Stealth Drones and Technology in Manhunts

A Washington Post story today revealing that stealth drones kept watch over bin Laden's Abbottabad compound is getting a lot of attention. While the development of such a drone would be significant, especially because bin Laden had appeared to have "drone-proofed" the compound by building it within range of Islamabad's air defense exclusion zone, it is not clear how this new gee-whiz technology specifically contributed to the successful raid.* 

Although the CIA "conducted clandestine flights over the compound for months before the May 2 assault in an effort to capture high-resolution video that satellites could not provide," the article goes on to admit that "the CIA never obtained a photograph of bin Laden at the compound or other direct confirmation of his presence before the assault."  And while the reporter notes "the agency concluded after months of watching the complex that the figure frequently seen pacing back and forth was probably the al-Qaeda chief," nothing in the article contradicts Bob Woodward's story in the Post on May 6 reporting that the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency could only estimate that man suspected to be bin Laden was somewhere between 5-foot-8 and 6-foot-8. 

In other words, given that there was human surveillance of the compound, and that the RQ-170 did not provide actual confirmation of bin Laden's process, it is not clear what the "Stealth Drone" contributed to the hunt. 

This is not to say this isn't a useful piece of technology, but rather that the story reinforces a key finding of my book, which is that technology is never a decisive factor in a strategic manhunt.  Ever since General Miles erected heliograph stations throughout the area of operations in the Geronimo Campaign, U.S forces have attempted to exploit their relative advantage in technology while engaged in strategic manhunts. Yet there is little-to-no correlation between advances in technology levels and operational success. Funston was able to capture Aguinaldo even though U.S. forces in the Philippines enjoyed no significant technological advantage over the Filipino insurgents, whereas Pershing failed to catch Pancho Villa despite being equipped with planes, trucks, and radios.

The United States enjoyed perhaps its greatest relative advantage in technology during the four-month pursuit of Aideed in Somalia. Task Force Ranger had access to the full range of U.S. intelligence capabilities and assets, including sensors that previous generations of raiders “could only dream about.” The Centra Spike signals intelligence team was pulled off the hunt for Colombian drug lord Pablo Escobar in order to assist the search for Aideed. Theater and joint task force imagery assets included the navy’s tactical airborne reconnaissance pod system (TARPS) slung under low-flying jet aircraft; a specially modified Navy P3 Orion patrol plane; a single-engine superquiet airplane with a real-time downlink to JTF HQ; the Pioneer unmanned aerial vehicle with a downlink to the JOC, and the Night Hawk ground FLIR system. All the observation birds were equipped with video cameras and radio equipment that would relay the action live to the JOC, meaning MG William Garrison and his staff had more instant information about unfolding operations than any commander in history.

Yet the highly sophisticated technological assets utilized by Task Force Ranger were ultimately ineffective because it could not pick up the low technology used by Somalis. Aideed communicated with his militia by using either couriers or dated walkie-talkies too low-powered to be detected by the sophisticated American electronic eavesdropping equipment. In other words, Somalia’s complete and utter technological backwardness actually was an asset to Aideed.

Even in cases such as the Saddam and Zarqawi manhunts where high degrees of absolute technology positively correlate to operational success, these technologies played only a peripheral role. U.S. forces hunting Saddam and Zarqawi possessed satellites that recorded suspicious changes in the Iraqi terrain, spy aircraft scoured hiding spots with thermal scans, and UAVs fed live video to military headquarters in Iraq. The radar in Apache helicopters, originally designed to target moving tanks, was reprogrammed to track cars and detect unusual traffic patterns, such as fast-moving convoys. And the RC-135 River Joint aircraft – a converted Boeing 707 loaded with antennae for picking up electronic communications – flew over Iraq for up to 10 hours at a time, detecting signals up to 230 miles away and pinpointing the source of the conversation to within one-to-three miles. But this advanced technology contributed little to the successful conclusion of the Iraqi manhunts. Saddam and his sons were extremely careful not to use phones or other communications equipment that might give their positions away. Other than the single phone call intercepted during the raid that killed his sons, there were reportedly few, if any, direct intercepts of Saddam available. Similarly, Zarqawi knew how much the Americans relied on high technology to track down suspects: he and his men refrained from using cell phones, knowing how easily they could be tracked.

This is not to say that technology is never useful during manhunts.  In broader targeted killing campaigns such as those being conducted against secondary al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders it is invaluable.  Whereas senior leaders such as Saddam, Zarqawi, or bin Laden can effectively go "off the net," their lieutenants do not have this luxury, and have to communicate in order to be functionally effective. 

But Lieutenant General Lance Smith, former Deputy Commander of CENTCOM once noted that one of the reasons U.S. forces have difficulty getting the leadership of al Qaeda "is because they recognize that technology is not their friend.”  Or as former Delta Force commander Pete Blaber argues in his memoir: “The reality and complexity of life virtually guarantee there will never be” an all-purpose technological panacea for finding people.  “Instead, these types of capabilities should be looked at as part of an overall system.  A buffet of capabilities that could be used in combination with our guys working the situation on the ground to assist in the vexing challenge of locating a wanted man.”

*If I'm wrong and the RQ0170 was the key to the whole operation, than it is a good thing that its specific role is murky.  However, there probably isn't anybody left alive in al-Qaeda who doesn't already know to be aware of drones.