If you haven't read it already, pour yourself a drink and settle down to read Eric Schmidle's piece on the SEALs Abbottabad raid in The New Yorker.
Go ahead, I'll wait.
We can discuss this tomorrow after you've had a chance to digest it, but for now, just know that his account surpasses Kimberly Dozier's May 17 article as the definitive account of the raid, and if I get to write a revised/expanded edition of "Wanted Dead or Alive," will be cited heavily.
But for now, just enjoy the kick-ass!
Monday, August 1, 2011
Al-Qa'ida on the Brink? Two Dissents
The Los Angeles Times provides some additional reporting on Douglas E. Lute's appearance at the Aspen Security Forum Friday, quoting the lieutenant general as saying "I think there are three to five senior leaders that, if they're removed from the battlefield, would jeopardize Al Qaeda's capacity to regenerate."
Two dissenting views garnered some attention last week. Previously, on Thursday retired Admiral Dennis C. Blair, who was forced out last year as Director of National Intelligence, told the same forum that the United States should end the drone war in Pakistan. "It's not going to lower the threat to the U.S.," he said, because al-Qa'ida has proved "it can sustain its level of resistance to an air-only campaign." Instead, Blair believes that cooperation with the government's of Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia is the only way to bring peace to the world's ungoverned spaces. He goes so far as to say that drone strikes in Pakistan need "two hands on the trigger," and should be launched only when "we agree with them on what drone attacks" should target.
Umm, yeah.
Apparently, Admiral Blair hasn't heard about the planned operations against jihadist IED factories in Pakistan that failed either due to poor operational security or deliberate tip-offs after the United States shared the intelligence with the Pakistanis, precisely the "dual-trigger" relationship Blair envisions. Also, Blair fails to consider that one way of changing conditions on the ground for the better in failed or at-risk states is precisely by killing the extremists who seek to terrorize the local population and undermine the legitimate authorities through terrorist attacks and intimidation. Does Blair really think that al-Qa'ida activists in these countries would be less interested in attacking the United States if we worked more closely with governments they consider apostates against their version of the true Islam?
Second, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross writes in National Review Online that statements such as Lute's (or earlier, Secretary Panetta) regarding al-Qa'ida's vulnerability should be taken with a large grain of salt given that U.S. officials have said the terrorist organization was on the ropes several times before over the last decade. I think Gartenstein-Ross's point about the failure of previous intelligence assessments is correct, but ignores the key point I noted earlier of distinguishing between AQSL and al-Qa'ida's affiliates.
The idea that we may be "three to five senior leaders" away from permanently crippling the core of the group based in Pakistan may be true (as if killing/capturing those 3-5 were an easy task in its own right), but this won't necessarily impinge upon the various affiliates' -- al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al-Qa'ida in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb,or al-Sha'baab -- ability to target U.S. interests or the homeland itself. These are not mutually exclusive developments.
Indeed, although we likely disagree regarding Osama bin Laden's importantce at the time of the Abbottabad raid, I think Gartenstein-Ross would agree that even with bin Laden dead, bin Ladenism lives on, and hence in terms of counter-terrorism policy little has changed since May 1 as we continue to target the broader network.
Two dissenting views garnered some attention last week. Previously, on Thursday retired Admiral Dennis C. Blair, who was forced out last year as Director of National Intelligence, told the same forum that the United States should end the drone war in Pakistan. "It's not going to lower the threat to the U.S.," he said, because al-Qa'ida has proved "it can sustain its level of resistance to an air-only campaign." Instead, Blair believes that cooperation with the government's of Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia is the only way to bring peace to the world's ungoverned spaces. He goes so far as to say that drone strikes in Pakistan need "two hands on the trigger," and should be launched only when "we agree with them on what drone attacks" should target.
Umm, yeah.
Apparently, Admiral Blair hasn't heard about the planned operations against jihadist IED factories in Pakistan that failed either due to poor operational security or deliberate tip-offs after the United States shared the intelligence with the Pakistanis, precisely the "dual-trigger" relationship Blair envisions. Also, Blair fails to consider that one way of changing conditions on the ground for the better in failed or at-risk states is precisely by killing the extremists who seek to terrorize the local population and undermine the legitimate authorities through terrorist attacks and intimidation. Does Blair really think that al-Qa'ida activists in these countries would be less interested in attacking the United States if we worked more closely with governments they consider apostates against their version of the true Islam?
Second, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross writes in National Review Online that statements such as Lute's (or earlier, Secretary Panetta) regarding al-Qa'ida's vulnerability should be taken with a large grain of salt given that U.S. officials have said the terrorist organization was on the ropes several times before over the last decade. I think Gartenstein-Ross's point about the failure of previous intelligence assessments is correct, but ignores the key point I noted earlier of distinguishing between AQSL and al-Qa'ida's affiliates.
