Today in Manhunting History -- August 30, 1993: The Raid on Lig Ligato House

At three AM, August 30, 1993, a dozen blacked-out helicopters rose from the tarmac at Mogadishu Airport, formed up, and then clattered over to the target, the nearby Lig Ligato house of Via Lenin. The birds pulled up one by one, hovering in loose formation above and around the sleeping compound before commandos swathed in black fast-roped down to the ground. While Ranger security team sealed off the objective, Delta operators stormed the house and plasticuffed all eight occupants. They did not find Muhammad Fara Aideed, as hoped, but discovered cash, khat, and evidence of a black-market operation. It was a textbook lightning strike.

When the Task Force returned from the mission, before they had even finished shedding their gear, they were astonished to see themselves on CNN in footage shot from afar with an infrared camera. It turned out the house was a part of the UN Development Program, and their plasticuffed prisoners were members of the UN mission and their Somali assistants. Subsequent newspaper reports portrayed the Task Force as Keystone Cops. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell recalled that he was so angry that "I had to screw myself off the ceiling," and MG Garrison reportedly received a brutal tongue-lashing from CENTCOM Commander General Joseph Hoar.

Today in Manhunting History -- July 9, 1993: The SNA Strikes Back

Over the month following the unsuccessful June 17 attack on Aideed's compound in Mogadishu, the 1-22nd Infantry conducted several raids aimed at capturing the Somali warlord. Yet having been alerted that he was a wanted man, Aideed went underground. He reorganized his intelligence service, purging suspected double agents or using them to spread disinformation regarding his movements. He changed his location once or twice a night, masquerading as a sheikh, a woman, an old man, an Islamic mullah, or a hospital patient. He appeared on television, weary yet defiant, declaring: “I’m not concerned by the search being conducted now. They are trying to arrest me unjustly.”

As the tempo of the strategic manhunt intensified, Aideed and the SNA kept the military pressure up, increasing their sniping at UN forces. On July 2 Aideed’s men attacked an Italian checkpoint, killing three and wounding 24. Five days later six Somali UN employees died in an ambush. And on July 9, the SNA lobbed the first mortar rounds into the U.S. embassy compound that housed the American QRF.

Today in Manhunting History -- December 2, 1993: Aideed Flies, Escobar Dies

Following the Battle of the Black Sea made famous by the book and movie Black Hawk Down, President Bill Clinton convened an emergency policy review with the vice president, key cabinet members, and senior civilian and military staff. The next day, Clinton announced a new policy in which the United States would increase its military presence in Somalia by over 5,000 troops until March 31, when all U.S. troops would be withdrawn. He personally ordered CENTCOM Commander General Joseph Hoar to halt any further action by U.S. forces against Aideed. The United Nations Security Council subsequently adopted Resolution 885, which suspended the call for Aideed’s arrest and established an international commission to investigate June 5 attacks that precipitated the hunt for the Somali warlord. Aideed seemed content to wait for the Americans to leave, and refrained from any large-scale violence against the bolstered forces. Simultaneously, the White House began referring to him as “a clan leader with a substantial constituency in Somalia.”

The ultimate symbol of Aideed’s rehabilitation was his flight to peace talks in Ethiopia in early December. He refused to travel on a UN plane, but accepted an offer to use an American transport. On December 2, 1993, Marines escorted the warlord to the plane in full view of U.S. troops at the Mogadishu airport. The spectacle caused “anger and disappointment throughout the ranks,” and the morale of U.S. forces plummeted.

Muhammed Farah Aideed, target of the failed 1993 strategic manhunt.


Halfway around the world, another target of a U.S. strategic manhunt was not faring as well.

In September 1989, at the request of the Colombian government, the Bush administration deployed a top-secret Army intelligence unit, Centra Spike, which specialized in locating individuals. Their target was the man listed by Forbes magazine as the seventh richest man in the world – Pablo Escobar, the vicious kingpin of the Medellin Cartel. From January 1990 to July 1991, the intelligence produced by Centra Spike led to significant blows to Escobar’s cocaine empire, but always barely missed out on capturing him due to the corruption or incompetence of the pursuing Colombian forces.

