The Associated Press Reviews "Wanted Dead or Alive"

This positive review is significant, because a lot of big-city papers without independent book sections, and small-to-mid-sized city papers will run the AP's review:

"Wanted Dead or Alive: Manhunts From Geronimo to bin Laden" (Palgrave Macmillan), by Benjamin Runkle: When U.S. Navy SEALs last spring ended a seemingly endless manhunt by killing Osama bin Laden in his hide-out in an affluent suburb north of Pakistan's capital, the world learned that the code name given to the al-Qaida leader during that operation was Geronimo.

Although the designation upset some Native Americans, it had some compelling logic. The strategic manhunt launched by U.S. forces 125 years ago was targeted at Geronimo, the tribal warrior whose savage attacks on American settlers in the Southwest made him the target of Army troops who pursued him on both sides of the border with Mexico.

The hunts for Geronimo and bin Laden were centered in borderlands that included rugged, mountainous terrain. The Apache leader, for whom the government posted a $25,000 reward, surrendered in 1886 after evading U.S. and Mexican troops for more than a year. In contrast, the quest for bin Laden, who had a $25 million bounty on his head, went on for 13 years.

Benjamin Runkle, an ex-paratrooper and presidential speechwriter now on the staff of the House Armed Services Committee, details the hunts for Geronimo, bin Laden and other targeted individuals in Asia, Africa and the Americas. They include Filipino rebel leader Emilio Aguinaldo, Mexican bandit Pancho Villa, Panamanian strongman and drug dealer Manuel Noriega and deposed Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.

Although there is no shortage of books about bin Laden, Runkle breaks new ground by putting his story in the context of earlier manhunts that are surely less familiar to most readers.

"Wanted Dead or Alive" may be most appealing to those with an interest in military history, but should also find favor with a broader readership drawn to lesser known episodes in the nation's past.

Most of the manhunts detailed in the book came to a successful conclusion. The author goes on to weigh the various elements that make for such an outcome, assigning less importance to factors such as technology and terrain and more to what he regards as the potential key to success: actionable human intelligence that can locate the target.

That was certainly the case with bin Laden, whose trail went cold in the mountains of Tora Bora. He met his end after interrogated detainees identified one of his trusted couriers. Likewise, help from one of Saddam's security officers led searchers to the spider hole where he was hiding out.

Geronimo's fate was far different. After constant pursuit by Army troops, he surrendered and eventually became a celebrity, appearing at Wild West shows and participating in Theodore Roosevelt's inaugural parade.

There have been nearly a dozen deployments of U.S. military forces whose missions were to kill or capture one specific person. At a time when leaders of terrorist groups or rogue states may pose the most immediate threats to U.S. security, Runkle predicts that the most recent manhunt will not be the last.

"Long after the operation that killed Osama bin Laden has faded into history, strategic manhunts will remain an important problem for U.S. policymakers and military officials alike," he concludes.

Is Al Qaeda Finished?

There have been a slew of articles over the last few weeks (all of which I've been negligent in commenting on, as I've been swamped and traveling for the day job) quoting Obama administration officials who suggest we are on the brink of defeating al-Qa'ida.  Several weeks ago, while visiting troops in Afghanistan, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta declared that “we’re within reach of strategically defeating al-Qaeda," and yesterday former general and current Deputy National Security Adviser for Afghanistan/Pakistan Douglas E. Lute said the United States has six months to "knock out" al-Qa'ida's leadership while it is in disarray following Osama bin Laden's killing.

It is significant that both policymakers and intelligence community officials are even broaching this topic, but there are two important caveats to consider.  First, nobody is suggesting that bin Laden's death alone represents the strategic defeat of al-Qa'ida.  Instead, most officials place greater if not equal emphasis on the sustained decapitation campaign via drone strikes against al-Qa'ida's senior leadership, largely in Pakistan.  This is consistent with my finding in "Wanted Dead or Alive" that killing/capturing the individual targeted by a strategic manhunt is not as important as eliminating the support network that made him strategically effective in the first place.  Thus, although killing bin Laden may have been necessary -- if for no other reason than to shatter his mythology -- by itself it was not sufficient to defeat al-Qa'ida.  However, the drone strikes that as of 2010 had killed 9 out of 20 of the terrorist organization's leaders (this number is higher by at least one now, but is currently highly classified) have the same devastating effect that capturing Filipino insurgent generals or Pancho Villa's deputies did more than a century ago.

