Today in Manhunting History -- December 20, 1989: Operation Just Cause

General Thurman set H-Hour for Operation Just Cause at 1AM, December 20, the timing of which proved to be the worst kept secret in Panama as the massive movement of U.S. aircraft to Panama compromised strategic surprise. At 10PM Dan Rather appeared on a CBS News special report to announce: “U.S. military transport planes have left Fort Bragg. The Pentagon declines to say whether or not they’re bound for Panama. It will only say that the Fort Bragg-based 18th Airborne Corps has been conducting what the Army calls an emergency readiness measure.” Similar stories and images compromising the secrecy of the invasion appeared on CNN and NBC. At midnight, the Comandancia sent out a message to PDF commanders: “They’re coming. The ballgame is at 1AM. Report to your units . . . draw your weapons and prepare to fight.” Consequently, General Thurman ordered the special operations forces to launch their operations 15 minutes ahead of schedule at 12:45AM.

Because SOUTHCOM could not be sure of Noriega’s location at H-Hour, an emphasis was placed on cutting off his potential means of escape. If intelligence, radar, or AWACS planes discovered Noriega trying to escape by air, F-16 fighters or AC-130 gunships would intercept his aircraft and force it to land. If the dictator’s pilot refused to obey, the U.S. military aircraft, upon authorization of Secretary Cheney, were to shoot down the suspected aircraft.

In order to cut off another potential escape route for Noriega, two combat rubber raider craft departed Rodman Naval Station at 11PM. They silently crossed the canal in the darkness and tied up in a mangrove stand near the docks at Balboa Harbor. Two two-man SEAL teams slipped over the sides of the crafts, and using sophisticated scuba gear that left no trail of air bubbles, swam to their target – the Panamanian fast patrol boat Presidente Poras, which U.S. commanders feared Noriega would use to flee Panama. The SEAL demolition teams placed haversacks filled with explosives in the propeller shaft, set the detonators for 1AM, and quickly swam away to their extraction point. Above the water’s surface they could already hear the roar of the initial firefights erupting between U.S. and Panamanian forces. At 1AM the explosion ripped a hole in the Presidente Poras, rocking downtown Panama City as the vessel slowly sank to the bottom of the harbor.

As one team of SEALs was navigating the waters of Balboa Harbor, SEAL Team Four was coming ashore at Panama City’s downtown Paitilla Airport, where Noriega based his personal LearJet. At 12:45AM the 62-man force – comprised of three 16-man SEAL platoons and a command element led by Lieutenant Commander Pat Toohey – came ashore. The SEALs hurried up the trail from the beach and snuck through a hole in the airport’s security fence. Two platoons each started moving up one side of the runway, while a third platoon remained on the southern edge of the airfield to provide security. By 1:05 the SEALs had reached their assault positions in front of the three northernmost hangars. One squad of nine commandos lay prone on the tarmac in front of the middle hangar that housed Noriega’s jet. Another platoon was positioned just to the north, providing cover and observing the northern side of the airfield.

A radio transmission reported that three PDF armored vehicles were racing down the road that circles the northern end of Paitilla airfield. Toohey quickly ordered the northernmost platoon to move to the road to either ensure the vehicles passed by the airport or, if necessary, ambush them. As the SEAL team rose from the tarmac, a Panamanian guard in the northernmost hangar saw them and raised his weapon. A SEAL fired first, but missed. A split second later the crack of AK-47 fire echoed through the humid night as the guard fired a burst on automatic. The bullets ripped through the line of exposed SEALs, two of whom were killed instantly. The remaining SEALs dove for cover in a drainage ditch, but were struck by shots ricocheting off the tarmac, wounding six others. The SEALs in front of Noriega’s hangar unleashed a hail of covering fire at the northern hangar, which now appeared to hold at least two Panamanians, but their line of fire was obstructed by two small aircraft parked in front of the hanger. The third platoon to the south was ordered up to attack the hangar.

A minute of intense fire gave way to a heavy silence. The hangar was riddled with bullet holes, the Panamanians were dead, and anti-armor rockets had destroyed the cockpit of Noriega’s plane. But although SEAL Team Four achieved its objective, the price paid was steep: four SEALs dead and eight more wounded. The unexpected casualties from such an elite force shocked the Special Operations community and would remain a source of controversy for years.

