A Rift Within Al-Qa'ida?

Jason Burke, a long-time observer of al-Qa'ida, writes in The Guardian that the selection of Saif al-Adel as "interim leader" of the terrorist network may represent a major split within militant ranks.

This raises an interesting question: is al-Qa'ida more dangerous as a hierarchical organization with a clear chain-of-command, or as a diffuse network?

The consensus has typically been that a network is more dangerous because it is harder to decapitate and is more adaptive/flexible than a hierarchy (see "The Spider and the Starfish," although that book works much better describing information networks than actual functional organizations). 

But what if the loss of the undisputed leader leads to significant infighting that strategically/operationally cripples the organization for a period of time?  Would the various al-Qa'ida franchises (AQ in the Arabian Peninsula, AQ in Islamic Magrheb, Jemaah Islamiyah in SE Asia, al Shabab in Somalia, etc). be able to coordinate the illicit networks upon which they depend to operate?

In 2006, when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed in Iraq, it took al-Qa'ida three months to settle upon a successor to lead al-Qa'ida's Iraqi franchise (AQI).  It was during that time that COL Sean MacFarland and the 1st BCT of the 1st Armored Division began the offensive in Ramadi and Sheik Sittar al-Rishawi of the Albu Risha clan (a subset of the massive Dulaimi tribe) formed the Anbar Salvation Council.  It is plausible that AQI's leadership void during this period prevented the terrorist organization from responding effectively to these challenges, and that this subsequently enabled the Anbar Awakening and eventually the U.S. Surge to succeed.* 

Theoretically, if a similar leadership void were to emerge in al-Qa'ida in the wake of bin Laden's death, and the U.S. were able to launch an offensive against its operatives and affiliates based . . . I don't know, on a newly discovered trove of intelligence, perhaps? . . . than bin Laden's death could have similar strategic significance.

But at this point, this is highly speculative at best.

*Unfortunately, lacking a reliable memoir of life inside al-Qa'ida in Iraq during this period -- if such a thing could possibly exist -- this is a completely untestable proposition.