Second, it is critical to distinguish between "AQSL" (al-Qa'ida senior leadership) and al-Qa'ida.  AQSL is the leadership core that created the terror network and led it to the height of its threat on September 11, 2001.  This core was dispersed beginning with the October 2001 bombing campaign/invasion of Afghanistan, and has been on the run ever since, its strategic effectiveness diminishing over the course of the decade as an increasing number of its leaders were killed.  Yet while this cohort may be on the verge of defeat,  al-Qa'ida writ large is far from finished, as the affiliates assume greater capability and autonomy.  As the head of the National Counter Terrorism Center Michael Leiter told the House Homeland Security Committee in February, Al Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and its charismatic spiritual leader Anwar al-Awlaki are "probably the most significant risk to the U.S. homeland."  Thus, even if we are successful in devastating AQSL in Pakistan during the rest of the year, the terrorist threat against the United States will still be significant.  In other words, although bin Laden may be dead, "bin Ladenism" will live on for the foreseeable future.

Billy Waugh on bin Laden

Speaking of the adulation of bin Laden's followers, here are Special Forces' legend Billy Waugh observations while surveilling the Saudi mastermind for the CIA in Khartoum in the early 1990s:*

As I sat across the street, watching and photographing him from the roof of my OP [Observation Post], I observed the way his followers treated him. . . . He sat cross-leged facing them, and they sat cross-legged facing him.  The followers -- twenty to twenty-five of them in this location -- sat there mesmerized, silent, mouths half-opened, listening to thier messiah as if it were Mohammed himself diong the speaking.  It was as if he cast a spell every day at this same time and they -- loyal followers all -- fell into a dutiful trance.

Waugh concludes:

My attitude toward bin Laden at the time was based on teh way his people responded to him.  The more I saw, the more concerned I became.  They came up to him like you wouldn't believe.  Watching them was enough to make you uncomforable, even a little disturbed. . . . They believed -- I watched them believe -- and the next step after believing is following.  To them, following meant doing whatever it took to make his wishes come true.

Again, this helps to explain why it was so difficult to obtain human intelligence on bin Laden, and hence why the strategic manhunt took thirteen years to successfully complete.

*From Billy Waugh, Hunting the Jackal, pp. 204-205.

Warrick's "The Triple Agent"

An interesting review of Washington Post reporter Joby Warrick's new book, "The Triple Agent," about the suicide bombing of the CIA's outpost near Khost, Afghanistan, that killed eight Agency employees.  The review is interesting for two reasons:

First, the Post (to its credit) allows the reviewer to say some really negative things about one of their own, i.e.

"Warrick’s account is . . . sometimes prone to the lazy phrase (“eye-popping,” “blowing off steam”), descriptive rather than reflective, anonymous in voice rather than textured and, notwithstanding the gutsy ending-first structure, undaring of prose. He has a skill with words but lacks a felicity with them, and he is not much interested in exploring the large moral questions his tale raises.
"He is also firmly establishmentarian. . . .  He also lapses now and then into stenographic journalism"

Second, although the reviewer may be critical of Warrick's prose, he praises Warrick on the book's substance, especially the depiction of the CIA's desperation to get a human source close to the al-Qa'ida senior leadership.  As I note in my book, one of the reasons it took so long to get bin Laden was the adulation he enjoyed throughout all levels of al-Qa'ida. 

Whereas Aguinaldo, Noriega, or Saddam's locations were ultimately revealed by a trusted subordinate, the CIA was unable to recruit a single asset with access to bin Laden’s inner circle despite several years of effort. As former senior U.S. counterterror official Roger Cressey told Peter Bergen, an al-Qa'ida operative betraying bin Laden would be like “a Catholic giving up the Pope.” Abdel Bari Atwan, editor of Al Quds al Arabi newspaper, similarly reflected: “I don’t believe they will surrender him. He’s adored by the people around him. For them, he is not a leader. He is everything. He’s the father; he’s the brother; he is a leader; he is the imam.”