In July 1992, following Escobar’s escape from La Catederal prison, elements of the Delta Force under Colonel Jerry Boykin were deployed to assist the Colombian police’s “Search Bloc.” U.S. and Colombian forces unsuccessfully pursued Escobar for the next 16 months despite access to an array of technical assets that dwarfed anything used in previous strategic manhunts: airborne triangulation sensors; microwave imagery platforms; Air Force RC-135s, U-2s, and SR-71s; and Navy P-3 spy planes. On December 2, 1993, in a middle-class neighborhood in Medellin, the son of the Search Bloc’s commander spied Escobar through the window of a row house after a failed raid in a nearby location. A firefight with Escobar and his bodyguard, Alvaro de Jesús Agudelo ensued. As Escobar and Agudelo The two fugitives attempted to escape by running across the roofs of adjoining houses to reach a back street, but both were shot and killed by Colombian National Police.

Colombian Police posing with the body of Medellin Cartel kingpin Pablo Escobar, killed as a result of a U.S. strategic manhunt from 1989-1993.

Today in Manhunting History -- October 4, 1993: The Battle of the Black Sea, Part II

At 1:55AM, October 4, the relief convoy finally reached Task Force Ranger’s perimeter. The combined force waited almost three hours while Wolcott’s body was extracted from Super 61. Seeing the preparations for withdrawal, the Somalis increased their fire and committed their last reserves. Finally, the combined force was able to depart the crash site at 0537. Because there were so many non-ambulatory wounded, there was not enough room in the vehicles for all the soldiers. Some of the corpses were placed atop the Malaysian APCs, a morbid spectacle given that “some bodies were missing pieces and others did not resemble a cadaver.” The nervous Malaysian drivers took off, leaving the Rangers and Delta operators who had been fighting 14 hours straight behind, and forcing them to run through the same streets they had already fought through before in what became known in Ranger lore as “The Mogadishu Mile.” Eventually they overtook and stopped a Pakistani M-113. By 6:20AM all personnel were loaded and movement continued until they reached the safety of the Pakistani perimeter at the stadium.

Overall, it was an impressive feat. Task Force Ranger had raided into the heart of the adversary’s stronghold in broad daylight and seized 24 prisoners, including the two “Tier One” leaders they were after. The cost had been steep: 18 Americans dead, one missing, and 84 wounded. But the Somalis had clearly fared worse, suffering an estimated 500-1,000 fatalities. In the mind of at least one Delta operator, “they’d just fought one of the most one-sided battles in American history.”

Aideed later said he had been just to the east of the target house at the time of the raid. Within 20 minutes the SNA had sealed the roads and the warlord was moved to a safer location. Yet even if he personally escaped harm, the “Battle of the Black Sea” had cost the warlord dearly. Many families aligned with him had suffered casualties, and local spies reported some of Aideed’s strongest clan allies had fled Mogadishu fearing the seemingly inevitable American retribution. Others were sending peace feelers, offering to dump Aideed to avoid further bloodshed. The SNA’s arsenal of RPGs were depleted, and both General Garrison and Howe believed Aideed had been struck a mortal blow. Consequently, they pressed their U.S. and UN superiors to take the initiative and finish the job.

The perception in Washington, however, was shaped by the vivid television images of dead and naked bodies of U.S. soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. President Clinton was in a hotel room in San Francisco when he saw the horrifying pictures. Angered, he asked his staff “How could this happen?” even though the raid was the direct result of his policy decisions. Many in Congress demanded an immediate withdrawal from Somalia, and as was the case with the Sandino manhunt 60 years prior, the outrage over U.S. casualties caused the White House to throw in the towel.

To many Americans, this was the lasting image of the October 3-4 battle, as well as of the broader hunt for Mohammed Farah Aideed.

Today in Manhunting History -- October 3, 1993: The Battle of the Black Sea

On Sunday, October 3, 1993, Mohammed Farah Aideed’s top political advisor, Omar Salad, was the featured speaker at the weekly Habr Gidr rally on Via Lenin. When the rally broke up, his white Toyota Land Cruiser was tracked by Task Force Ranger air assets as it drove north toward the Bakara Market. Salad was observed entering a house one block north of the Olympic Hotel. Later, at 1:30PM the CIA station chief brought a Somali to the JOC. The Somali’s name had appeared on a list of wanted men Task Force Ranger had published after capturing Aideed's financier, Osman Ato. “My name shouldn’t have been on that list,” the Somali complained, and offered to reveal the location of a secret meeting between Salad, Abdi Awale, and many of Aideed’s lieutenants if his name were removed. Although nobody had actually seen him, the presence of so many Somali National Alliance (SNA) officials raised hopes Aideed might attend as well.

