Operation RESTORE HOPE, launched in December 1992 by President George H.W. Bush to deliver humanitarian supplies in Somalia, was a resounding success. The worst of the famine in southern Somalia was over, thanks to the acceleration of humanitarian relief operations following the arrival of coalition forces. On May 4, 2003, the U.S.-led UNITAF transferred command of operations in Somalia to the U.N.-led UNOSOM II.
Yet whereas UNITAF had a mission limited to protecting relief operations, the Security Council Resolution (814) authorizing UNOSOM II committed the UN to more expansive national reconstruction and political reconciliation goals and charged UNSOM II to disarm the Somali clans. Thus, instead of the more traditional peacekeeping, UNOSOM II's mission would be one of “peace enforcement,” in which warlords could be compelled to disarm.
This shift in mission especially threatened the leader of the Habr Gidr clan, Muhammad Farah Aideed, who saw himself as having liberated Somalia from Siad Barre's dictatorship and himself entitled to be Somalia’s future leader. Understanding clearly that the UN’s plan necessitated a weakening of his military power and political status, and perceiving that UN-led forces would be weaker than UNITAF, Aideed calculated that his ambitions to lead Somalia could best be furthered by striking out violently against the peacekeepers.
This calculation and the events that followed would set him on a course to become the target of America's first strategic manhunt in the Muslim world.
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