This desperation led Agency officials to overlook several red flags that should have alerted them to the fact that Humam Khalil al-Balawi had returned to the jihadist fold and was feeding them false information, and ultimately to the loss of eight courageous Americans.

The Haqqani Network

A couple of good pieces about the Haqqani Network that highlight the group's affiliation with al-Qa'ida:

In the National Journal, Yochi J. Dreazen provides a good summary of the Haqqani Network's history and their relationship with Pakistani intelligence.  He also correctly notes the transfer of operational leadership from Jalaluddin Haqqani -- whom the United States was able to work with when he was an anti-Soviet mujaheddin in the 1980s -- to his son Sirajuddin, who is much closer to al-Qa'ida ideologically and much more ambitious and vicious in terms of target selection.  Consequently, the U.S. has offered $5 million for information leading to Sirajuddin's death or capture.

A bit more advanced analysis comes from West Point's Combating Terrorism Center, which analyzes jihadist magazines, old digital videos, and jihadist memoirs to conclude that since the 1980s, the Haqqani Network has provided sanctuary, training, propaganda support, and other resources for al-Qa'ida fighters.  The CTC concludes that "U.S. efforts to disrupt and degrade [al-Qa'ida] today . . . are just as much about dismantling [al-Qa'ida] as they are about degrading the Haqqani network."

How Do You Say "Asinine" in Spanish?

I guess it was inevitable that a Spanish lawyer would file charges against President Obama for the killing of Osama bin Laden with the Internatioanl Criminal Court, but it still doesn't make it any less ridiculous. 

It will be interesting, however, to see if these charges are treated with the same legitimacy in the U.S. media as were similar charges against Bush administration officials regarding Iraq, Guantanamo, etc.

Vaccination Ploy Criticized

As I noted yesterday, the CIA used a hepatitis vaccination campaign as a ploy to obtain DNA from members of Osama bin Laden's family in order to confirm his presence at the Abbottabad compound.

It only took a day for public health officials to jump into the fray and criticize the Agency for undermining anti-polio campaigns in the Muslim world, where apparently there is a rampant conspiracy theory that such programs are really fronts for a CIA sterilization campaign.

I guess the World Health Organization has a point, at least from their narrow vantage point.  But if you are really thinking of what is best for the children of Pakistan in the long-term, I'd say defeating the sort of extremism that propagates such medieval conspiratorial thinking in the first place should rank up there as well.  

Bin Laden and the 7/7 Bombings

Yesterday the Telegraph provided new details on Osama bin Laden's involvement in al-Qa'ida attacks during the last decade.  Once again, however, the ambiguity of the details leaves bin Laden's relevance (and, consequently, the strategic impact of his death) open to intrepretation.

On the one hand, the article quotes a U.S. official saying: "Bin Laden was absolutely a detail guy.  We have every reason to believe that he was aware of al-Qaeda's major plots during the planning phase."  The article goes on to say bin Laden was personally involved in plots against European targets last year, and that al-Qa'ida's "senior leadership" supervised Najibullah Zazi's 2009 plot to bomb the New York City subway system.

On the other hand, the article also notes the last successful attack was the July 7, 2005 London tube attacks.  All the subsequent plots emanating from "al-Qa'ida Central" were caught relatively early in the process.  Additionally, the Telegraph has previously reported that "it was unclear if anyone was listening to the missives he sent to senior commanders" and that at the end bin Laden no longer running al-Qa'ida. 

As I've noted before, history would suggest the latter interpretation is more likely correct, that by isolating our quarry and forcing him to concentrate more on his own survival than on future attacks, the United States rendered bin Laden strategically impotent.*  Consequently, the United States and its allies should concentrate on targeting the remainder of bin Laden's network.  But there likely won't be a true consensus on bin Laden's role within al-Qa'ida at the end until the Abbottabad documents see the light of day (hopefully not too soon, of course).

*This isn't to say that al-Qa'ida wasn't still dangerous during this time period, but rather that the limited attacks it could execute would not pose an existential threat to U.S. interests.

The Nation's Loose Lips?

Milblogger "Blackfive" catches The Nation publishing the location of the CIA's main operating base in Mogadishu, from which it presumably directs operations against al-Qa'ida affiliate Al Shabaab.