The idea that we may be "three to five senior leaders" away from permanently crippling the core of the group based in Pakistan may be true (as if killing/capturing those 3-5 were an easy task in its own right), but this won't necessarily impinge upon the various affiliates' -- al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al-Qa'ida in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb,or al-Sha'baab -- ability to target U.S. interests or the homeland itself. These are not mutually exclusive developments.
Indeed, although we likely disagree regarding Osama bin Laden's importantce at the time of the Abbottabad raid, I think Gartenstein-Ross would agree that even with bin Laden dead, bin Ladenism lives on, and hence in terms of counter-terrorism policy little has changed since May 1 as we continue to target the broader network.
Saturday, July 30, 2011
The Associated Press Reviews "Wanted Dead or Alive"
This positive review is significant, because a lot of big-city papers without independent book sections, and small-to-mid-sized city papers will run the AP's review:
"Wanted Dead or Alive: Manhunts From Geronimo to bin Laden" (Palgrave Macmillan), by Benjamin Runkle: When U.S. Navy SEALs last spring ended a seemingly endless manhunt by killing Osama bin Laden in his hide-out in an affluent suburb north of Pakistan's capital, the world learned that the code name given to the al-Qaida leader during that operation was Geronimo.
Although the designation upset some Native Americans, it had some compelling logic. The strategic manhunt launched by U.S. forces 125 years ago was targeted at Geronimo, the tribal warrior whose savage attacks on American settlers in the Southwest made him the target of Army troops who pursued him on both sides of the border with Mexico.
The hunts for Geronimo and bin Laden were centered in borderlands that included rugged, mountainous terrain. The Apache leader, for whom the government posted a $25,000 reward, surrendered in 1886 after evading U.S. and Mexican troops for more than a year. In contrast, the quest for bin Laden, who had a $25 million bounty on his head, went on for 13 years.
Benjamin Runkle, an ex-paratrooper and presidential speechwriter now on the staff of the House Armed Services Committee, details the hunts for Geronimo, bin Laden and other targeted individuals in Asia, Africa and the Americas. They include Filipino rebel leader Emilio Aguinaldo, Mexican bandit Pancho Villa, Panamanian strongman and drug dealer Manuel Noriega and deposed Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.
Although there is no shortage of books about bin Laden, Runkle breaks new ground by putting his story in the context of earlier manhunts that are surely less familiar to most readers.
"Wanted Dead or Alive" may be most appealing to those with an interest in military history, but should also find favor with a broader readership drawn to lesser known episodes in the nation's past.
Most of the manhunts detailed in the book came to a successful conclusion. The author goes on to weigh the various elements that make for such an outcome, assigning less importance to factors such as technology and terrain and more to what he regards as the potential key to success: actionable human intelligence that can locate the target.
That was certainly the case with bin Laden, whose trail went cold in the mountains of Tora Bora. He met his end after interrogated detainees identified one of his trusted couriers. Likewise, help from one of Saddam's security officers led searchers to the spider hole where he was hiding out.
Geronimo's fate was far different. After constant pursuit by Army troops, he surrendered and eventually became a celebrity, appearing at Wild West shows and participating in Theodore Roosevelt's inaugural parade.
There have been nearly a dozen deployments of U.S. military forces whose missions were to kill or capture one specific person. At a time when leaders of terrorist groups or rogue states may pose the most immediate threats to U.S. security, Runkle predicts that the most recent manhunt will not be the last.
"Long after the operation that killed Osama bin Laden has faded into history, strategic manhunts will remain an important problem for U.S. policymakers and military officials alike," he concludes.
Is Al Qaeda Finished?
There have been a slew of articles over the last few weeks (all of which I've been negligent in commenting on, as I've been swamped and traveling for the day job) quoting Obama administration officials who suggest we are on the brink of defeating al-Qa'ida. Several weeks ago, while visiting troops in Afghanistan, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta declared that “we’re within reach of strategically defeating al-Qaeda," and yesterday former general and current Deputy National Security Adviser for Afghanistan/Pakistan Douglas E. Lute said the United States has six months to "knock out" al-Qa'ida's leadership while it is in disarray following Osama bin Laden's killing.
It is significant that both policymakers and intelligence community officials are even broaching this topic, but there are two important caveats to consider. First, nobody is suggesting that bin Laden's death alone represents the strategic defeat of al-Qa'ida. Instead, most officials place greater if not equal emphasis on the sustained decapitation campaign via drone strikes against al-Qa'ida's senior leadership, largely in Pakistan. This is consistent with my finding in "Wanted Dead or Alive" that killing/capturing the individual targeted by a strategic manhunt is not as important as eliminating the support network that made him strategically effective in the first place. Thus, although killing bin Laden may have been necessary -- if for no other reason than to shatter his mythology -- by itself it was not sufficient to defeat al-Qa'ida. However, the drone strikes that as of 2010 had killed 9 out of 20 of the terrorist organization's leaders (this number is higher by at least one now, but is currently highly classified) have the same devastating effect that capturing Filipino insurgent generals or Pancho Villa's deputies did more than a century ago.
