Somehow I missed this "Top 10 Manhunts" list that Time magazine published the day after the Abbottabad raid. Sure, it's gimmicky and misses some obvious choices (i.e. the Faqir of Ipi, Pablo Escobar, and Eric Rudolph, to name a few), but it is interesting nonetheless.
Again, the difference between most of these manhunts and what I describe as "strategic manhunts" are that only four of Time's Top 10 were pursued across an international border (Saddam, Karadzic, Eichmann, and bin Laden), and of those, Eichmann was not pursued by uniformed forces (it was strictly a covert Mossad operation) and Karadzic, although a prominent target, was one roughly two dozen Bosnian Serbs pursued by JSOC forces after the Dayton Accords.
Tuesday, May 31, 2011
Today in Manhunting History -- May 31: Losing al-Rahman
Since May 20, Task Force 145 had been following Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's spiritual adviser, Abd al-Rahman, waiting for him to get into the blue sedan that indicated he was en route to meeting Iraq's most wanted terrorist. Finally, after eleven days of waiting and watching, on May 31 a Predator observed Rahman switching cars to a blue sedan.
The sedan weaved through Baghdad traffic, making numerous turns to shake any possible tail. After one sudden turn it disappeared behind a tall building. The Predator’s camera panned up and down the street, but could find no sign of the car. The Predator flew around the building, continuing to pan its camera in all directions, but the blue sedan had simply vanished, and with it possibly the best chance of catching Zarqawi to date.
Little did the Task Force realize they would get another shot a week later . . .
The sedan weaved through Baghdad traffic, making numerous turns to shake any possible tail. After one sudden turn it disappeared behind a tall building. The Predator’s camera panned up and down the street, but could find no sign of the car. The Predator flew around the building, continuing to pan its camera in all directions, but the blue sedan had simply vanished, and with it possibly the best chance of catching Zarqawi to date.
Little did the Task Force realize they would get another shot a week later . . .
Monday, May 30, 2011
In Memoriam
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| CPT Shane Mahaffee, Died of wounds suffered in an May 5, 2006, IED attack near Hilla, Iraq. |
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| CPT Brian Freeman, KIA, Karbala, Iraq, January 20, 2007 |
Sunday, May 29, 2011
Today in Manhunting History -- May 29, 1998: The Raid That Never Was
Note: Updated to edit a bad grammatical error in the opening sentence . . . that will teach me to post while trying to build a Lego castle with a five-year-old at the same time.
By May 1998, the CIA’s Counter Terrorism Center had spent months planning a raid on Tarnak Farms, Osama bin Laden’s compound on the outskirts of Kandahar comprising about 80 concrete or mud-brick buildings surrounded by a 10-foot wall, for some time. CIA officers were able to map the entire site from satellite photos, identifying the houses belonging to bin Laden’s wives and the one where he was most likely to sleep. The plan was meticulously detailed. One team of Afghan tribals on the CIA payroll would enter the compound through a drainage ditch that ran under the fence while another team would sneak through the front gate, using silenced pistols to eliminate the guards. When they found bin Laden, they would hold him in a provisioned cave 30 miles away until the Americans could take custody. From May 20 to 24 the CIA ran a successful final rehearsal of the operation. The CTC planned to brief cabinet-level principals and their deputies the following week. June 23 would be D-Day for the raid, with bin Laden in American custody by July 23.
Although a Principals Committee meeting to approve the operation was scheduled for May 30, it never took place. The White House Counterterror Strategy Group, led by Richard Clarke, perceived the Afghan tribals as a bunch of aging anti-Soviet mujahideen well past their prime and milking the CIA for easy money while avoiding any real operations on the ground. Moreover, the CIA’s senior management did not believe the plan would succeed. Thus on May 29, CTC Chief Jeff O’Connell informed the Bin Laden unit that cabinet-level officials thought the risk of civilian casualties was too high, and the decision had been made to abort the operation.
The working-level CIA officers were disappointed, believing the raid to be the “best plan we are going to come up with to capture [bin Laden] while he is in Afghanistan and bring him to justice.” The tribals’ reported readiness to act was subsequently diminished. And as the 9/11 Commission later noted, “No capture plan before 9/11 ever again attained the same level of detail and preparation.”
By May 1998, the CIA’s Counter Terrorism Center had spent months planning a raid on Tarnak Farms, Osama bin Laden’s compound on the outskirts of Kandahar comprising about 80 concrete or mud-brick buildings surrounded by a 10-foot wall, for some time. CIA officers were able to map the entire site from satellite photos, identifying the houses belonging to bin Laden’s wives and the one where he was most likely to sleep. The plan was meticulously detailed. One team of Afghan tribals on the CIA payroll would enter the compound through a drainage ditch that ran under the fence while another team would sneak through the front gate, using silenced pistols to eliminate the guards. When they found bin Laden, they would hold him in a provisioned cave 30 miles away until the Americans could take custody. From May 20 to 24 the CIA ran a successful final rehearsal of the operation. The CTC planned to brief cabinet-level principals and their deputies the following week. June 23 would be D-Day for the raid, with bin Laden in American custody by July 23.