Some of the commenters suggest that this site was likely already known to Al Shabaab. Given that Mogadishu rises up from the waterfront where the airport is located, making the entire facility easily observable from the city (as Task Force Ranger discovered to its detriment in 1993), this is certainly possible. But the specifics that Jeremy Scahill provides arguably compromise the site's operational security to Al Shabaab's advantage.

Unfortunately, this is hardly the first time The Nation has aided (inadvertently or intentionally) an adversary of the United States. During the U.S. Marines' hunt for Augusto Sandino from 1927 to 1933, pro-Sandino committees in the United States, which included The Nation and the All American Anti-Imperialist League (a front group for the Soviet Comintern), collected funds ostensibly for medical supplies for the Sandinistas. Yet Marine pilots found they were being fired upon by new American munitions not yet issued to the Marines, suggesting somebody in the United States was supplying Sandino with better ammunition than the Marines were receiving.

CIA's OBL DNA Plot DOA

An interesting story from earlier in the week regarding a failed plot by the CIA to obtain samples of Osama bin Laden's DNA through a phony vaccination program in Abbottabad.  Although Shakil Afridi -- the Pakistani doctor used for the plot -- did gain access to bin Laden's compound claiming he was offering free vaccinations for Hepatitis B, he never saw the terrorist nor obtained the desired samples from his family.  Such samples would have generated greater certainty that bin Laden was at the compound prior to the May 1 raid.

Of course, this being Pakistan, it was subsequently reported that Dr. Afridi has since been arrested by Pakistani authorities.  Granted, it is difficult to imagine the United States being completely sanguine about an American doctor in say, Baltimore, revealed as an agent for a foreign intelligence service.  But Pakistan apparently is either oblivious or completely unconcerned about how such post-hoc actions appear to Americans who believe the Pakistanis were somehow complicit in bin Laden's Abbottabad sanctuary.

Meanwhile, in Pakistan . . .

Two stories from over the weekend worth noting. 

First, on Thursday (okay, not technically the weekend) the Wall Street Journal reported that the independent Pakistani commission investigating the Abbottabad raid has barred bin Laden's family from leaving the country.  Apparently, the Pakistani military is not happy about this, seeing their continued presence in the country as an embarrassment.  (The wives and their children will eventually be repatriated to their countries of origin, Saudi Arabia and Yemen). 

Also, new Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta visited Kabul on Saturday and said he believed that the new al-Qa'ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri was living in Pakistan's tribal areas.  Pakistan responded by urging the United States to share any actionable intelligence on Zawahiri so the Pakistani military could carry out targeted operations.

No, really.

Does anybody know how to say chutzpah in Dari?

Today in Manhunting History -- July 10, 1996: Bin Laden Declares War

After arriving in Afghanistan in May 1996 to receive protection from the Taliban, Osama bin Laden launched his holy war against the United States.  On July 10 The Independent published an interview of bin Laden by journalist Robert Fisk, in which the Saudi declared the world had reached “the beginning of war between Muslims and the United States.”

Today in Manhunting History -- July 9, 1993: The SNA Retaliates

Over the month following the unsuccessful June 17 attack on Aideed's compound in Mogadishu, the 1-22nd Infantry conducted several raids aimed at capturing the Somali warlord. Yet having been alerted that he was a wanted man, Aideed went underground. He reorganized his intelligence service, purging suspected double agents or using them to spread disinformation regarding his movements. He changed his location once or twice a night, masquerading as a sheikh, a woman, an old man, an Islamic mullah, or a hospital patient. He appeared on television, weary yet defiant, declaring: “I’m not concerned by the search being conducted now. They are trying to arrest me unjustly.”

As the tempo of the strategic manhunt intensified, Aideed and the SNA kept the military pressure up, increasing their sniping at UN forces. On July 2 Aideed’s men attacked an Italian checkpoint, killing three and wounding 24. Five days later six Somali UN employees died in an ambush. And on July 9, the SNA lobbed the first mortar rounds into the U.S. embassy compound that housed the American QRF.

