Bin Laden the Comic Book

The Washington Post reports that Captain (Ret.) Dale Dye has written a comic book version of the Abbottabad raid that killed Osama bin Laden, titled "Code Name: Geronimo."

In case Dye's name isn't familiar, he is a bad ass.  Name a great modern war movie (i.e. "Platoon," "Saving Private Ryan") and there's a good chance he was the military consultant for it.

Am I worried about the competition for my book?  No, because Dye's comic only can whet the appetite for more stories about manhunts/raids such as the one that killed bin Laden, and my book contains nearly a dozen such missions.  Second, he is specifically aiming for a younger audience, and I've already retold all the strategic manhunts in my book as children's stories to my five-year-old, and trust me, it is tough to sanitize them appropriately.  Finally, I would never put myself up against Dye -- even at 66 years old, I'm pretty sure he could probably still kick my a**.

Today in Manhunting History -- June 29, 1927: "If words were bullets . . ."

U.S. Marine Captain Gilbert Hatfield waited two days until June 27 to renew his correspondence with Sandino. “Dear General,” Hatfield wrote:

Since there seems to be no opportunity to meet you on the field of battle, it has occurred to me that . . . you might be willing to come in and talk with me, Your safety both coming and leaving us is guaranteed, and you may bring a reasonable number of men as a bodyguard, say 25, to insure your safety while on the road. . . . Hoping that you are a patriot and not a robber, and that you will talk to me soon, I am,

G.D. HATFIELD, Capt., USMC.

Sandino replied on the 29th, again escalating the war of words. He said he would not come in for a conference and fall like a dove deceived by “a few grains of rice at the door of a trap.” Instead, he invited the Marines to come and get him. “I will allow you to come for the conference that you want, and I will also allow you to come with a guard of 500 men.” But when “you come to my mountains,” Sandino warned, “make your wills beforehand.” Until then, the Nicaraguan concluded, “I remain your most obedient servant, who ardently desires to put you in a handsome tomb with beautiful bouquets of flowers.”

“If words were bullets and phrases were soldiers,” Hatfield replied, “you would be a field marshal instead of a mule thief.” He suggested Sandino wire him again “when you have something more than the ravings of a conceited maniac.”

Bin Laden "The Cranky Old Uncle" of Al Qa'ida?

McClatchy reports that Osama bin Laden was no longer running al-Qa'ida at the time of his death, according to U.S. and Pakistani officials.

According to the report, "bin Laden was out of touch with the younger generation of Al Qaida commanders, and they often didn't follow his advice during the years he was in hiding in northern Pakistan."

One U.S. official said: "He was like the cranky old uncle that people weren't listening to.  The younger guys had never worked directly with him.  They did not take everything he said as right."

This is not in the least bit surprising.  One of my book's key findings is that the success/failure of strategic manhunts rarely corresponds with the achievement of the strategic objectives that triggered the hunt in the first place.  As I noted in my Weekly Standard piece last month: "The reason for the disparity between the outcome of a manhunt and the achievement of our objective is simple: Pursuing an individual and forcing him to go to ground renders him strategically ineffective and creates space for other actors to step to the fore."  Thus, McClatchy notes in the case of al-Qa'ida, "The computer records [discovered in Abbottabad] also lend credence to long-held beliefs that bin Laden's longtime deputy, Ayman al Zawahiri . . . had been much more involved and important to the group's operations than bin Laden had been in the last several years."

This is an important finding, however, because it suggests that even with bin Laden dead, the war against al-Qa'ida will continue.  Again, in the Weekly Standard piece I argued: "From a strategic standpoint, the successful targeting of an individual is usually less important than the successful targeting of the network that either supports him or will carry on the struggle in his absence."  Consequently, it is imperative for the United States to continue to target al-Qa'ida's key subordinate leaders, and to attack the organization with the equivalent of a counterinsurgency strategy by which we target its finances, fight for Muslim "hearts and minds," and work to eliminate its potential sanctuaries.

Meanwhile, in Pakistan . . .

Two stories from last week that shed light on the problem of hunting for al-Qa'ida in Pakistan.