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| Satellite imagery of Tarnak Farms used to prepare for the proposed 1998 raid. |
The working-level CIA officers were disappointed, believing the raid to be the “best plan we are going to come up with to capture [bin Laden] while he is in Afghanistan and bring him to justice.” The tribals’ reported readiness to act was subsequently diminished. And as the 9/11 Commission later noted, “No capture plan before 9/11 ever again attained the same level of detail and preparation.”
Bin Laden Confidants Captured
The Daily Mail reports that a British SAS team has captured two top Taliban commanders -- reported to be close confidants of Osama bin Laden -- near Babaji in Helmand province.
More details are sure to emerge in the coming days (i.e. Was the intel derived from the Abbottabad raid, or part of the ongoing decapitation campaign against the Taliban?) but any time members of the Quetta Shura can be taken out of the fight it is a good thing.
More details are sure to emerge in the coming days (i.e. Was the intel derived from the Abbottabad raid, or part of the ongoing decapitation campaign against the Taliban?) but any time members of the Quetta Shura can be taken out of the fight it is a good thing.
Friday, May 27, 2011
Bin Laden and Pakistan
One of the critical questions in the aftermatth of the Abbottabad raid that killed bin Laden is whether any Pakistani intelligence or government officials knew of his location, and if so, how high did such knowledge go.
Today, Mark Mazzetti of the The New York Times reports that documents seized in the Abbottabad compound show bin Laden and his aides discussed seeking Pakistani protection in exchange for al Qa'ida refraining from attacking targets within Pakistan. Although the proposal apparently never got beyond the "discussion phase," it suggests the Pakistani government was not complicit in hiding bin Laden. Secretary of State Clinton explicitly stated this yesterday as she arrived for an unannounced visit in Islamabad. This in itself is interesting, as in the past Secretary Clinton -- to her credit -- was never shy about saying she thought bin Laden was hiding in Pakistan. Secretary Clinton's statement follows Secretary Gates' remarks last week that there was no evidence "current Pakistani leaders" knew bin Laden was there, although Gates' also suggested his gut told him somebody had to know.
This is likely not the last word on this topic, as skeptics and conspiracy theorists will inevitably chime in on the subject. But although we have a number of reasons to be frustrated with our Pakistani allies, hiding bin Laden in defiance of our strategic manhunt for him does not appear to be one of them.
Today, Mark Mazzetti of the The New York Times reports that documents seized in the Abbottabad compound show bin Laden and his aides discussed seeking Pakistani protection in exchange for al Qa'ida refraining from attacking targets within Pakistan. Although the proposal apparently never got beyond the "discussion phase," it suggests the Pakistani government was not complicit in hiding bin Laden. Secretary of State Clinton explicitly stated this yesterday as she arrived for an unannounced visit in Islamabad. This in itself is interesting, as in the past Secretary Clinton -- to her credit -- was never shy about saying she thought bin Laden was hiding in Pakistan. Secretary Clinton's statement follows Secretary Gates' remarks last week that there was no evidence "current Pakistani leaders" knew bin Laden was there, although Gates' also suggested his gut told him somebody had to know.
This is likely not the last word on this topic, as skeptics and conspiracy theorists will inevitably chime in on the subject. But although we have a number of reasons to be frustrated with our Pakistani allies, hiding bin Laden in defiance of our strategic manhunt for him does not appear to be one of them.
Thursday, May 26, 2011
A Pakistani Mole?
Over at HotAir, "Allahpundit" conjectures there may have been a mole within Pakistani intelligence who provided the details of the Abbottabad compound, which would also explain the recent arrest of Muhammed Ali Qasim Yaqub and the rumors regarding Mullah Omar.
This theory is plausible, but unlikely for several reasons:
On the other hand, maybe Allahpundit is on to something by suggesting a wife may have turned bin Laden in because of his porn stash . . .
* Although I think the Obama administration should have sat on the news of bin Laden's death for a week to exploit the intelligence found, it should be noted that the Bush administration announced the capture of Saddam Hussein and death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi within 24 hours of the event. Alas, it may be unrealistic in this day and age to ask policymakers to keep such good news to themselves for a full news cycle.
This theory is plausible, but unlikely for several reasons:
- If true, and the mole was somebody within Pakistan's ISI who knew bin Laden's location for a long time, why would they decide to rat him out now, especially at a time of heightened U.S.-Pakistani tensions.
- Theoretically, it could have been somebody who was recently looped in on bin Laden's location, but that would represent an unprecedented breech within ISI to allow access to such important information. (Of course, it should also be noted that it is still at most unproven speculation that somebody within ISI knew his location in the first place).
- Yaqub was reportedly arrested by Pakistani forces, so it is unclear why a mole feeding us the location and details of bin Laden's compound to the US would also be providing information to other elements of Pakistani security as well. Wouldn't this just cast more suspicion on a potential "traitor"?
- Also, if we did have anything to do with Mullah Omar's rumored death, does anybody realistically think the Administration could keep quiet about it?*
On the other hand, maybe Allahpundit is on to something by suggesting a wife may have turned bin Laden in because of his porn stash . . .
* Although I think the Obama administration should have sat on the news of bin Laden's death for a week to exploit the intelligence found, it should be noted that the Bush administration announced the capture of Saddam Hussein and death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi within 24 hours of the event. Alas, it may be unrealistic in this day and age to ask policymakers to keep such good news to themselves for a full news cycle.
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