Bakara Market lay in the heart of an area Task Force Ranger called “the Black Sea,” a labyrinth of narrow alleys and walkways that was a SNA stronghold. The Olympic Hotel served as a virtual headquarters for the Habr Gidr militia, and MG William Garrison had once told his officers: “I will not send you in [the Barkara area] unless it is a lucrative target. I know if I send you guys in we’ll get in a gunfight.” When informed of the Task Force’s mission just minutes before it was launched, an astonished MG Thomas Montgomery (Deputy Commander of UNOSOM II) called Garrison. “Bill,” Montgomery said, “that’s really Indian country. That’s a bad place.” Although U.S. policy was to not even drive through Bakara Market, the chance of netting two “Tier One” targets was too good to resist.

Shortly after 3PM the CIA’s source marked the target for U.S. overhead sensors by stopping his car outside and raising the hood. The squared off, three-story building with whitewashed cinder block walls and windows with no glass that the source identified was the same house U.S. surveillance had watched Omar Salad enter earlier in the day. With their tip confirmed, Task Force Ranger went from briefing to mission launch in less than an hour. At 3:32PM, 14 helicopters from the 160th SOAR took off from Mogadishu airport. Three minutes later, a ground convoy of three five-ton trucks and nine Humvees moved out. In all, the mission on October 3 involved 160 men, 19 aircraft, and 12 vehicles.

At 3:40PM two Little Birds gave a final visual reconnaissance of the target building. They were immediately followed by four MH-6s, each carrying a four-man Delta team perched on the benches attached to each side of the helicopters. The Task Force swept in from the north, the beating blades of the rotors stirring up great clouds of orange dust. As the MH-6s settled on the street, the operators leapt from the skids and dashed into the building, while Rangers fast-roped from four Black Hawks to establish their security perimeter and blocking positions around the objective. The Delta operators, clad in black body armor, swept through the rooms, bellowing orders, and corralling the stunned Somalis together. Within 20 minutes they had secured 24 prisoners – including Salad and Awale – marching them out with their hands flex-cuffed behind their backs.

Other than a Ranger who had been critically injured due to a fall while fast-roping, the mission was going like clockwork. The raiders radioed “Laurie,” the brevity code for success, back to the JOC. At 4PM the ground convoy commanded by LTC Danny McKnight – a veteran of the Ranger’s jump into Rio Hato during the Noriega manhunt – headed toward the secured objective. As the vehicles arrived at the target building, both Delta and the Rangers pulling security on the perimeter were beginning to draw increasingly heavy fire. The passing bullets “made a loud snap, like cracking a stick of dry hickory.” The volume of fire built steadily as thousands of people grabbed weapons and poured into the streets. Garrison and the officers watching the mission from the JOC could see them racing from all directions toward the Bakara Market, as if the raiders “had poked a stick into a hornet’s nest.”

The Somalis began firing RPGs, and the Delta ground commander called the command-and-control helicopter overhead. “Hey, boss, I think we’ve got the guys you sent in for,” he told LTC Gary Harrell, the C Squadron commander. “We’re ready to get out of Dodge.”

But almost immediately another radio call grabbed the attention of those listening.




Danny McKnight, commander of Task Force Ranger's ground element on October 3, 1993


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Chief Warrant Officer (CWO) Cliff Wolcott had earned the nickname “Elvis” from his buddies in the 160th both for his unflappable cool and his uncanny impression of the “King of Rock and Roll.” On January 3, 1990, when Manuel Noriega surrendered, it was Wolcott who piloted the Black Hawk carrying the deposed strongman from the Papal Nunicature to Howard Air Force Base. On October 3, 1993, after disgorging his chalk of Rangers at 3:45PM, his Black Hawk, Super Six One, provided fire support to the Rangers on the perimeter using its sniper team to disperse the growing crowd. At 4:15PM, however, his voice broke through the radio clutter, calmly saying: “Six-One is going down.” Wolcott’s Black Hawk had been hit by a RPG-7 grenade, and dropped like a stone 300 yards east of the target building. The two crew chiefs and three Delta snipers survived, albeit badly injured, but the two pilots were killed on impact.

The Somalis had gotten Task Force Ranger’s “Elvis” before the Americans could get theirs’.

