My latest piece on foreign policy in the Presidential election campaign has been published by my friends at ForeignPolicy.com's Shadow Government blog.  This was actually supposed to appear in the Wall Street Journal a few weeks ago, but then the Benghazi attack that killed Ambassador J. Christopher Stephens overshadowed my relatively mild argument here.

(And yes, I'll get back to posting pure non-political/manhunting/War-on-Terror pieces more frequently once the side project I've been overwhelmed with the last few months is complete).

If Obama's foreign policy has been so successful, then why are we talking about Romney's advisors?

Prior to the terrorist attack that killed U.S. Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and the subsequent anti-U.S. demonstrations throughout the Muslim world, the conventional wisdom held that President Obama was unassailable on foreign policy during the election campaign. Yet rather than tout the administration's successes -- which have produced an edge in polls as to who the public trusts on foreign affairs -- the Obama campaign and its allies seem more eager to warn voters that Mitt Romney is planning to bring back George W. Bush's foreign policy than tout the president's "successes." "Of Romney's 24 special advisors on foreign policy, 17 served in the Bush-Cheney administration," wrote Adam Smith, the most senior Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee -- and that's "a frightening prospect." Similarly, during the Democratic convention, Senator John Kerry said: "[Romney] has all these [neoconservative] advisers who know all the wrong things about foreign policy. He would rely on them." Now, noted foreign policy scholar Maureen Dowd has written not one, but TWO columns decrying "neocon" influence over Romney's foreign policy.

This is an especially odd line of attack given that most of the Obama administration's foreign policy achievements are little more than extensions of Bush administration policies.
President Obama frequently boasts that he fulfilled his promise to "end the war" in Iraq. In reality, he merely adhered to the U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement negotiated and signed by the Bush administration in 2008. What's more, as a senator Mr. Obama opposed the 2007 surge of U.S. forces that made this agreement possible. The Obama administration's only policy innovation on Iraq was last year's failure to broker a new strategic framework agreement with Iraq, a deal they had previously insisted was necessary and achievable.

Then there's the operation that killed Osama bin Laden. To be sure, the president deserves credit for launching the raid against the advice of so many of his advisors, including Vice President Joe Biden. But Mr. Obama fails to acknowledge that the intelligence chain that led to the Abbottabad raid began with detainee interrogations at Guantanamo Bay and CIA "black" sites that he vowed to close upon taking office.

What about drones? President Obama deserves credit for the successful "drone war" against al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan, but the uptick in U.S. drone attacks there began in July 2008. The Obama administration's continuation of this policy is an acknowledgment -- unspoken, of course -- that the Bush administration was correct to treat the war on terror as an actual war rather than a global law-enforcement campaign.

On Iran, President Obama brags that "Iran is under greater pressure than ever before, "and "few thought that sanctions could have an immediate bite on the Iranian regime." Putting aside the fact that these sanctions were imposed upon the president by a 100-0 Senate vote, and that Obama's State Department has granted exemptions to all 20 of Iran's major oil-trading partners, this triumphalism ignores that the Bush administration worked for years to build multilateral support for sanctions (both at the United Nations and in national capitals). The Obama administration broke from this effort for two years, attempting instead to engage the Iranian leadership. When this outreach predictably failed, the Obama administration claimed that Tehran had proven itself irrevocably committed to its nuclear program -- precisely the conclusion the Bush administration had reached years earlier.

Yes, there's more to the Obama administration's foreign-policy case, but the other "achievements" are muddled ones. Even before the Benghazi attack, post-Qaddafi Libya was so insecure that the State Department issued a travel advisory warning U.S. citizens against "all but essential travel to Libya," and NATO's intervention in Libya raised the inconvenient question of why the administration intervened to alleviate a "medieval siege" on Benghazi but sits silently as tens of thousands of civilians are slaughtered in Syria.

In Afghanistan, the surge ordered by President Obama in December 2009 had the operational effect intended. But even in taking this step, the president undermined the policy by rejecting his military commander's request for 40,000 troops, declaring the surge would end according to a fixed timeline rather than conditions on the ground, and announcing the withdrawal of the last 20,000 surge forces before the Afghan fighting season ended (but before the November election). The Bush administration veterans advising Governor Romney surely know more about the importance of seeing a policy through to its fruition.

