Is Al Qaeda Finished?

There have been a slew of articles over the last few weeks (all of which I've been negligent in commenting on, as I've been swamped and traveling for the day job) quoting Obama administration officials who suggest we are on the brink of defeating al-Qa'ida.  Several weeks ago, while visiting troops in Afghanistan, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta declared that “we’re within reach of strategically defeating al-Qaeda," and yesterday former general and current Deputy National Security Adviser for Afghanistan/Pakistan Douglas E. Lute said the United States has six months to "knock out" al-Qa'ida's leadership while it is in disarray following Osama bin Laden's killing.

It is significant that both policymakers and intelligence community officials are even broaching this topic, but there are two important caveats to consider.  First, nobody is suggesting that bin Laden's death alone represents the strategic defeat of al-Qa'ida.  Instead, most officials place greater if not equal emphasis on the sustained decapitation campaign via drone strikes against al-Qa'ida's senior leadership, largely in Pakistan.  This is consistent with my finding in "Wanted Dead or Alive" that killing/capturing the individual targeted by a strategic manhunt is not as important as eliminating the support network that made him strategically effective in the first place.  Thus, although killing bin Laden may have been necessary -- if for no other reason than to shatter his mythology -- by itself it was not sufficient to defeat al-Qa'ida.  However, the drone strikes that as of 2010 had killed 9 out of 20 of the terrorist organization's leaders (this number is higher by at least one now, but is currently highly classified) have the same devastating effect that capturing Filipino insurgent generals or Pancho Villa's deputies did more than a century ago.

Second, it is critical to distinguish between "AQSL" (al-Qa'ida senior leadership) and al-Qa'ida.  AQSL is the leadership core that created the terror network and led it to the height of its threat on September 11, 2001.  This core was dispersed beginning with the October 2001 bombing campaign/invasion of Afghanistan, and has been on the run ever since, its strategic effectiveness diminishing over the course of the decade as an increasing number of its leaders were killed.  Yet while this cohort may be on the verge of defeat,  al-Qa'ida writ large is far from finished, as the affiliates assume greater capability and autonomy.  As the head of the National Counter Terrorism Center Michael Leiter told the House Homeland Security Committee in February, Al Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and its charismatic spiritual leader Anwar al-Awlaki are "probably the most significant risk to the U.S. homeland."  Thus, even if we are successful in devastating AQSL in Pakistan during the rest of the year, the terrorist threat against the United States will still be significant.  In other words, although bin Laden may be dead, "bin Ladenism" will live on for the foreseeable future.