Second, it is critical to distinguish between "AQSL" (al-Qa'ida senior leadership) and al-Qa'ida. AQSL is the leadership core that created the terror network and led it to the height of its threat on September 11, 2001. This core was dispersed beginning with the October 2001 bombing campaign/invasion of Afghanistan, and has been on the run ever since, its strategic effectiveness diminishing over the course of the decade as an increasing number of its leaders were killed. Yet while this cohort may be on the verge of defeat, al-Qa'ida writ large is far from finished, as the affiliates assume greater capability and autonomy. As the head of the National Counter Terrorism Center Michael Leiter told the House Homeland Security Committee in February, Al Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and its charismatic spiritual leader Anwar al-Awlaki are "probably the most significant risk to the U.S. homeland." Thus, even if we are successful in devastating AQSL in Pakistan during the rest of the year, the terrorist threat against the United States will still be significant. In other words, although bin Laden may be dead, "bin Ladenism" will live on for the foreseeable future.
It is significant that both policymakers and intelligence community officials are even broaching this topic, but there are two important caveats to consider. First, nobody is suggesting that bin Laden's death alone represents the strategic defeat of al-Qa'ida. Instead, most officials place greater if not equal emphasis on the sustained decapitation campaign via drone strikes against al-Qa'ida's senior leadership, largely in Pakistan. This is consistent with my finding in "Wanted Dead or Alive" that killing/capturing the individual targeted by a strategic manhunt is not as important as eliminating the support network that made him strategically effective in the first place. Thus, although killing bin Laden may have been necessary -- if for no other reason than to shatter his mythology -- by itself it was not sufficient to defeat al-Qa'ida. However, the drone strikes that as of 2010 had killed 9 out of 20 of the terrorist organization's leaders (this number is higher by at least one now, but is currently highly classified) have the same devastating effect that capturing Filipino insurgent generals or Pancho Villa's deputies did more than a century ago.
Second, it is critical to distinguish between "AQSL" (al-Qa'ida senior leadership) and al-Qa'ida. AQSL is the leadership core that created the terror network and led it to the height of its threat on September 11, 2001. This core was dispersed beginning with the October 2001 bombing campaign/invasion of Afghanistan, and has been on the run ever since, its strategic effectiveness diminishing over the course of the decade as an increasing number of its leaders were killed. Yet while this cohort may be on the verge of defeat, al-Qa'ida writ large is far from finished, as the affiliates assume greater capability and autonomy. As the head of the National Counter Terrorism Center Michael Leiter told the House Homeland Security Committee in February, Al Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and its charismatic spiritual leader Anwar al-Awlaki are "probably the most significant risk to the U.S. homeland." Thus, even if we are successful in devastating AQSL in Pakistan during the rest of the year, the terrorist threat against the United States will still be significant. In other words, although bin Laden may be dead, "bin Ladenism" will live on for the foreseeable future.
Tuesday, July 26, 2011
Billy Waugh on bin Laden
Speaking of the adulation of bin Laden's followers, here are Special Forces' legend Billy Waugh observations while surveilling the Saudi mastermind for the CIA in Khartoum in the early 1990s:*
*From Billy Waugh, Hunting the Jackal, pp. 204-205.
As I sat across the street, watching and photographing him from the roof of my OP [Observation Post], I observed the way his followers treated him. . . . He sat cross-leged facing them, and they sat cross-legged facing him. The followers -- twenty to twenty-five of them in this location -- sat there mesmerized, silent, mouths half-opened, listening to thier messiah as if it were Mohammed himself diong the speaking. It was as if he cast a spell every day at this same time and they -- loyal followers all -- fell into a dutiful trance.Waugh concludes:
My attitude toward bin Laden at the time was based on teh way his people responded to him. The more I saw, the more concerned I became. They came up to him like you wouldn't believe. Watching them was enough to make you uncomforable, even a little disturbed. . . . They believed -- I watched them believe -- and the next step after believing is following. To them, following meant doing whatever it took to make his wishes come true.Again, this helps to explain why it was so difficult to obtain human intelligence on bin Laden, and hence why the strategic manhunt took thirteen years to successfully complete.
*From Billy Waugh, Hunting the Jackal, pp. 204-205.
Warrick's "The Triple Agent"
An interesting review of Washington Post reporter Joby Warrick's new book, "The Triple Agent," about the suicide bombing of the CIA's outpost near Khost, Afghanistan, that killed eight Agency employees. The review is interesting for two reasons:
First, the Post (to its credit) allows the reviewer to say some really negative things about one of their own, i.e.