First, a new Pew survey shows a majority of Pakistanis disapproved of the Abbottabad raid and think bin Laden's death was a bad thing. The first is easy to explain, as even Pakistanis who were ambivalent about bin Laden could oppose the violation of Pakistani sovereignty the raid represented.  More puzzling, I think, is the latter result, in which 55% saw the terror mastermind's death as a bad thing. Although 46% of Pakistanis reported "having confidence" in bin Laden according to a 2003 Pew Research survey, by 2010 this number had dropped to 18%.  Again, there is a simple explanation for this, i.e. bin Laden was not particularly popular with Pakistanis anymore, but their pride resented the Americans invading their territory to kill him.  But the question at the heart of these polls is important, as a key factor in whether strategic manhunts are successful or not is the popularity of the targeted individual with the local population from which HUMINT and indigenous forces can be drawn.

Second, and somewhat relatedly, the New York Times reported on Thursday that U.S. intelligence analysis of bin Laden courier Ahmed al-Kuwaiti's cell phone contained several numbers connected to a Pakistani militant group, Harakat-ul-Mujahedeen.  On the one hand, this is a little less significant than it first seems: it doesn't establish direct contact between bin Laden and Harakat, and even if it did, Harakat and al-Qa'ida have been allied for a long time.  On the other hand, this is important in that it would suggest how bin Laden could have moved from Afghanistan to Abbottabad without ever raising the attention of Pakistani authorities (assuming they were looking for him, of course . . . Harakat was founded with the assistance of Pakistan's ISI in the 1980s, its leader Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil has long been one of bin Laden's Pakistani BFF's and lives openly on the outskirts of Islamabad), or necessarily enjoying widespread popularity across Afghanistan.

Today in Manhunting History -- June 25, 1927: Gilbert Hatfield's New Pen Pal

Ocotal, the capital of Nicaragua’s Nueva Segoiva department, sits 2,000 feet up a broad valley, less than 20 miles from the Honduran border. In the summer of 1927 it was the northernmost outpost for the U.S. forces deployed on the peacekeeping mission to the tiny Central American republic. Although such an isolated garrison could be a lonely place, Captain Gilbert D. Hatfield, United States Marines Corps, had a pen pal. Although he had only recently occupied the Nicaraguan garrison town of Ocotal with 40 Marines and 60 Nicaraguan guardsmen, Hatfield had attracted the attention of the most prominent local citizen: General Augusto C. Sandino.

On June 25 Sandino wired Hatfield that he had arrived in nearby San Fernando with his insurgent forces, and asked: “Shall I wait here for you or shall I go to you?”

Hatfield wrote back the same day. “I am giving you the idea of coming here, assuring you that we shall not run away. . . . I thank you for your letter, and trusting that you will soon come and salute me personally. I am yours respectfully, G.D. Hatfield, Capt., USMC.”
Sandino replied by sending Hatfield a crudely drawn cartoon of a guerrilla brandishing a machete over the neck of a prostate marine.

Thus began one of the more remarkable correspondences in U.S. military history.

Captain Gilbert Hatfield and his Marines at Ocotal, July 1927

Today in Manhunting History -- June 23, 1885: The Capture of Chihuahua's Family

At about 9AM, June 23, 1885, Captain Emmett Crawford’s scouts found Chihuahua’s camp* in the Bavispe Mountains northeast of Opunto. The leader of his scouts deemed it impossible to surround the camp without being seen, thus making it impossible to capture any of the hostiles. Once the scouts moved into the best position possible, they opened fire. As with previous engagements during the Geronimo Campaign, rather than hold their position to defend their supplies, the Apache fled, escaping with their women and children through several deep canyons that joined near the camp. The scouts pursued them as quickly as the rough terrain would allow, and for several miles a running battle continued between the scouts and the fleeing braves. Although all eight warriors of the hostile band escaped – along with four boys and three women – Crawford’s scouts returned to camp with 15 women and children captured, including Chihuahua’s entire family.

*Chihuahua and his followers had briefly separated from Geronimo, partly out of anger that Geronimo had lied to get them to flee San Carlos, partly because it was harder for the Cavalry to track multiple, smaller bands than all 120 escaped Chiricahua together.



Chihuahua



"Whitey" Bulger Captured

Okay, so technically this isn't a "strategic manhunt," given that no military forces were involved whatsoever.  (There was a foreign component, however, as the last credible sighting of Bulger before this was in London in 2002).  But, still, it is pretty incredible, that after 14 years, the FBI finally caught notorious Boston mobster James "Whitey" Bulger.

The 81-year old gangster, who was the basis for Jack Nicholson's character in "The Departed," was arrested near Santa Monica, CA.  The article I've linked to is a bit cursory, but for anybody who has ever lived in Boston, I'm sure this will be a fascinating story as the details emerge.  (Bulger was a monster, but an eminently interesting monster).