CWO Cliff "Elvis" Wolcott: The pilot who took Manuel Noriega into U.S. custody in 1990, but whose shoot down over Mogadishu on October 3, 1993, precipitated the "Black Hawk Down" battle

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General Garrison had anticipated the loss of a helicopter, and with his planners had drafted three contingency plans:

· Insert 15 soldiers from a combat-search-and-rescue (CSAR) Black Hawk circling nearby;

· Alert the 10th Mountain’s Quick Reaction Force(QRF); and

· Move the main body of Task Force Ranger from the target building to the crash site to provide more firepower.

Garrison executed all three contingencies almost simultaneously.

McKnight ordered the raiders to split up, and Delta operators and two chalks of Rangers dashed to the crash site through the narrow streets and alleyways against a growing barrage of gunfire emanating from seemingly every doorway, alley, and window. They reached Super 61 at 4:28PM, just moments ahead of the onrushing mob of armed Somalis and established a perimeter round the wreckage. At the same time, the lone CSAR helicopter – “Super 68” – moved over the downed Black Hawk to insert its medics and Ranger security team. As the last two men of the CSAR team fast-roped down, Super 68 was hit by an RPG. The helicopter was badly damaged, but managed to limp back to base.

Garrison directed McKnight to move the convoy – with the prisoners and initial wave of Task Force wounded aboard the trucks – to reinforce the perimeter around Super 61. As the trucks bounded east, every building spat tracers and RPGs. McKnight’s lead Humvee – disoriented by dust, smoke, and roadblocks – quickly got last in Mogadishu’s maze of constricted, unfamiliar streets. As “scattered small arms fire . . . became a metal storm,” the convoy went in circles, twice passing near the crash site but unable to link up with the detachment defending it. Of the 65 men who started from the original objective an hour earlier, nearly half – including McKnight – were wounded. There were now more casualties in the convoy than there were at the crash site. When the procession of shot-up vehicles passed the Olympic Hotel a second time at 5:15PM, Garrison ordered McKnight to get his precious cargo of prisoners back to the headquarters at the airport. For if the SNA leaders were not evacuated, the raid would certainly be a failure. Even then, the convoy had to fight its way back to the airport, suffering still more casualties before it made it back to base.

While McKnight was enduring the abattoir, a second Black Hawk –Super 64 – took an RPG through its tail and crashed about two miles south of the target building. As there was no pre-existing plan to react to a second downed aircraft, Garrison and his staff tried several desperate courses of action, each unsuccessful. First, at about 5:03PM, an improvised QRF of 27 Rangers was dispatched from the airport to the second crash site. But this small force was quickly ambushed and pinned down at the K-4 traffic circle. A half-hour later, Charlie Company from the 10th Mountain’s QRF left the airfield, but within 10 minutes was ambushed. Fighting for their lives, 100 U.S. soldiers fired nearly 60,000 rounds of ammunition and hundreds of grenades in 30 minutes before being forced to retreat.

Another Black Hawk, Super 62, made a low pass over Super 64 and could see that pilot CWO Mike Durant, his co-pilot, and two crew chiefs had survived the crash, but were badly injured. They also saw what seemed to be thousands of armed, angry Somalis massing and moving towards the crash site. Knowing the horrific fate of those who fell into the clutches of Somali mobs, two Delta snipers on board Super 62 volunteered to try to save Super 64’s survivors. LTC Harrell rejected Master Sergeant Gary Gordon and Sergeant First Class Randall Shugart’s request twice, but after learning of the QRF ambushes, approved their third request for insertion.

Super 62 dropped the snipers off 100 meters from the crash site in a deserted, garbage-strewn alley. When word was passed to the operators that it was time to jump, Gordon grinned and – despite the near hopelessness of their task – gave an excited thumbs-up. As they moved towards Super 64 and saw the hundreds of Somalis surging towards the wreckage, they must have known they would not survive. Super 62 hovered above the wreckage and pointed down – using its rotors to create a wind to blast back the mob – long enough for Gordon and Shugart to reach the downed bird. An RPG slammed through 62’s cockpit, knocking the co-pilot unconscious and ripping the leg off the door gunner. Super 62’s co-pilot, CWO Michael Goffena, could not make it back to the airfield but managed a crash landing in the secure area near Mogadishu’s port.

At the crash site, the operators freed the crew from Super 64’s wreckage. For a few minutes they held their own, methodically firing round after round in aimed fire at the onrushing crowd. But with the helicopters gone and their ammunition running low, the tide of Somalis pressed closer. Durant heard Gordon cry out as he was fatally wounded on the other side of the wreckage. Shugart brought the immobilized pilot Gordon’s rifle and handed the weapon to Durant.