Whereas Aguinaldo, Noriega, or Saddam's locations were ultimately revealed by a trusted subordinate, the CIA was unable to recruit a single asset with access to bin Laden’s inner circle despite several years of effort. As former senior U.S. counterterror official Roger Cressey told Peter Bergen, an al-Qa'ida operative betraying bin Laden would be like “a Catholic giving up the Pope.” Abdel Bari Atwan, editor of Al Quds al Arabi newspaper, similarly reflected: “I don’t believe they will surrender him. He’s adored by the people around him. For them, he is not a leader. He is everything. He’s the father; he’s the brother; he is a leader; he is the imam.”
This desperation led Agency officials to overlook several red flags that should have alerted them to the fact that Humam Khalil al-Balawi had returned to the jihadist fold and was feeding them false information, and ultimately to the loss of eight courageous Americans.
First, the Post (to its credit) allows the reviewer to say some really negative things about one of their own, i.e.
"Warrick’s account is . . . sometimes prone to the lazy phrase (“eye-popping,” “blowing off steam”), descriptive rather than reflective, anonymous in voice rather than textured and, notwithstanding the gutsy ending-first structure, undaring of prose. He has a skill with words but lacks a felicity with them, and he is not much interested in exploring the large moral questions his tale raises.Second, although the reviewer may be critical of Warrick's prose, he praises Warrick on the book's substance, especially the depiction of the CIA's desperation to get a human source close to the al-Qa'ida senior leadership. As I note in my book, one of the reasons it took so long to get bin Laden was the adulation he enjoyed throughout all levels of al-Qa'ida.
"He is also firmly establishmentarian. . . . He also lapses now and then into stenographic journalism"
Whereas Aguinaldo, Noriega, or Saddam's locations were ultimately revealed by a trusted subordinate, the CIA was unable to recruit a single asset with access to bin Laden’s inner circle despite several years of effort. As former senior U.S. counterterror official Roger Cressey told Peter Bergen, an al-Qa'ida operative betraying bin Laden would be like “a Catholic giving up the Pope.” Abdel Bari Atwan, editor of Al Quds al Arabi newspaper, similarly reflected: “I don’t believe they will surrender him. He’s adored by the people around him. For them, he is not a leader. He is everything. He’s the father; he’s the brother; he is a leader; he is the imam.”
This desperation led Agency officials to overlook several red flags that should have alerted them to the fact that Humam Khalil al-Balawi had returned to the jihadist fold and was feeding them false information, and ultimately to the loss of eight courageous Americans.
Tuesday, July 19, 2011
The Haqqani Network
A couple of good pieces about the Haqqani Network that highlight the group's affiliation with al-Qa'ida:
In the National Journal, Yochi J. Dreazen provides a good summary of the Haqqani Network's history and their relationship with Pakistani intelligence. He also correctly notes the transfer of operational leadership from Jalaluddin Haqqani -- whom the United States was able to work with when he was an anti-Soviet mujaheddin in the 1980s -- to his son Sirajuddin, who is much closer to al-Qa'ida ideologically and much more ambitious and vicious in terms of target selection. Consequently, the U.S. has offered $5 million for information leading to Sirajuddin's death or capture.
A bit more advanced analysis comes from West Point's Combating Terrorism Center, which analyzes jihadist magazines, old digital videos, and jihadist memoirs to conclude that since the 1980s, the Haqqani Network has provided sanctuary, training, propaganda support, and other resources for al-Qa'ida fighters. The CTC concludes that "U.S. efforts to disrupt and degrade [al-Qa'ida] today . . . are just as much about dismantling [al-Qa'ida] as they are about degrading the Haqqani network."
In the National Journal, Yochi J. Dreazen provides a good summary of the Haqqani Network's history and their relationship with Pakistani intelligence. He also correctly notes the transfer of operational leadership from Jalaluddin Haqqani -- whom the United States was able to work with when he was an anti-Soviet mujaheddin in the 1980s -- to his son Sirajuddin, who is much closer to al-Qa'ida ideologically and much more ambitious and vicious in terms of target selection. Consequently, the U.S. has offered $5 million for information leading to Sirajuddin's death or capture.
A bit more advanced analysis comes from West Point's Combating Terrorism Center, which analyzes jihadist magazines, old digital videos, and jihadist memoirs to conclude that since the 1980s, the Haqqani Network has provided sanctuary, training, propaganda support, and other resources for al-Qa'ida fighters. The CTC concludes that "U.S. efforts to disrupt and degrade [al-Qa'ida] today . . . are just as much about dismantling [al-Qa'ida] as they are about degrading the Haqqani network."
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