today, examined hidden U.S.-Pakistani counter-terrorism cooperation in the Daily Beast. As I noted in Wanted Dead or Alive, one of the keys to targeting individuals is cooperation with indigenous forces. Although Lake only discusses the capture of al-Qa'ida's external operations chief, Younis al-Mauritani, U.S. intelligence agencies similarly used local Pakistani agents to surveil Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti and the compound in Abbottabad where Osama bin Laden was killed.
- Speaking of Abbottabad, ABC reported that Pakistan is preparing to release Osama bin Laden's wives from custody. The article notes that "In the months after the raid, both Pakistani and U.S. officials described the wives as uncooperative and it's not clear that they knew much about bin Laden's work." This isn't surprising, as bin Laden somehow always struck me as somebody who would not have a problem telling his wives not to inquire about his business, i.e. Michael Corleone or Tony Soprano.
- Speaking of the Mafia, Michele Zagaria, head of Naples' Casalesi clan, was captured Wednesday, September 7, after Italian police drilled into his concrete bunker in his hometown of Casapesenna. Although this isn't technically a "strategic" manhunt, in that Zagaria never left Italy, he had been on the run for 16 years. (Although what is the point of being a mob boss if you are forced to live in an underground bunker? Unless he had a really great satellite dish and, um, plenty of conjugal visitors, how different would that be from prison?)
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| Mafia boss Michele Zagoria, dressed frighteningly similar to my high school calculus teacher. Hmmm. . . . |
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| Manuel Noriega, on the first of his 7,600 days (and counting) as a prisoner. |
Friday, December 2, 2011
Today in Manhunting History -- December 2, 1993: Aideed Flies, Escobar Dies
Following the Battle of the Black Sea made famous by the book and movie Black Hawk Down, President Bill Clinton convened an emergency policy review with the vice president, key cabinet members, and senior civilian and military staff. The next day, Clinton announced a new policy in which the United States would increase its military presence in Somalia by over 5,000 troops until March 31, when all U.S. troops would be withdrawn. He personally ordered CENTCOM Commander General Joseph Hoar to halt any further action by U.S. forces against Aideed. The United Nations Security Council subsequently adopted Resolution 885, which suspended the call for Aideed’s arrest and established an international commission to investigate June 5 attacks that precipitated the hunt for the Somali warlord. Aideed seemed content to wait for the Americans to leave, and refrained from any large-scale violence against the bolstered forces. Simultaneously, the White House began referring to him as “a clan leader with a substantial constituency in Somalia.”
The ultimate symbol of Aideed’s rehabilitation was his flight to peace talks in Ethiopia in early December. He refused to travel on a UN plane, but accepted an offer to use an American transport. On December 2, 1993, Marines escorted the warlord to the plane in full view of U.S. troops at the Mogadishu airport. The spectacle caused “anger and disappointment throughout the ranks,” and the morale of U.S. forces plummeted.
Halfway around the world, another target of a U.S. strategic manhunt was not faring as well.
In September 1989, at the request of the Colombian government, the Bush administration deployed a top-secret Army intelligence unit, Centra Spike, which specialized in locating individuals. Their target was the man listed by Forbes magazine as the seventh richest man in the world – Pablo Escobar, the vicious kingpin of the Medellin Cartel. From January 1990 to July 1991, the intelligence produced by Centra Spike led to significant blows to Escobar’s cocaine empire, but always barely missed out on capturing him due to the corruption or incompetence of the pursuing Colombian forces.
In July 1992, following Escobar’s escape from La Catederal prison, elements of the Delta Force under Colonel Jerry Boykin were deployed to assist the Colombian police’s “Search Bloc.” U.S. and Colombian forces unsuccessfully pursued Escobar for the next 16 months despite access to an array of technical assets that dwarfed anything used in previous strategic manhunts: airborne triangulation sensors; microwave imagery platforms; Air Force RC-135s, U-2s, and SR-71s; and Navy P-3 spy planes. On December 2, 1993, in a middle-class neighborhood in Medellin, the son of the Search Bloc’s commander spied Escobar through the window of a row house after a failed raid in a nearby location. A firefight with Escobar and his bodyguard, Alvaro de Jesús Agudelo ensued. As Escobar and Agudelo The two fugitives attempted to escape by running across the roofs of adjoining houses to reach a back street, but both were shot and killed by Colombian National Police.
The ultimate symbol of Aideed’s rehabilitation was his flight to peace talks in Ethiopia in early December. He refused to travel on a UN plane, but accepted an offer to use an American transport. On December 2, 1993, Marines escorted the warlord to the plane in full view of U.S. troops at the Mogadishu airport. The spectacle caused “anger and disappointment throughout the ranks,” and the morale of U.S. forces plummeted.
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| Muhammed Farah Aideed, target of the failed 1993 strategic manhunt. |
Halfway around the world, another target of a U.S. strategic manhunt was not faring as well.
In September 1989, at the request of the Colombian government, the Bush administration deployed a top-secret Army intelligence unit, Centra Spike, which specialized in locating individuals. Their target was the man listed by Forbes magazine as the seventh richest man in the world – Pablo Escobar, the vicious kingpin of the Medellin Cartel. From January 1990 to July 1991, the intelligence produced by Centra Spike led to significant blows to Escobar’s cocaine empire, but always barely missed out on capturing him due to the corruption or incompetence of the pursuing Colombian forces.
In July 1992, following Escobar’s escape from La Catederal prison, elements of the Delta Force under Colonel Jerry Boykin were deployed to assist the Colombian police’s “Search Bloc.” U.S. and Colombian forces unsuccessfully pursued Escobar for the next 16 months despite access to an array of technical assets that dwarfed anything used in previous strategic manhunts: airborne triangulation sensors; microwave imagery platforms; Air Force RC-135s, U-2s, and SR-71s; and Navy P-3 spy planes. On December 2, 1993, in a middle-class neighborhood in Medellin, the son of the Search Bloc’s commander spied Escobar through the window of a row house after a failed raid in a nearby location. A firefight with Escobar and his bodyguard, Alvaro de Jesús Agudelo ensued. As Escobar and Agudelo The two fugitives attempted to escape by running across the roofs of adjoining houses to reach a back street, but both were shot and killed by Colombian National Police.
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| Colombian Police posing with the body of Medellin Cartel kingpin Pablo Escobar, killed as a result of a U.S. strategic manhunt from 1989-1993. |
Bin Laden Bread
CNN reports thhat "Bin Laden buns" are a popular item in bakeries in Blantyre, Malawi.
No, really.
The bakers say that the bread isn't popular for political reasons, as "Malawian people are very pro-Western," and the bakeries also feature baked goods named after George W. Bush and Barack Obama. However, those items are slightly smaller and don't sell as well as the bin Ladens.
Hmmm . . .
Personally, I think they should have to sell them as part of pastrami or reuben sandwiches, or offer an accompanying spread of kosher liverwurst, just to be sure.
No, really.
The bakers say that the bread isn't popular for political reasons, as "Malawian people are very pro-Western," and the bakeries also feature baked goods named after George W. Bush and Barack Obama. However, those items are slightly smaller and don't sell as well as the bin Ladens.
Hmmm . . .
Personally, I think they should have to sell them as part of pastrami or reuben sandwiches, or offer an accompanying spread of kosher liverwurst, just to be sure.
Thursday, December 1, 2011
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