The Bush administration made many foreign policy mistakes during its eight years in office, most notably the conduct of the Iraq War after the fall of Baghdad. And Governor Romney still needs to provide details demonstrating why he would be a better steward of U.S. national security than President Obama. But the potential devolution of the Arab Spring into anti-U.S. violence demonstrates why both candidates owe the American people a serious discussion about foreign and defense policy. Hopefully in the election campaign's waning weeks the Democrats will offer much more than the ad hominen anti-Bush attacks they have provided to date.

Today in Manhunting History: September 4, 1886 -- Geronimo's Final Surrender

Chiricahua Apache war captain Geronimo had evaded U.S. forces for 16 months since his escape from the San Carlos Reservation in May 1885

Captain Henry W. Lawton’s command had escorted Geronimo the remaining renegade Chiricahuas across the Mexican border, arriving at Skeleton Canyon in Arizona just before nightfall on September 2. The canyon was given its name from the still visible remains of 19 Mexicans ambushed and killed there by the Tombstone outlaw Curly Bill and his gang, who more than a century later would be immortalized as the Earp brothers’ antagonists in the film “Tombstone.” Despite this grisly legacy, the canyon actually presented a serene landscape as its stream wound lazily from the low Peloncillo Mountains down to the arid San Simon basin. Lawton and Geronimo found several commands of regular soldiers already there when they arrived, which triggered the Chiricahuas’ fear of treachery. Lawton sent another desperate message through the chain of command, and the next day the Acting Assistant Adjutant General of the Department, William Thompson, heliographed Brigadier General Nelson A. Miles (Commander of the Arizona Territory): “Lawton says the hostiles will surrender to you, but if he does not see you today he is afraid they will leave.”



Finally, after days of delay, Miles and his entourage arrived at Skeleton Canyon at 3PM on September 3. Geronimo immediately rode down from his campsite in the rocks overlooking the stream. He dismounted from his horse and approached the general.

The glade in Skeleton Canyon where Geronimo met Brigadier General Nelson A. Miles (Images via http://abell.as.arizona.edu/~hill/4x4/skeleton/skeleton.html)

Geronimo shook Miles’ hand. The interpreter said, “General Miles is your friend.”

Geronimo replied: “I never saw him, but I have been in need of friends. Why has he not been with me?”

The tension broke as everyone within earshot burst into laughter.

As the conference began in earnest, Miles told Geronimo: “Lay down your arms and come with me to Fort Bowie, and in five days you will see your families now in Florida, and no harm will be done to you.” Miles became frustrated with the laborious translation procedures that transformed English into Spanish into Apache and back again. He picked up some stones and drew a line in the dirt, and said “This represents the ocean.” He placed a stone near the line. “This represents the place where Chihuahua is with his band.” He then placed another stone a short distance from the first and said, “This represents you, Geronimo.” He picked up a third stone and put it near the second one. “This represents the Indians at Camp Apache. The President wants to take you and put you with Chihuahua.” He then picked up the stones representing the Apaches in Arizona and put them beside the one representing Chihuahua in Florida. “This is what the President wants to do, get all of you together.”

Miles indicated the stay in the East would be of indefinite duration, but that eventually the Apaches would be returned to Arizona. He concluded: “Tell them I have no more to say. I would like to talk generally with him, but we do not understand each other’s tongue.”

Geronimo turned to Gatewood and smiled. “Good,” he said in Apache, “you told the truth.” He shook Miles’ hand and said that no matter what the others did he was surrendering.

Brigadier General Nelson A. Miles, the vain, ambitious (and later controversial) officer who accepted Geronimo's formal surrender 126 years ago today.

The next morning a formal surrender ceremony was held. On September 5 Geronimo, Naiche, and other warriors were placed in Miles’ wagon and set out for Fort Bowie. Looking at the Chiricahua Mountains near the end of their journey, Geronimo said to Miles: “This is the fourth time I have surrendered.”

“And I think it is the last time,” Miles replied.

Four days later the prisoners were assembled on the parade ground at Fort Bowie and packed into heavily guarded wagons for the trip to the rail station. As they departed, the 4th Cavalry band played “Auld Lang Syne.” Geronimo was left to wonder why the soldiers jeered and laughed as they sang “Should auld acquaintance be forgot, and never brought to mind.”

The Geronimo Surrender site, on Highway 80 near Apache, Arizona, looking East toward Skeleton Canyon.

