Today in Manhunting History -- July 19, 2003: The Tip that Doomed the Hussein Brothers

On July 19, U.S. forces received a tip that Uday and Qusay were hiding in the northern city of Mosul. The informant failed a polygraph test, however, causing U.S. military officials to dismiss the tipster. But intelligence units soon picked up signal intercepts suggesting the possible presence of HVTs in the same location in Mosul that the source had identified. Just as they began investigating this lead, an Iraqi businessman named Nawaf al-Zaydan Mohammed approached U.S. forces and told them the brothers were staying at his house in Mosul’s Falah district. The Americans told him to go back to the house, act normally, and wait for U.S. troops to arrive . . .  

Saddam and sons (Uday on the left, Qusay on the right) sometime before Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The Abbottabad Commission Report, Part IV: Mark Stout

Another interesting take on the Abbottabad Commission's report by Mark Stout, Director of the MA Program in Global Security Studies at Johns Hopkins, and an experienced academic and practitioner on intelligence issues. Mark emphasizes the report's description of the May 2011 Abbottabad raid as a humiliation, but notes the Commission's conclusion that it was a humiliation Pakistan brought on itself, saying: "It is possible to understand if not agree with the US decision to unilaterally implement its special operations mission."

Mark also notes the Commission's criticism of the ISI, who failed to commit to searching for Osama bin Laden despite numerous statements from U.S. leaders stating that the al-Qa'ida head was in their country. The report notes that when the CIA passed on a set of telephone numbers that included those belonging to the al-Kuwaiti brothers who were living with him in the Abbottabad compound, the ISI did not properly monitor the numbers.

Thus, Mark concludes, "The Commission seems to have thought that had the ISI been less dysfunctional and had it not 'closed the file' on Bin Laden, Pakistan might have gotten Bin Laden itself or done so in visible cooperation with the United States, either one of which scenarios would have avoided the humiliation of the May 2011 raid."

Tsarnaev Manhunt Photos Released

In case you have not already seen these, Boston Magazine has published a series of photos from the hunt for Boston Marathon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev in response to Rolling Stone's controversial use of a soft-focus glamour shot of the young terrorist. The photos were taken by Sgt. Sean Murphy, a tactical photographer with the Massachusetts State Police, who apparently was furious with Rolling Stone for "glamorizing the face of terror." My favorite shot is the photo below, with a sniper's laser-sighting prominent on his forehead as he surrenders . . .

Boston Marathon Bomber Dzhokar Tsarnaev climbing out of the boat in which he'd been hiding on April 19.

More on the Capture of Miguel Angel Trevino Morales

Miguel Angel Trevino Morales' mugshot was released yesterday. (Mexican Navy, via Associated Press)
 

Three relevant pieces on Monday’s capture of Mexican drug cartel Los Zetas kingpin Miguel Angel Trevino Morales worth reading for new details of the operation and analysis of whether the decapitation campaign against the Zetas will have any strategic effect.

The Associated Press notes that Trevino Morales is “at least the eighth capture or killing of a high-ranking cartel leader since 2011,” as Mexican president Pena Nieto continues his predecessor’s strategy of decapitating the cartels. Although Trevino Morales’ brother is expected to succeed him, the AP cites experts who warn that this could lead to a fragmentation of the gang into a less-hierarchical organization, and that consequently more violence may result in the ensuing power struggles. Even if the Zetas in their current form are crippled, this only strengthens Mexico’s most-wanted man, Sinaloa cartel head Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman.”

The New York Times provides more details on the capture operation, and notes the possibility of U.S. involvement. Despite Mexican sensitivity regarding U.S. influence on its security agencies,

"The two governments began sharing information on Mr. Trevino several months ago, with the Americans passing along word of the birth of Mr. Trevino’s child a little more than a month ago . . . . The Americans also shared the information that he appeared to be making trips to visit the baby in the Nuevo Laredo area, near where he was captured. . .

“The authorities traded intelligence gleaned from conversations caught on wiretaps and informants’ tips that led Mexican authorities to Mr. Trevino’s truck, moving before dawn on a highway near the border, the official said. Mexican marines in a helicopter intercepted Mr. Trevino and arrested him and two aides without a shot.”

Finally, Nathan Jones observes in the Houston Chronicle that yesterday’s operation “demonstrates the continued potency of the Mexican Navy when it comes to capturing or killing kingpins or high-value targets,” but notes the potential for increased violence if the Sinaloa cartel and its allies sense weakness within the Zeta network.

Even if the operational success of capturing Trevino Morales does not lead to immediate strategic success in terms of violence or volume of drug trafficking, in the words of a U.S. Ranger en route to capture another drug kingpin (Manuel Noriega) in 1989, “If anybody deserved to be slammed, he was the one.” Trevino Morales is believed responsible for the massacre of at least 265 migrants, amongst other charges of murder, torture, and trafficking. He was also known for his favorite terror technique, the “guiso,” or stew, in which his enemies would be placed in 55-gallon drums and burned alive. So regardless of whether the attack on the broader Zeta network is successful, or whether the broader conditions in Mexico will allow for a drop in violence, Trevino Morales [again, in the Ranger’s words] “deserved to be got.”

