Although I still maintain that domestic and strategic manhunts are not wholly analogous, I think this piece reinforces three points I've made in my work:
1- Troop strength is not determinative of success in manhunts. In the day after the initial shootout with the Tsarnaev brothers, authorities had thousands of officers sweeping the contained area in Watertown. But Dzhokar had already broken out of that area, and if he had just kept moving might very well have evaded capture that day/night. (Of course, if the brothers had had half a brain between them they would have been in Canada or some other urban area by the time their photos appeared everywhere instead of partying in Dartmouth, MA);
2 - Technology is of limited value in strategic manhunts. Schonely, author of Apprehending Fleeing Suspects admits that "a heat signature [from Forward Looking Infrared] is rarely clear enough to identify as a human being" and that the incorporation of air units into manhunts can make patrolmen "overconfident."
3 - Human intelligence is still of primary importance. It was the tip from a homeowner regarding the cover on his boat that led the air units to the driveway outside the containment area in the first place, and more importantly, the Tsarnaevs do not appear to have had some place they could go where people would have voluntarily helped them to hide (in Watertown, at least).
Again, I hesitate to make this case too strongly, especially because the Tsarnaev's made so many missteps. But a cursory glance certainly does highlight some commonalities that may be useful for commanders and policymakers in the future.
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