Noriega's Lear Jet, destroyed at H-Hour+1, but at the cost of four SEALs killed.

In addition to cutting off Noriega’s avenues of escape, another critical H-Hour mission was to destroy the units that had come to his rescue during the October coup. The PDF numbered nearly 12,800 troops, but only a third of these could be classified as combat troops. Although the infantry units were judged “a well-trained and disciplined force at the small unit, tactical level,” they suffered from reliance on overly centralized command and control. The two exceptions were the 7th Infantry Company and Battalion 2000.

The black uniformed, bearded “Macho de Monte” (literally, “Mountain Men”) of the 7th Infantry were a well-armed commando unit trained by Cuban military advisors for a single purpose: to protect and, if necessary, rescue Noriega. They were stationed at Rio Hato about 65 miles from Panama City on the Pacific Coast, but as demonstrated during the Giroldi Coup, were able to rapidly deploy by air to the capital. The mission of attacking Rio Hato was given to the U.S. Army’s elite light infantry, the 75th Ranger Regiment under Colonel William F. “Buck” Kernan.

At precisely 1AM, two F-117A “Stealth” bombers, in their first-ever combat mission, swooped in at 4,000 feet to drop a pair of 2,000-pound bombs next to the 7th Infantry’s barracks. The idea was to terrify and confuse the Panamanians into surrendering quickly. Yet instead of stunning the Macho de Monte, the massive bombs roused the Panamanians from their beds and out of their barracks, leaving them better prepared to resist the incoming Rangers.

The Mountain Men moved into position, while 13 C-130 transports carried 1,300 Rangers from the 2nd and 3rd Ranger battalions into battle. As they prepared to jump into the warm, humid night, one Ranger recalled: we “just went around and started hitting one another on the head and got motivated, because if anybody deserved to be slammed, [Noriega] was the one. Because he was an evil man . . . There was no death wish, but we wanted to get him bad, and he deserved to be got.” The lights of the airfield and barracks were visible as the planes approached, leading the Rangers to think they had achieved strategic surprise. But as soon as they began to exit the aircraft, the skies filled with tracer fire.

The Rangers jumped from an altitude of only 500 feet, 300 feet below the standard training jump. This meant their main parachutes would open at just 100 feet. While limiting their exposure to ground fire, it also meant their reserve parachutes were virtually useless in case of a malfunction, and with their 100-pound packs, every Ranger was assured a brutal landing. Four soldiers were killed on the jump, and another 86 formed part of an “orthopedic nightmare” of broken legs and ankles.

Although the runway was cleared within 30 minutes, the fighting in the barracks area was intense. The PDF withdrew through the rear of a building and took up firing positions in nearby gullies or trenches. When the Rangers worked through to the building’s exit, the PDF ambushed them and withdrew to the next building to repeat the tactic. Finally, after five hours of room-to-room, building-to-building combat, the Macho de Monte had all either surrendered or melted into the surrounding jungle.

Rangers raise the U.S. flag after an intense battle versus Noriega's elite "Mountain Men" at Rio Hato

The other PDF unit that concerned U.S. commanders was Battalion 2000, an elite fighting unit of 200 mechanized infantry that had smashed the abortive October revolt. One of Noriega’s most loyal units, they were stationed at Fort Cimarron, approximately 16 miles from Panama City’s Torrijos-Tocumen Airport, which could serve as either an escape hatch for Noriega or an entry point for Cuban or Nicaraguan reinforcements. Thus, another critical H-Hour mission was to seize the airport complex before Battalion 2000 could secure it.

While 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment captured the airfields, elements of 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (SFG) were tasked with conducting surveillance missions at Fort Cimarron and the Pacora River Bridge to monitor Battalion 2000’s movements. Major Kevin Higgins was preparing to take off in three helicopters with a 24-man element of Company A, 3/7th SFG, when an intelligence officer came running onto the helipad. “We just got reports that . . . a ten-vehicle convoy is leaving Cimarron Cuartel for Panama City,” he said. Higgins’ mission instantly shifted from reconnaissance to direct action, with the goal of seizing Pacora River Bridge and blocking Battalion 2000 from entering the capital.