AQAP Number Two Killed

Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) announced today that its second-in-command, Said al-Shihri, was killed in a U.S. drone strike in Yemen.

Al-Shihri,was a former Guantanamo detainee released to Saudi Arabia in 2007 before fleeing to Yemen to join AQAP. He has been reported dead twice before, but each time the terror group denied the reports. (This, incidentally, is the one convenience of fighting a fanatically religious organization, as their obligation to ask their followers to appropriately mourn the deceased outweighs operational secrecy).

Although AQAP's announcement gave no date for the drone strike that killed al-Shihri, Yemeni security officials claimed he died from serious injuries from a strike in November 2012. AQAP's chief theologian, Ibrahim al-Robaish, did say al-Shihri was hit by the drone while speaking on his mobile phone in the province of Saadah, north of the Yemeni capital of Sanaa.

An undated screen capture of a web video featuring Said al-Shihri, who somehow rose to the #2 position in al-Qa'ida's most dangerous affiliate without knowing to stay off his cell phone.

Pakistani Taliban Denies Syria Deployment

Yeah, remember that story I linked to a long time ago (okay, yesterday) stating that the Pakistani Taliban has deployed “experts in warfare and information technology” to assist Syrian jihadists.

Well, never mind.

Pakistani Dawn reports that although some militants -- mainly Arabs and Central Asians -- have gone to fight in Syria as individuals, a senior commander who sits on the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)'s shura council denies either a tactical shift or a decision to deploy forces to Syria.

"There is no reality in these reports, we have far better targets in the region, NATO troops headed by the Americans are present in Afghanistan," said the unnamed TTP commander. "We support the mujahideen's struggle in Syria but in our opinion, we have a lot more to do here in Pakistan and Afghanistan."

Al-Qa'ida's Big Week in Syria

Last week al-Qa’ida’s two affiliates in Syria -- the al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant -- were in the news quite a bit.

First, on Wednesday it was reported that American-born jihadist Adam Gadahn had appeared in a new al-Qa’ida video urging Syrian rebels to reject Western assistance and turn their insurgency into a global jihad.

That same day, Ghaith Abdul-Ahad of The Guardian offered an in-depth look at al-Nusra’s strategy, including its management of resources such as the oil and gas fields and fertile agricultural areas in northeastern Syria. Initially, hearing “The Emir of Gas” describe the jihadists approach to governance is frightening, as it recalls why the Taliban was initially popular in Afghanistan, and how terrorist groups have learned the lesson from Hezbollah of the necessity of providing public services. However, as the “Emir” outlines the brutal logic behind an operation against a potentially disloyal village, and one oil worker laments that “We got rid of one despot [Bashar] and replaced him with another,” it is not so clear that they have learned from al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI)’s mistakes.

Abdul-Ahad reports that roughly 80 percent of the foreign fighters that had joined al-Nusra left after the fissure with AQI to form the ISIL. On Friday, it was revealed that this splinter group had assassinated one of the top commanders in the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in Syria’s Latakia province, one of several such attacks by the jihadists against their more secular counterparts. Initially, the FSA said this was tantamount to a declaration of war, and issued a 24-hour deadline to turn over the ISIL commander responsible. But by Sunday Al Jazeera (h/t Bill Roggio) was reporting that FSA leaders were walking back their threats, quoting a senior FSA commander as saying al-Qa’ida-affiliated fighters “are welcome if they help us fight the regime.”

Also on Friday, Bill Roggio reported that the Pakistani Taliban has deployed “experts in warfare and information technology” to assist Syrian jihadists. Wait, what? How does the TTP have the resources to do this? Has al-Qa’ida decided to shift its strategic center of gravity away from the Af/Pak region to Syria, or is this a way to fight somewhere without having to face U.S. drone strikes in the FATA? If the former, how are these operatives will transiting across theaters? If the latter, how the announced “reduction” in U.S. drone strikes and eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan affect AQ’s strategic calculus?

This also points to the inherent dangers of letting a conflict metastasize, as the question of whether or not to support the overthrow of Assad has taken on an entirely different character now that U.S. inaction has allowed the extremists to take over the rebellion against the regime. Although there are still legitimate arguments for/against assistance and/or intervention, the number of variables that we can not control either way has increased exponentially. This makes the potential margin for a successful outcome to the civil war from a U.S.-strategic perspective much, much, much narrower than it would have been if the White House had a clear idea of our interests in the region and decided which side to support in 2011, to say nothing of the humanitarian disaster that has emerged.