How Republicans Should Talk About Afghanistan

My latest op-ed, on Afghanistan, is appearing in tomorrow's Washington Times. 

This is my first explicitly partisan op-ed, although I think the Times' editors ramp it up with the headline they chose (as opposed to my preference in the post's title).  Some of the key analytical points were inevitably lost cutting the draft by 20% for publication, but I still think the argument holds up.

We'll see whether this unleashes any venom in the comments, although aside from my family, I don't know how many Administration supporters will be reading the Times' op-ed section tomorrow.

Golf in Afghanistan

When I was on active duty in Baghdad, we used to joke that with the clear skies, palm trees, and man-made lakes, the International Zone would make a great golf course in more peaceful days, which we would call "Tigris Woods."
Well, today AFP has a great little piece on Afghanistan's only golf course.  Apparently, security hasn't been a problem thus far as "Deminers cleared the course, but as an extra precaution Afzal set several thousand sheep roaming over it for five days -- they set off no mines and all survived."

McMasters on Afghanistan

One of the most impressive officers I've met in recent years is Major General H.R. McMasters.  I worked with him briefly while he was at U.S. Army TRADOC, and even more briefly when he headed the Task Force Shaffiyat in Afghanistan.  Fellow officers who had him as their tactical officer at West Point raved about him, and his book Dereliction of Duty is one of the rare books that becomes zeitgeisty in military literary circles that actually lives up to the hype.  He speaks with infectious enthusiasm on the driest of topics, from obscure Army doctrine debates to the origins of criminal patronage networks in Afghanistan.

This weekend the Wall Street Journal published a great interview by David Feith with MG H.R. McMasters on the war in Afghanistan.  "Our soldiers, airmen, Marines and sailors, working alongside Afghanistan, have shut down the vast majority of the physical space in which the enemy can operate," McMasters says.  "The question is, how do we consolidate those gains politically and psychologically."

McMasters goes on to argue that the fundamental reason the Taliban collapsed so quickly in 2001 was "that every Afghan was convinced of the inevitability of the Taliban's defeat."  Unfortunately, I think that although the Strategic Partnership Agreement signed last week (which MG McMasters says is "immensely important") is a positive step, its complete absence of specifics, especially with regards to the future funding of the Afghan National Security Forces, risks undermining the psychological gains intended to sway those Afghans still sitting on the fence between supporting the government or the Taliban.

As they say, the entire feature is worth perusing.

Three Takes on Bin Laden

As the anniversary of Osama bin Laden's death recedes, the debate as to his role in al-Qa'ida a decade after 9/11 continues, stoked by the recent declassification of seventeen of the files removed by Navy SEALs from his compound in Abbottabad.  Three interesting analyses of these documents and what they mean to the War on Terror are provided by Bruce Hoffman in the Wall Street Journal, Patrick Cockburn in The Independent (UK), and Fawaz Gerges in The Daily Beast.

Hoffman argues that the released documents provide a corrective to the "extravagant and incorrect claims about the weakness of al Qaeda and the irrelevance of its founding leader."  Instead, he argues that "the picture that emerges from the seized Arabic-language documents is of a leader involved in both al Qaeda's day-to-day operations and long-term strategy," and that bin Laden "remained both determined and able to communicate his wishes to al Qaeda's growing stable of associates."  Okay, but any crazy derelict on a DC street corner is "determined and able to communicate his wishes" to passers-by, the question is whether anybody is actually listening.  Hoffman himself admits that the al-Qa'ida affiliates were "unresponsive," but rather cavalierly dismisses this as "a problem familiar to any manager coping with rapid expansion." 

Hoffman does make an interesting point when he cites an August 27, 2010 communique in which bin Laden expresses concern for the safety of his followers in Pakistan not because of potential military action, but because of the massive flooding that summer.  Hoffman concludes that "this assertion alone speaks volumes about how comfortable he and his minions found their refuge there."  Hmm . . . . maybe.  But there are dozens of other reports of al-Qa'ida leaders urging their fighters to seek other sanctuaries in Yemen, Somalia, or even Iran because of the drone strikes in Pakistan's tribal areas, not to mention the arrest of numerous al-Qa'ida senior leaders in Pakistan (i.e. Khalid Sheikh Muhammad).  Hoffman could be right in this interpretation, but given that only seventeen out of thousands of documents have been released, how do we know that this one is in any way a representative sample, a fact that Hoffman himself bemoans later in calling for a full release of the Abbottabad files?