As the helicopters approached the bridge at 12:45AM, the lead pilot spotted six PDF vehicles on the road. It was now a race between the Green Berets and the Panamanians to see who could get to the bridge first. The helicopters dropped Higgins’ element on the western shore of the river. His men quickly clambered up the steep slope to the road and found themselves directly in the headlights of the first PDF vehicle crossing the bridge from the east. The soldiers hit the lead vehicle with two light anti-tank weapons and poured machine gun fire and M203 launched grenades into the column. The Air Force Combat controller with Higgins’ element directed AC-130 fire onto the stalled column, driving the Panamians from their trucks. The battle continued for several hours, as the Panamanians attempted to outflank the small element, but Higgins’ men repelled all PDF attempts to cross the bridge or the river.

Pacora River Bridge, where 24 Green Berets backed by close air support held off "Battalion 2000"

Meanwhile, 11 transport aircraft approached Tocumen airfield in a straight line over the runway. At 1:03AM, the clear evening sky filled with the dark silhouette of parachutes as the 1st Ranger Battalion jumped from the planes. The seizure of the airfield was flawless, and once again, more Rangers suffered torn knee ligaments, broken legs, and other injuries from the low jumping altitude and unforgiving concrete of the tarmac than from hostile fire. As the other Ranger companies assaulted objectives held by the PDF, Bravo 1/75th was tasked to secure the perimeter and establish roadblocks around the airfield. Bravo landed on target and received only sporadic enemy fire as it quickly moved to its blocking positions. The biggest obstacle these Rangers faced were Panamanian vehicles ignoring its warning sign and barricades. These vehicles typically turned and fled once the Rangers fired warning shots. But one convoy of two hatchbacks refused to heed the warnings and hurtled towards Bravo Company at full speed. The Rangers took aim and shot out the front tires of the lead vehicle. The second car came to a screeching halt and turned around, disappearing into the night.

It would not be discovered until later that General Noriega was in the car that got away.

The simultaneous H-Hour assault on dozens of targets with overwhelming force decimated the PDF, who proved to be no match for American firepower and training, and had little stomach for a genuine fight. “Essentially, the leaders didn’t show,” said Major General James Johnson, commander of the 82nd Airborne. “The troops were deserted.” The Panamanians would typically empty the magazines of their rifles and disappear. The exception to this pattern was at the Comandancia, where elements of the PDF’s 6th, 7th, and 8th Rifle Companies, reinforced by two public order companies, vigorously defended PDF headquarters for a day. Resistance finally collapsed on the morning of December 21, thereby immobilizing resistance in outlying provinces as well.

Noriega's military headquarters, La Comandancia, where the incidents that finally provoked Operation Just Cause occurred on December 16, was one of the strongman's last bastions to hold out against U.S. forces on December 20.

American forces were greeted by the long-suffering Panamanian people as liberators. In Colon, one officer recalled, “the streets came alive as people appeared from every door and window, cheering us.” In a scene eerily foreshadowing the liberation of Baghdad more than a decade later, “People were out there looting their asses off. They had armfuls of televisions, pillows, anything they could get. When they saw us, they shouted, ‘Viva Bush! Viva the United States!’” Another soldier noted: “There was people out partying and waving U.S. flags and cheering for us. And then we would turn a corner and start heading down another way, and all of a sudden we’d start getting shot at.”

On the home front, however, the failure to capture Noriega dominated the perception of Operation Just Cause. At the first press conference on the morning of December 20, reporters wanted to know about Noriega. “If we did not catch him, what was the point of invading Panama?” they asked Powell. “Wouldn’t it make life miserable for the U.S. forces down there, a reporter asked, if Noriega was still running around in the Panamanian wilds?”

Powell assured the press that “we’ll chase him and we will find him. I’m not quite sure he’s up to being chased around the countryside by Army Rangers, Special Forces, and light infantry units.”

But the reporters persisted: “Could we really consider Just Cause successful as long as we did not have Noriega in custody?”