Awl al-Awlaki, Awl the Time

Some interesting reading in the wake of the drone strike that killed Anwar al-Awlaki.

The New York Times summarizes the two-year hunt for al-Awlaki.  The money quote, in that it supports my argument that the "human terrain" is decisive in strategic manhunts:

In 2009 and 2010, Mr. Awlaki seems to have been mostly in the southern heartland of his own powerful tribe, the Awaliq, where killing him would have been politically costly for the government, and capturing him nearly impossible. The area where Mr. Awlaki was finally killed, in the remote north, did not afford him the same tribal protection. There are also many tribal leaders in the far north who receive stipends from Saudi Arabia — the terrorist group’s chief target — and who would therefore have had more motive to assist in killing him.

The hunt for Mr. Awlaki has involved some close calls, including the failed American drone strike in May, and the previously unreported operation in the Yemeni village. Yemen’s elite counterterrorism commandos, backed by weapons from Yemen’s regular armed forces, formed a ring around the town as commanders began negotiating with local leaders to hand Mr. Awlaki over, said one member of the unit.

“We stayed a whole week, but the villagers were supporting him,” said the counterterrorism officer, who is not authorized to speak on the record. “The local people began firing on us, and we fired back, and while it was happening, they helped him to escape.”

The Washington Post weighs in with two articles.  One noting the strike demonstrates the increased cooperation between the CIA and the JSOC, another highlighting the Obama administration's legal justification for killing an American citizen absent a conviction in an American court: 

“As a general matter, it would be entirely lawful for the United States to target high-level leaders of enemy forces, regardless of their nationality, who are plotting to kill Americans both under the authority provided by Congress in its use of military force in the armed conflict with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces as well as established international law that recognizes our right of self-defense,” an administration official said in a statement Friday.

Although there is no real doubt that Awlaki was actively targeting U.S. civilians for attack, it is not difficult to imagine how this precedent could be abused in the future in a less-clear cut case.  A serious and useful debate on this question is taking place over at National Review Online between Andrew McCarthy (pro) and Kevin Williamson (con). 

Finally, an interesting contrast of views on the strategic significance of the strike.  In Foreign Policy, Daniel Byman argues al-Awlaki's death is a signficant blow to al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula.  In The Daily Beast,  Bruce Hoffman argues it is nothing more than a glancing blow to AQAP, and that al-Awlaki was more effective as a communicator than an operational leader.

Although I think Hoffman is correct that the threat posed by AQAP is not over, I tend to agree more with Byman.  Awlaki was unique because of his ability to radicalize and inspire American Muslims, who once recruited into the various al-Qa'ida affiliates or cells, pose a greater risk to U.S. security than foreign jihadists.  (Here I'll add the obligatory disclaimer that 99.9% of American Muslims pose zero threat whatsoever, which is absolutely true, but also masks the significance of the threat posed by those who are radicalized).  Awlaki inspired not only AQAP attacks against the U.S. homeland, but also the deadliest attack on U.S. soil since 9/11 (Nidal Hussein's lone wolf shooting spree at Fort Hood in 2009) and Faisal Shahzad's failed May 2010 attack in Times Square, conducted under the auspices of the Tehrik-E-Taliban (the Pakistani Taliban).  This represents more significant attacks than al-Qa'ida core under Osama bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri has been able to conduct in the last five years. 

Moreover, if the Associated Press is correct that AQAP bombmaker Ibrahim Hassan Tali al-Asiri was also killed in the attack, this represents a significant blow to AQAP's operational capacity.  Al-Asiri was widely believed to be something of an evil genius when it came to bomb design, creating the innovative explosive device hidden in his brother's . . . um, well, ass . . . that wounded Saudi Prince Muhammad bin Nayef bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, the Deputy Minister of the Interior, in February 2009.  He also designed the "underwear bomb" that made it onto a transatlantic flight in December 2009, and the printer cartridge bombs from November 2010.  Although AQAP undoubtedly has other bombmakers, it will take some time before any of them acquire al-Asiri's skill level. 

Consequently, the drone strike may have killed several AQAP leaders that possessed unique skills that contributed to that affiliate's lethality, and which can not be quickly replaced.

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