In other words, Hoffman tends to undermine his own assertions quite a bit here.

Patrick Cockburn takes an almost diametrically opposed interpretation as Hoffman, writing:

Immediately after the killing, administration officials portrayed Bin Laden as a spider at the centre of a conspiratorial web, the well-hidden but operationally active commander in chief of al-Qa'ida.  They later retreated from these claims that were obviously at odds with his demonstrably limited contacts with the world outside his compound in Abbottabad.

He concludes that "a striking feature of these letters is that there is no evidence that their recipients made any effort to carry out their leader's instructions," and proceeds to weave a fascinating tale of how bin Laden was marginalized by al-Qa'ida after 2003, when the terror network's leaders "decided to keep the Saudi as a titular leader but quietly remove him from all operational control."

Cockburn's account and analysis certainly seem intuitively plausible.  My only caveat is that his main source for the scoop (via the investigative website Truthout) is a retired Pakistani general.  Again, it is plausible that Shaukat Qadir is correct in his details about bin Laden's isolation, but this assertion comes just after Cockburn's caution that we can't take anything Pakistan's ISI says at face value.  (Yes Qadir is retired, but the narrative that everything the Obama administration has said about Abbottabad is a lie veers to close to conspiracy theory for my tastes).

Finally, Fawaz Gerges argues that "even more than the killing of bin Laden, the Arab uprisings . . . have not only shaken the very foundation of the regional authoritarian order but unraveled the standard terrorism narrative."  Whereas al-Qa'ida's leadership decries democracy, preaching that only violent terrorism will bring about political change, "The millions of Arabs who took to the streets openly have shown that politics matters and that peaceful protests are more effective at delivering change.  The ballot box and parliamentarianism, not the sword and the caliphate, are their rallying cry, an utter rejection of what al Qaeda stands for." 

I think Gerges is right, broadly speaking, that al-Qa'ida's "core ideology is intrinsically incompatible with the universal aspirations of the Arabs."  Yet whereas the instability created by Arab Spring will not lead to al-Qa'ida taking over countries in the Middle East, I think Gerges understates the near-term risks of the Arab autocracies' security apparatuses crumbling, thereby creating space for local Salafist terrorist groups to operate.  Additionally, I think he is too quick to dismiss the Khomeini analogy.  The Iranian Revolution is much closer to the historical norm of a first wave being surpassed by more zealous ideologues in later stages.  Consequently, if the newly elected, moderately Islamic parties are unable to resolve the deep systemic problems that helped to trigger the Arab Spring in the first place, there is a significant danger that the frustrated populations will be susceptible to more extremist voices.

The Most Dangerous Man in the World?

In appearances publicizing my book, I've said several times that if the United States could successfully target any individual in the world, it would not be the Ayman al-Zawahiri, but rather Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri, the deadly genius behind AQAP's "underwear" and printer-cartridge bombs, and the suspected designer of the device recently smuggled out of Yemen by a U.S. double-agent.  Yesterday The Washington Post had an excellent profile on al-Asiri, whom the reporters describe as representing "the CIA's worst fears."

Although I recommend the entire article, there were three key takeaways I found particularly interesting:
- There is a debate as to how al-Asiri, a 30-year-old chemistry major, learned to make such sophisticated bombs.  One expert says he was taught by a Pakistani bombmaker linked to al-Qa'ida, while Bruce Riedel says "He seems to be largely self-educated."  The latter is especially dangerous, as it suggests the threat of lone-wolfs learning to make sophisticated devices via manuals and other resources on the Internet is viable.
- Even if al-Asiri is unique in his learning capacity and ingenuity, analysts say al-Asiri "is training the next generation of bombmakers in the event he is killed."  The possibility of al-Asiri creating a "starfish network" of sophisticated bombmakers is truly frightening, and underscores the need to kill him as quickly as possible.
- Al-Asiri's first significant bomb utilized 100 grams of PETN, "a white, powdery explosive that was virtually undetectable" and was targeted at Saudi Arabia's counterterrorism chief, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef.  The bomber selected to conduct the suicide mission was Abdullah al-Asiri, Ibrahim Hassan's brother.  In other words, al-Asiri is one cold-hearted bastard.

Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri: The single most important target in the War on Terror.