Over the weekend, Bloomberg reported that al-Qa'ida terror attacks have gotten so bad in Iraq (roughly 30/month over the past 90 days, with more than 3,000 killed) that Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said the government in Baghdad is seeking U.S. advisers, air surveillance, or even drone strikes to help them combat AQI/ISIL.
Conversely, over the border, the acting commander of Iran's Revolutionary Guards Basij militia has announced that the paramilitary units plan to teach drone-hunting to high school students. The AP notes that Gen. Ali Fazli did not elaborate how they would hunt the drones, but that the plan suggests students will be taught how to track and bring down UAVs by hacking their computer systems.
Alternatively, the Iranians could take a page from the good people of Deer Trail, Colorado, population 600, which two weeks ago voted on an ordnance permitting the issuance of "drone hunting" licenses. "If you don't want it to go down, don't fly it in the town," a resident told CBS. At least 157 people signed up in advance to pay the $25 fee for the honor of keeping the skies of Deer Trail UAV-free the old fashioned way . . . with shotguns (and presumably from the back of a pickup with a case of beer, which to be honest, sounds kind of fun!)
Alas, the vote apparently was tied, thereby stalling the measure so that Deer Trail will continue to remain an unattractive sanctuary for al-Qai'da for the time being.
Tuesday, August 20, 2013
Monday, August 19, 2013
Gulf Cartel Leader Captured (with Zetas Update)
The Associated Press reports that the Mexican army captured Mario Armando Ramirez Trevino, one of the contenders to lead the Gulf Cartel, in northeast Mexico near the Texas border Saturday. Although there are no details on the operation yet, or possible U.S. support, Ramirez is wanted on federal drug charges and the State Department had offered a $5 million reward for Ramirez's capture.
There has been no analysis yet (at least that I've seen) regarding how his capture will affect the Gulf Cartel. The drug empire has been weakened significantly over the past decade due to the 2003 capture of its former boss, Osiel Cardenas Guillen, and the defection and increasingly brutal competition with their former security wing, the Zetas. The cartel's previous top boss, Jorge Eduardo Costilla Sanchez, was arrested last September.
Incidentally, at Foreign Affairs.com, Dwight Dyer and Daniel Sachs provide a good analysis of the strategic consequences of Miguel Angel Trevino Morales' capture last month. Although the Zetas have traditionally relied upon a decentralized organizational structure (think more starfish than spider) that appears to negate a counter-strategy of leadership decapitation, the lack of a clear leader might also result in intra-gang competition. Like al-Qa'ida and its devolution into various affiliates, this prevents them from acting in a coordinated and strategic fashion (especially given that all of the Zetas' original leaders have been killed or captured), but means this instability may lead to increased violence at the local level. Dyer and Sachs argue that although "the arrest of Trevino may prove a devastating blow for the Zetas in Mexico," they are threatening to expand into parts of Central America that are not as well organized to fight them as are Mexican forces near the U.S. border.
 |
| Gulf Cartel leader Mario Armando Ramirez Trevino, captured Saturday near the Texas border. |
Incidentally, at Foreign Affairs.com, Dwight Dyer and Daniel Sachs provide a good analysis of the strategic consequences of Miguel Angel Trevino Morales' capture last month. Although the Zetas have traditionally relied upon a decentralized organizational structure (think more starfish than spider) that appears to negate a counter-strategy of leadership decapitation, the lack of a clear leader might also result in intra-gang competition. Like al-Qa'ida and its devolution into various affiliates, this prevents them from acting in a coordinated and strategic fashion (especially given that all of the Zetas' original leaders have been killed or captured), but means this instability may lead to increased violence at the local level. Dyer and Sachs argue that although "the arrest of Trevino may prove a devastating blow for the Zetas in Mexico," they are threatening to expand into parts of Central America that are not as well organized to fight them as are Mexican forces near the U.S. border.
The War on Terror Online (Continued)
Two months ago I linked to a collection of articles that looked at U.S. intelligence efforts to hack into and sabotage al-Qa'ida's online magazine, the debates over whether or not to shut down various terror groups' Twitter feeds, and an interview with former al-Shabaab propagandist (and Twitter aficionado) Omar Hammani.
Two interesting articles followed up on some of these topics last week. In ForeignPolicy.com, J.M. Berger has a fascinating (albeit slightly disturbing) look at how Twitter's algorithm's for recommending accounts to follow inadvertently facilitates jihadist recruitment by exposing potential extremists to more feeds they may not have previously been aware of (i.e. "If you like Ayman al-Zawahiri, you might also want to follow . . . "). Although it is possible that in time this function could be used to direct potential recruits towards dissenting Islamists, in the near term Twitter is "making extremist ideologies more accessible than ever before."