“Good luck,” he said, and then returned to battle the Somalis who were now within 30 feet. Shugart defended the crash site with his pistol until he too went down and Super 64 was overrun. Gordon and Shugart’s heroism bought enough time for SNA leaders to gain control of the mob before it finished off Durant. Durant was taken prisoner, while laughing Somalis desecrated the bodies of the other Americans. For their sacrifice, Gordon and Shugart were awarded the first Medals of Honor since the Vietnam War.




SFC Randall Shugart and MSG Gary Gordon: American Heroes


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The roughly 90 soldiers defending Super 61 took shelter in four houses near the downed helicopter. The troops termed the three city blocks around the wreckage “The Alamo,” a fitting name given that their survival was uncertain. More armed Somalis were arriving, and ammunition was running dangerously low. AK-47 bullets flew overhead with a loud pop, punctuated by the ominous SWOOSH of RPGs exploding every five or ten minutes. Even if they had been willing to abandon the bodies trapped in the helicopter, seven of every ten soldiers had been wounded, many of whom were unable to walk, thereby making it impossible for the raiders to fight their way out on foot. Consequently, the Rangers and Delta operators hunkered down for the night.

Even though it risked making a bad situation worse, at about 7PM General Garrison ordered a helicopter to resupply the besieged troops. As soon as the Black Hawk roared in and began hovering above the crash site, Somali gunfire and RPGs erupted from every direction. Two Delta operators kicked out water, ammunition, and IV bags, as the pilots held steady until the resupply was complete. Then, shot full of holes and leaking fluid, the helicopter returned to base, unable to fly again. The Little Birds, which were capable of firing thousands of rounds per minute, made running and diving fire attacks against Somali groups throughout the night. Like Major Rusty Rowell at Ocotal 66 year earlier, the repeated sorties by the 160th’s AH-6 pilots probably saved the besieged Americans from being overrun.

****************************************************

Another relief force was organized, consisting of a platoon of four Pakistani M485 tanks; two companies of 28 Malaysian Condor armored personnel carriers (APCs) and four command APCs; most of the Rangers, and all the Delta operators, SEALs, and air force combat controllers still at the airfield; Alpha and Charlie Company of 2-14th Infantry, and a platoon from Charlie Company, 1-87th Infantry. About 500 men strong, the convoy included nearly 100 vehicles and stretched almost two miles long. At 11:15PM the convoy departed from the port into the pitch black city and fought its way to the surrounded Rangers and Delta operators, who could hear the rumble of its engines and thunderclap of its guns from miles away, steadily edging closer. At 1:55AM, October 4, the relief convoy finally reached Task Force Ranger’s perimeter. The dash through the Somali gauntlet resulted in three 10th Mountain soldiers killed and more than 30 wounded.

TOMORROW:  The "Mogadishu Mile" and the battle's aftermath.

Today in Manhunting History -- August 27, 1993: Task Force Ranger Arrives

On August 27, six massive C-5B Galaxy jet transports arrived at Mogadishu airport. The men that stepped off these planes comprised the “best of the best, the very sharp tip of the spear” of American military might. The Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) included 130 operators from Delta’s Squadron C; Bravo Company, 3-75th Ranger Regiment; and 16 helicopters from 1st Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR), the legendary “Night Stalkers.” These elite warriors would be led by the JSOC deployable headquarters element under MG Garrison, “the picture of American military machismo” with a 9-mm Baretta strapped to his chest and a half-lit cigar perpetually jutting out of a corner of his mouth.

With orders to capture Aideed, Garrison divided “Operation Gothic Serpent” – as the mission was designated – into three phases. The first phase was the deployment of the Task Force and making it operational. Phase Two would concentrate exclusively on locating and capturing Aideed. If this objective appeared futile, then Garrison would initiate Phase Three, which would target the warlord’s command structure and force Aideed in to the open in order to control his forces.