"Joker" Bombs and the Dangers of Over Reliance on Technology

On Wednesday it was reported that terrorists may begin surgically implanting bombs inside militants bodies in order to evade airport detection devices.  And if you're thinking this sounds vaguely familiar, yes, this is straight out of the scene in The Dark Knight in which the Joker blows up the Gotham City police headquarters via a bomb implanted in an unwitting henchman.

Will Saletan of Slate writes a well-linked piece explaining why current scanner technology would be unable to detect these bombs, and that we are therefore vulnerable until we develop a technology capable of seeing completely through a person to detect any foreign object.

To me, this illustrates a point in my book, which is that we are over reliant on technology in our counterterrorism efforts.  I don't mean to imply that technology plays no role in manhunting, only that satellites and eavesdropping technology can not locate every terrorist, and work best when supplementing human intelligence.  Similarly, passive defensive technologies are most effective when backing up well-trained security personnel that possess good judgment. 

It is telling that Saletan never even considers this human dimension (in his telling, humans are automatons that only act when the scanners tell them to), or the fact that certain types of profiling (shhhh!) . . . i.e. past travel itineraries, age groups, physical "tells" . . . can be effective where technology fails.  But because of our reliance on technology (okay, and probably political correctness) Saletan never discusses these as possibly effective methods for ferreting out terrorists carrying surgically implanted bombs. 

If we conducted offensive counterterrorism in a similar manner (i.e. only targeted terrorists positively identified by satellite before striking), Osama bin Laden and countless other bad guys would still be alive.

The First Review!!!

From Kirkus Reviews (subscription required), which along with Publishers' Weekly and Library Journal is one of the three key trade publications of the publishing industry:

WANTED DEAD OR ALIVE (reviewed on July 1, 2011) The recent demise of Osama bin Laden serves as an appropriate coda for former Defense Department and National Security Council staffer Runkle's (co-author: Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority, 2009, etc.) history of the manhunt in American military strategy.With the bin Laden hunts, the author downplays what Clinton and his administration tried to do from 1997 to ’98, while providing Bush I's team with the benefit of the doubt—e.g., in bin Laden's escape from Tora-Bora in 1991. His preferences are understandable, however, as he demonstrates how such partisanship has been an included feature of countless manhunts, often with military consequences. At the end of the Indian Wars, with one quarter of the U.S. Army in the hunt, Grover Cleveland had a personal interest in bringing the “monster” Geronimo to account. In the Philippines at the turn of the century, the fate of the “demonized” Emilio Aguinaldo was affected by the 1900 election between William Jennings Bryan and William McKinley. Intervening in Mexico's civil war prior to World War I to hunt for Pancho Villa, President Wilson found he could not withdraw without giving the Republicans an issue in the 1916 elections. Militarily, Runkle's 12 manhunts illustrate key features of counterinsurgency or asymmetrical warfare strategy, and indicate how America's military leadership, and its thinking, has been shaped through the succession of such hunts and campaigns. The author provides a focus on the necessity of what Colin Powell called creating “a flesh and blood villain” to crystallize political support.Going behind the headlines, Runkle provides worthwhile background and context for understanding current wars and how they are fought.

It is interesting to see some basic things they get wrong, but since it is an overall positive review, I won't quibble.

"The Man Who Hunted Osama bin Laden"

A great piece today by AP writers Adam Goldman and Matt Apuzzo on the unnamed CIA analyst who led the hunt for Osama bin Laden.  The article illustrates just how much uncertainty there was in identifying the Abbottabad compound as bin Laden's hideout, what a significant risk the Agency took in presenting this to the White House as such, and yes, the guts it took for President Obama to order the raid that killed the Saudi mastermind. 

It also illustrates the importance of perseverance in manhunting.  Excluding the hunt for bin Laden, which at 13 years was an obvious outlier, the average successful strategic manhunt lasts 18 months.  According to Goldman and Apuzzo, it took three years from the decision to focus on Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti before he turned up on a National Security Agency wiretap.  Again, only the four-year pursuit of Pablo Escobar lasted longer than the lag in waiting for a lead in the bin Laden hunt.

It is a pity -- albeit an understandable one -- that a hero such as "John" should remain anonymous for the rest of his life.