Meanwhile, the Associated Press reported on how al-Qa'ida operatives have been using secretive chat rooms and encrypted Internet message boards for planning and operational communications. The article goes into some detail as to the likely means used to evade U.S. surveillance technology. While interesting, I always have mixed feelings about this sort of reporting. On the one hand, it provides a potential source of intelligence for al-Qa'ida as to our means and methods of interception. For example, a recent profile of AQAP leader (and new al-Qa'ida general manager) Nasser al Wuhayshi stated "At the request of its sources, The Daily Beast is withholding details about the technology al Qaeda used to conduct the conference call." That's great, except obviously al-Qa'ida knows what technology it used, and therefore knows it is compromised! Unless U.S. intelligence agencies actually planted an informant on the jihadist forum in question, such reporting harms our ability to monitor their networks and disrupt future operations.
On the other hand, the disruption of this particular plot likely will force the terrorists to find new means of communication. Depending on how long this takes, it buys time to either attrit their leadership through kinetic operations or disrupt their network through other means. Of course, this only works if one assumes we will be able to crack that technology as well, which once illustrates the importance of developing human intelligence that can access these communications regardless of the technology used.
Two interesting articles followed up on some of these topics last week. In ForeignPolicy.com, J.M. Berger has a fascinating (albeit slightly disturbing) look at how Twitter's algorithm's for recommending accounts to follow inadvertently facilitates jihadist recruitment by exposing potential extremists to more feeds they may not have previously been aware of (i.e. "If you like Ayman al-Zawahiri, you might also want to follow . . . "). Although it is possible that in time this function could be used to direct potential recruits towards dissenting Islamists, in the near term Twitter is "making extremist ideologies more accessible than ever before."
Meanwhile, the Associated Press reported on how al-Qa'ida operatives have been using secretive chat rooms and encrypted Internet message boards for planning and operational communications. The article goes into some detail as to the likely means used to evade U.S. surveillance technology. While interesting, I always have mixed feelings about this sort of reporting. On the one hand, it provides a potential source of intelligence for al-Qa'ida as to our means and methods of interception. For example, a recent profile of AQAP leader (and new al-Qa'ida general manager) Nasser al Wuhayshi stated "At the request of its sources, The Daily Beast is withholding details about the technology al Qaeda used to conduct the conference call." That's great, except obviously al-Qa'ida knows what technology it used, and therefore knows it is compromised! Unless U.S. intelligence agencies actually planted an informant on the jihadist forum in question, such reporting harms our ability to monitor their networks and disrupt future operations.
On the other hand, the disruption of this particular plot likely will force the terrorists to find new means of communication. Depending on how long this takes, it buys time to either attrit their leadership through kinetic operations or disrupt their network through other means. Of course, this only works if one assumes we will be able to crack that technology as well, which once illustrates the importance of developing human intelligence that can access these communications regardless of the technology used.
Thursday, August 15, 2013
Boko Haram's Number Two Killed?
Yesterday Nigeria's Ministry of Defense announced that Nigerian soldiers had killed Momodu Bama, second-in-command of the Islamist terror group that has attacked schools, markets, and both Christian and Muslim worshippers, and has killed thousands in the past two years (including 44 in an attack on a mosque on Sunday).
This development is separate from yesterday's announcement that two Boko Haram leaders were killed in a four-hour gun battle with Nigerian forces in northeast Adamawa State. (The two had been captured a week earlier, and reportedly died when showing army officers their hideout, when the firefight erupted. Not surprisingly, this has given rise to suspicions of an extra-judicial killing).
As Reuters reports, "The military has announced the killing of senior members of the sect before, notably a spokesman called Abu Qaqa, only for a person using the same name to say he had not been killed," hence the question mark in this post's title.
This development is separate from yesterday's announcement that two Boko Haram leaders were killed in a four-hour gun battle with Nigerian forces in northeast Adamawa State. (The two had been captured a week earlier, and reportedly died when showing army officers their hideout, when the firefight erupted. Not surprisingly, this has given rise to suspicions of an extra-judicial killing).
As Reuters reports, "The military has announced the killing of senior members of the sect before, notably a spokesman called Abu Qaqa, only for a person using the same name to say he had not been killed," hence the question mark in this post's title.
Wednesday, August 14, 2013
President Obama Played Cards During Abbottabad Raid . . .
. . . according to his "body man," Reggie Love.
"Most people were like down in the Situation Room and [President Obama] was like, 'I'm not going to be down there, I can't watch this entire thing.' We must have played 15 games of spades."Given how long the raid took from takeoff in Afghanistan to completion, and how stressful the wait must have been, this isn't necessarily a damning revelation. But it is interesting that this only came out now, whereas during the 2012 campaign the President's proxies made it seem as if Obama had personally parachuted into Pakistan himself to kill Osama bin Laden.
 |
| "Hurry up, I've got a poker game to get back to!" |
WaPo on Al-Qa'ida's Expansion in Syria
On Monday Liz Sly of The Washington Post reported on AQI/The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant's "surge" into neighboring Syria, where it is expanding into territory seized by other rebel groups and carving out sanctuaries.