Garrison believed the key to capturing Aideed was “current actionable intelligence” provided by human intelligence (HUMINT). Yet when Garrison checked the local intelligence trail upon arrival, there were no leads. The Intelligence Support Activity (Delta’s special intelligence cell) and the CIA had lost track of the warlord, who had not been seen since July. Moreover, within days of Task Force Ranger’s arrival, the top Somali CIA informant was mortally wounded in a game of Russian Roulette. The original plan had called for the spy – a minor warlord loosely affiliated with Aideed – to present the SNA chief with an elegant hand-carved cane with a homing beacon embedded in the head. The plan seemed foolproof, until Lieutenant Colonel Danny McKnight – commander of the 3-75th Ranger battalion and Task Force Ranger’s intelligence chief – burst into Garrison’s headquarters at the Mogadishu airport on their first day and exclaimed: “Main source shot in the head. He’s not dead yet, but we’re fucked!”

Garrison responded philosophically, quoting the opening lines of Ulysses S. Grant’s memoir: Man proposes and God disposes.


Bravo Company, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment in Somalia



Today in Manhunting History -- August 23, 1993: Major General Garrison Arrives

August 23, 1993, was an overcast day when the plane touched down at Mogadishu Airport. Yet when the U.S. Army officers stepped off the chartered Boeing 737, they were greeted by a blast of intense humidity. The air was filled with the suffocating stench of burning garbage, rotting ocean waste, and the sweat of the more than one million souls who dwelled in the Somali capital. Decrepit Soviet transport aircraft left from the 1960s sat rusting on the tarmac. Sloping upward beyond the airport’s perimeter, the officers could see Mogadishu devastated “like Stalingrad after the battle.” The city’s streets were cratered and strewn with debris, its buildings were either bullet-ridden or collapsed.

Among the officers disembarking was a tall, muscular lieutenant colonel (LTC) with a gray crew cut wearing desert fatigues. To the casual observer, he was just another replacement officer for the U.S. Forces Somalia staff. Yet in reality, Major General (MG) William F. Garrison was America’s most accomplished commando. A veteran Green Beret with two tours in Vietnam – including participation in the Phoenix program – Garrison had run covert operations all over the world for 25 years, including a four-year stint as commander of the Delta Force.  He was the youngest man in U.S. Army history to hold the ranks of Colonel, Brigadier General, and Major General.  Now leading the Joint Special Operations Command, Garrison was travelling incognito in hopes of surprising the man he had been sent half way around the world to capture: the Somali warlord General Mohammed Farrah Aideed.

Major General William Garrison*

*(Note: It is surprisingly difficult to find good pictures of Major General Garrison in uniform, so much so that I was tempted to post a photo of Sam Sheppard portraying Garrison in "Black Hawk Down," just because he looked the part so well.  But this is the inevitable result of Garrison spending the overwhelming majority of his career in covert ops, I suppose).

Today in Manhunting History -- August 22, 1993: The Deployment of Task Force Ranger

On August 19 and 22, IEDs implanted by Muhammed Farah Aideed's Somali National Alliance wounded 10 more soldiers.  This time Jonathan Howe’s pleas finally won out, and while vacationing on Martha’s Vineyard, President Clinton agreed to deploy what would become known as “Task Force Ranger.”

Today in Manhunting History -- August 8, 1993: Enter the IEDs

In response to the UNOSOM II attacks on Mohammed Farah Aideed, his Somali National Alliance escalated the violence against the international peacekeepers. On August 8, four American military policemen were killed when their Humvee was destroyed by a remotely detonated antitank mine similar to the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that became ubiquitous in Iraq and Afghanistan a decade later. Again, Jonathan Howe asked for a strike team to snatch Aideed. Although Howe had stridently opposed a similar operation against Noriega during the Reagan administration, his obsession led one aide of Defense Secretary Les Aspin to observe Howe had “adopted Aideed as his Great White Whale,” and Howe’s nickname in Washington became “Jonathan Ahab.” Again, CENTCOM commander General Joseph Hoar did not endorse Howe’s request for Delta Force, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell also expressed reservations regarding the aggressive pursuit of the SNA.

The remains of the Humvee destroyed by the Somali mine, which killed Sgt. Ronald N. Richerson, Sgt. Christopher K. Hilgert, Spec. Keith D. Pearson, and Spec. Mark E. Gutting.

Today in Manhunting History -- July 9, 1993: The SNA Retaliates

Over the month following the unsuccessful June 17 attack on Aideed's compound in Mogadishu, the 1-22nd Infantry conducted several raids aimed at capturing the Somali warlord. Yet having been alerted that he was a wanted man, Aideed went underground. He reorganized his intelligence service, purging suspected double agents or using them to spread disinformation regarding his movements. He changed his location once or twice a night, masquerading as a sheikh, a woman, an old man, an Islamic mullah, or a hospital patient. He appeared on television, weary yet defiant, declaring: “I’m not concerned by the search being conducted now. They are trying to arrest me unjustly.”