Today in Manhunting History -- July 2, 1927: "The Sandino Affair" Begins

Initially, U.S. officials did not perceive Sandino to be a significant threat. Sandino had not attempted to stop the occupation of Jinotega, San Rafael, and Ocotal as the Marines restored civil government throughout Nicaragua. Combined with his requests for an American military governor, U.S. officials believed persuasion could still work on Sandino. Even if persuasion failed, General Feland viewed Sandino’s band as only one of several groups of “bandits operating near the Honduran border, none of which were seen as a substantial barrier to peace and the elections of 1928. Moreover, since Tititapa, desertions had left Sandino with less than 30 men under arms, and Feland was confident the rebel’s force would eventually disintegrate altogether

On May 31, 50 Marines under Major Harold Pierce left Managua to establish control over Nueva Segovia and to “peaceably disarm everybody.” Yet there was no desire “to make heroes out of a copule of cattle thieves by chasing them through the jungles with a squad of Marines.” Thus, Feland instructed Pierce to “secure information that will facilitate the coming supervision of elections, but do not fire a shot inless imperatively necessary; and conciliate with firmness, tranquilize without force of arms, avoid combat.” There were no immediate plans for military action against Sandino, and even Captain Hatfield confined his garrison’s activities to disarming cooperative Nicaraguans and collecting information on Sandino.

U.S. Marine Corps Brigadier General Logan Feland and staff in 1928

During this period of Marine restraint, however, Sandino began plundering mines and kidnapping Europeans for ransom, attracting new recruits in the process. On June 30 word came to Managua that Sandino had seized his old workplace, the American-owned San Albino gold mine. On July 2 Rear Admiral Julian Latimer – commander of the Special Service Squadron in Nicaragua – ordered General Feland to commence operations to disarm Sandino as soon as possible. Feland subsequently detailed Major Oliver Floyd to command a force of 75 Marines and 150 Nicaraguan volunteers with the mission of disarming Sandino.

Today in Manhunting History -- July 1, 2004: Zarqawi's Bounty

U.S. commanders began to focus intently on hunting Abu Musab al-Zarqawi after the March 2004 massacre of an estimated 185 Shi’a pilgrims celebrating the Ashura festival in Karbala and Baghdad. During the abortive offensive on Fallujah the next month, Task Force 121 operators (who four months earlier had pulled the fugitive Saddam Hussein from his spiderhole) approached Marine commanders for help to insert “certain devices” in a house near city hall that would aid the search for the Jordanian. The mission was scrubbed, however, for fear that inserting such a small force into the middle of hostile territory in an urban battlefield would lead to a reprise of Mogadishu.

Consequently, early attempts to apprehend Zarqawi were dependent upon a decidedly unsupportive local population. When the CIA determined the torture studio in which Zarqawi murdered Nicholas Berg was located in Fallujah’s Jolan District, Major General James Mattis proposed joint U.S.-Iraqi patrols in Jolan to pursue Zarqawi. But the ineffectual commander of the “Fallujah Brigade” declined. In June, U.S. aircraft began dropping pamphlets over Fallujah urging residents to turn in Zarqawi, who had a $10 million bounty on his head. But this effort also produced no tangible results.

U.S. forces began kinetic action against Zarqawi’s network in Fallujah through the only means available to them, killing 18 Iraqis in an airstrike against a suspected safe house on June 19.  On July 1 the reward for Zarqawi’s capture was raised to $25 million, the same amount as bin Laden.

Zarqawi's wanted poster before the bounty was raised to $25 million.

In Other News . . .

As I head out for the Fourth of July weekend (and hopefully spend time away from the computer), some brief Osama bin Laden/al-Qa'ida related stories from the past week that caught my eye:

- Intelligence recovered from Abbottabad reveals bin Laden considered changing al-Qa'ida's name in order to rebrand it in the Muslim world;

- A rumor that SEAL Team Six wore night vision contact lenses on the Abbottabad raid.  (Question: Would such lens be subject to wash out like regular NVGs, and if so, wouldn't this make such lens a bad idea?); and finally

- PETA has apparently asked Pakistani President Asif Ali Zadari if they can decorate the walls of bin Laden's Abbottabad compound with animal rights slogans.  No, really.

Have a happy and safe holiday weekend!