The article generally echoes Anne Barnard and Eric Schimitt's New York Times' piece I linked to previously, with three interesting additional pieces of information.
First, Sly cites an anonymous Lebanese security official's estimate that at least 17,000 foreigners have joined rebel forces in Syria. This is less than the 130,000 claimed by Ibrahim Talib of the Center for Strategic Studies in Damascus, but still more than the U.S. counterterrorism officials' estimates of 6,000 cited by Barnard and Schmitt. By comparison, it is estimated that there were never more than 2,000 "Afghan Arabs" fighting the Soviets in the 1980s at any one time, although Ahmed Rashid estimates in his book Taliban that the total number who fought at some point in Afghanistan was 35,000.
Given Syria's strategic location, and the fact that the Syrian civil war does not appear likely to end anytime soon, Sly quotes terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman as saying: "There are a lot of reasons to worry that Syria will emerge as an even more powerful variant of what Afghanistan was more than 30 years." Similarly, Brian Fishman of the New America Foundation notes that one reason for the ISIL's resurgence is that there are no U.S. forces hunting them down, hence "They can plan better and discipline better, and that is dangerous." Ap Apparently, neither of them read Paul Pillar's assurance that it really doesn't matter if Syria becomes an al-Qa'ida haven.
Finally, Sly notes both ISIL's brutality and their determination not to make the same mistakes in alienating the local population that turned Iraq's tribes against them. She notes that as a part of their "hearts and minds" campaign they distributed toys, including Teletubbies, at a gathering in Aleppo to mark the Eid al-Fitr. No word as to whether this included any Tinky-Winky dolls, or whether those were taken away to have a stone wall toppled on top of them.
The article generally echoes Anne Barnard and Eric Schimitt's New York Times' piece I linked to previously, with three interesting additional pieces of information.
First, Sly cites an anonymous Lebanese security official's estimate that at least 17,000 foreigners have joined rebel forces in Syria. This is less than the 130,000 claimed by Ibrahim Talib of the Center for Strategic Studies in Damascus, but still more than the U.S. counterterrorism officials' estimates of 6,000 cited by Barnard and Schmitt. By comparison, it is estimated that there were never more than 2,000 "Afghan Arabs" fighting the Soviets in the 1980s at any one time, although Ahmed Rashid estimates in his book Taliban that the total number who fought at some point in Afghanistan was 35,000.
Given Syria's strategic location, and the fact that the Syrian civil war does not appear likely to end anytime soon, Sly quotes terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman as saying: "There are a lot of reasons to worry that Syria will emerge as an even more powerful variant of what Afghanistan was more than 30 years." Similarly, Brian Fishman of the New America Foundation notes that one reason for the ISIL's resurgence is that there are no U.S. forces hunting them down, hence "They can plan better and discipline better, and that is dangerous." Ap Apparently, neither of them read Paul Pillar's assurance that it really doesn't matter if Syria becomes an al-Qa'ida haven.
Finally, Sly notes both ISIL's brutality and their determination not to make the same mistakes in alienating the local population that turned Iraq's tribes against them. She notes that as a part of their "hearts and minds" campaign they distributed toys, including Teletubbies, at a gathering in Aleppo to mark the Eid al-Fitr. No word as to whether this included any Tinky-Winky dolls, or whether those were taken away to have a stone wall toppled on top of them.
 |
| Apparently the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant does not have a strong sense of irony. |
"We Got the Operational Guys We Were After"
ABC News reports that an American drone strike has killed four suspected al-Qa'ida operatives associated with the threat that prompted the closing of U.S. embassies in the Middle East and North Africa.
U.S. officials said they believed the original threat was a possible vehicle-borne bombing attack against the U.S. Embassy in Sana'a, which remains the only embassy still closed.
The U.S. official who was ABC's source said there currently was no information to substantiate the claim that AQAP bombmaker Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri had been wounded in a recent drone strike, although the AP reported that there have been nine drone strikes in Yemen since July 27 that have killed 38 suspected militants.
U.S. officials said they believed the original threat was a possible vehicle-borne bombing attack against the U.S. Embassy in Sana'a, which remains the only embassy still closed.
The U.S. official who was ABC's source said there currently was no information to substantiate the claim that AQAP bombmaker Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri had been wounded in a recent drone strike, although the AP reported that there have been nine drone strikes in Yemen since July 27 that have killed 38 suspected militants.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)