As the tempo of the strategic manhunt intensified, Aideed and the SNA kept the military pressure up, increasing their sniping at UN forces. On July 2 Aideed’s men attacked an Italian checkpoint, killing three and wounding 24. Five days later six Somali UN employees died in an ambush. And on July 9, the SNA lobbed the first mortar rounds into the U.S. embassy compound that housed the American QRF.

Today in Manhunting History -- June 17, 1993: The Raid on Aideed's Compound

After the AC-130 attacks from June 12-14, Mogadishu was quiet on June 15 and 16. But at 1:30AM on June 17, AC-130s began striking weapons storage sites and knocking out selected roadblocks in southern Mogadishu. The PSYOPS teams’ speakers warned anyone around Aideed’s compound to drop their weapons, raise their arms, and walk to the main road. “Evacuate immediately, these buildings will be destroyed in 10 minutes . . . You have five minutes to evacuate immediately, immediately . . .” This announcement was followed by warning shots from a 40mm cannon. Approximately 30-40 people left Aideed’s compound before 105mm guns fired at targets in the area of the warlord’s house.

Aideed was finally being directly targeted.

At 4AM hundreds of Pakistani, Moroccan, Italian, and French troops lined up for the ground assault, supported by U.S. liaison officers and American attack helicopters. A tight cordon was in place by 5:45AM, and two Pakistani infantry battalions kicked in the gates and assaulted the housing complexes of Aideed, Ato, and Jess. The international forces conducted a house-to-house search of Aideed’s compound. Although reporters later found the pink earplugs he used to block the previous nights’ PSYOPS’ broadcasts, the warlord had slipped away. Local legend had Aideed escaping under the UN troops’ noses on a donkey cart, wrapped up in a sheet like a corpse.

As the Pakistanis cleared the objective, however, the Moroccans began to take fire on the outer perimeter, engaging in a four hour firefight complicated by the Somali use of women and children to shield the militiamen. Just before 10:30AM, a recoilless rifle shell disabled the Moroccan command vehicle and killed the regimental commander. It took until 6:30PM to finish clearing all the shattered target buildings. In the end, the operation only managed to damage Aideed’s house at the cost of five UN troops killed and 46 wounded, and at least 100 Somalis killed.

One senior Clinton administration official who participated in the President’s decision to mount the attacks acknowledged “We didn’t plan to kill him, but the president knew that if something fell on Aideed and killed him, no tears would be shed.” Failing to achieve this, the Administration chose to portray the operations as a success nevertheless. Jonathan Howe proclaimed a “tremendous victory,” and President Clinton declared: “The military back of Aideed has been broken.”

Today in Manhunting History -- June 12, 1993: Attack on Radio Mogadishu

For a month prior to the June 5 ambush of Pakistani peacekeepers, Radio Mogadishu – also known as “Radio Aideed” – had launch a no-holds barred propaganda campaign against UNOSOM II, accusing the UN of “imperialist designs” and “colonization” and calling upon Somalis to defend their sovereignty. After the massacre of 24 Pakistanis, Radio Mogadishu declared the firefights a victory for the Somali people.

At 4AM on June 12, a “steady, ominous buzz” was audible in the sky over Mogadishu. A distant pop was quickly followed by a deep thud – pa-Daa, pa-Daa, pa-Daa – again and again. American AC-130 Spectre gunships fired 10 rounds at Radio Mogadishu and some of the SNA’s weapons cantonments. The attack ended almost as quickly as it began, an orange glow from fires illuminating the city as the buzz of the gunships faded away.

As dawn broke over Mogadishu, Somalis woke to find Radio Aideed destroyed.

Over the next two nights the AC-130s attacked Aideed’s headquarters and the workshop where the SNA’s financier – Osman Ato – converted stolen cars into battle wagons. At Aideed’s residence, American PSYOPS units used mobile speakers similar to those that taunted Noriega to blast Aideed’s house with the sounds of helicopter rotors, tank engines, and machine gunfire in an attempt to intimidate the warlord.

Today in Manhunting History -- June 9, 1993: Howe Requests Delta Force

After the June 5 massacre of the Pakistanis the head of UNOSOM II, retired U.S. Admiral Jonathan Howe, declared Muhammad Farah Aideed “a menace to public safety” and a “killer.”  President Bill Clinton and his advisors agreed with Howe that the ambush demanded a strong response lest UNOSOM II lose all credibility.

On June 9, Howe requested a team of 50 Delta Force operators to snatch Aideed.  (This was ironic, given that when Howe was a deputy to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William Crowe, he had vigorously opposed proposals for a similar operation against Manuel Noriega).  UNOSOM II’s Commander, Turkish Lieutenant General Cervik Bir, and its Deputy Commander, U.S. Army Major General Thomas Montgomery, both supported the request, and Howe advised the Clinton administration that the probability of U.S. special operations forces capturing Aideed at 90 percent.  (A CENTCOM intelligence assessment team traveled to Mogadishu in June 1993 and reported the capture of Aideed was “viable and feasible.”  In private, however, team members described the task as “extremely ugly . . . with numerous potential points of failure.”) 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell resisted Powell’s request, and Secretary of Defense Les Aspin rejected the idea.  Even if Aideed could be found, Aspin thought an already skeptical public would consider Delta’s deployment to be a dangerous escalation.  Consequently, Howe would have to try to catch Aideed with the conventional forces already in place. 

Retired Admiral Jonathan Howe, the UN Secretary General's Special Representative for Somalia

Today in Manhunting History -- June 5, 1993: Welcome to Hell

When UNOSOM II began on May 4, it adopted an expanded mission of “peace enforcement” in which warlords could be compelled to disarm. Mohamed Farah Aideed recognized that the UN’s plan would weaken his military power and political base, and thus began a vicious, no-holds-barred propaganda campaign on Radio Mogadishu. “Radio Aideed,” as it was known, accused the UN of “imperialist designs” and “colonization” and called upon Somalis to defend their sovereignty. Shootings and rock-throwing confrontations increased around Mogadishu, and UNOSOM II began taking casualties. A CIA assessment around this time deemed Aideed “a threat to peace,” and UNOSOM II’s commander, Turkish Lieutenant General Cervik Bir, decided he had seen enough and decided to respond.

On June 4, UNOSOM II notified Aideed’s interior minister, Abdi Hassan Awale, that various SNA weapons sites were to be inspected the next morning. “This is unacceptable,” Awale replied to the messenger. “This means war.”

The next day, after inspecting the arms cache co-located with Aideed’s radio station, a company-sized Pakistani force was ambushed while returning to their battalion’s camp at Mogadishu’s sports stadium. Another Pakistani unit protecting a food distribution center was slaughtered after one soldier, trying to calm a growing mob, was pulled into the crowd and dismembered. Twenty-four Pakistanis were killed in the attacks, and another 56 were wounded. Ten of the dead were castrated and their eyes gouged out, while others were disemboweled and skinned.

When the Quick Reaction Force from the U.S. 10th Mountain Division advanced to cover the Pakistani retreat, they saw nearby ruins with fresh graffiti declaring: “WELCOME TO HELL.”

Today in Manhunting History -- May 4, 1993: UNOSOM II Takes Command

Operation RESTORE HOPE, launched in December 1992 by President George H.W. Bush to deliver humanitarian supplies in Somalia, was a resounding success.  The worst of the famine in southern Somalia was over, thanks to the acceleration of humanitarian relief operations following the arrival of coalition forces.  On May 4, 2003, the U.S.-led UNITAF transferred command of operations in Somalia to the U.N.-led UNOSOM II.  

Yet whereas UNITAF had a mission limited to protecting relief operations, the Security Council Resolution (814) authorizing UNOSOM II committed the UN to more expansive national reconstruction and political reconciliation goals and charged UNSOM II to disarm the Somali clans.  Thus, instead of the more traditional peacekeeping, UNOSOM II's mission would be one of “peace enforcement,” in which warlords could be compelled to disarm.

This shift in mission especially threatened the leader of the Habr Gidr clan, Muhammad Farah Aideed, who saw himself as having liberated Somalia from Siad Barre's dictatorship and himself entitled to be Somalia’s future leader.  Understanding clearly that the UN’s plan necessitated a weakening of his military power and political status, and perceiving that UN-led forces would be weaker than UNITAF, Aideed calculated that his ambitions to lead Somalia could best be furthered by striking out violently against the peacekeepers.

This calculation and the events that followed would set him on a course to become the target of America's first strategic manhunt in the Muslim world.